2025年1月26日，星期日，第1168期

美国务卿鲁比奥称，或对阿塔高层发布巨额悬赏，对方方面面，尤其是俄罗斯发出了怎样的信号？

【媒体报道】

1月25日，美国国务卿鲁比奥表示，美国可能会针对阿富汗塔利班领导层发布“巨额赏金”，并补充说“可能比对（‘基地’组织前头目）本·拉登的赏金还高”。截至发稿前，暂未看到阿富汗临时政府对此作出回应。

【讨论纪要】

●美国历届政府在对外政策上“核心目标”从未改变，调整的只是具体执行的“方式方法”

美国国务卿鲁比奥就阿富汗塔利班的相关言论值得大家关注。在我们的观察与评估中，鲁比奥向方方面面，尤其是俄罗斯传递出以下一组强烈信号：

第一，用本·拉登做例子，影射阿塔政权。前者被美国击毙，且死无葬身之地，后者，阿塔政权的下场如何不言自明。也就是说，特朗普政府就阿塔政权，发出了“追杀令”；

第二，在“第一”的基础上，如果说美国前总统拜登于2021年9月14日正式宣布的是美军从阿富汗全面撤军，那么这次，特朗普政府正在做的就是高调宣扬美国将“重返阿富汗”；

第三，在“第二”的基础上，无论是拜登政府在2021年玩的那出“美军撤离阿富汗”，还是今天特朗普政府玩的“美国重返阿富汗”，其核心都在于瞄着俄罗斯至今不肯实质性放弃的“阿富汗政策小九九”做文章；

第一，在“第三”的基础上，2021年，拜登政府在美军撤离阿富汗后，意图通过“威逼利诱，威逼为主”的方式，迫使俄罗斯同意提供“莫斯科通道”（针对阿富汗问题），核心目的在于实质性解构中俄战略互信。然而，事与愿违，由于俄罗斯拒绝提供“莫斯科通道”，最终导致2022年2月24日，俄乌战争的爆发。某种意义上说，俄乌战争的爆发意味着拜登政府玩的那出“美军撤离阿富汗”在“方式方法”层面是行不通的。于是，在2025年，特朗普政府上任伊始，就美国阿富汗政策进行“微调”，采取的方式是“威逼利诱，利诱为主”。甚至我们可以说，特朗普政府基于“美国或战略收缩”及“合纵连横、远交近攻”欲对俄罗斯进行“极限拉拢”（至少在客观层面，特朗普政府继续玩“合纵连横”策略的可能性进一步增加）。但同样想迫使俄罗斯同意提供“莫斯科通道”，核心目的仍在于实质性解构中俄战略互信。由此大家不难看出，美国历届政府在对外政策上是如何进行协调的。也就是说，“核心目标”从未改变，调整的只是具体执行的“方式方法”。

●这份恐惧是如此的清晰，以至于在3年前，俄罗斯宁可发动对乌特别军事行动，也不愿意向美国提供“莫斯科通道”

第二，“极限拉拢”不代表没有“大棒”，某种程度上说，“大棒”和“胡萝卜”是一体的。也就是说，如果我们将“只要俄罗斯可以配合，提供‘莫斯科通道’，乌克兰问题好说”视为“胡萝卜”的话，那么，反过来“如果俄罗斯拒不配合，那么乌克兰问题只有‘更糟糕’，没有‘最糟糕’”。具体案例就是乌克兰总统泽连斯基所说的，至少需要欧洲国家派遣20万名士兵充当维和部队。

值得一提的是，这种情况，东方时事解读早有评估，那就是北约欲用从俄罗斯库尔斯克地区全面撤军，换取北约公开、成建制进入乌克兰。且其中内嵌了基于“求其上，得其中”的致命陷阱——只要俄罗斯始终不做出“有效反击”，这种以“核武装乌克兰”为支撑的“嵌套式核讹诈”（以“核武装乌克兰”为战略支撑，用与之相比更具操作性的以扎波罗热核电站为代表的乌克兰境内核电站之安全问题作为直接对俄罗斯进行核讹诈的手段）与基于常规层面的“嵌套式战略讹诈”（以“嵌套式核讹诈”为战略支撑，与之相比更具操作性的常规手段，如，推动波罗的海“北约内海化”，军事打击克里米亚大桥等作为直接对俄罗斯进行战略讹诈的手段）可以将俄罗斯“一吃到底”。

所谓“一吃到底”的意思就在于，如果在整个过程中，俄罗斯都能忍，那么与上述“嵌套式核讹诈”“嵌套式战略讹诈”同步施行的“伴随战略进攻的战略测试”将会取得巨大成果，比如，俄白联盟被瓦解，实质性解除俄罗斯核威慑的有效性。

值得一提的是，对于乌克兰总统泽连斯基有关“至少需要20万‘欧洲军队’用于维和”的说法，俄罗斯外交部表示，不会接受北约在俄乌停火后向乌克兰部署维和部队，此举可能导致“不可控的局势升级”。

也许俄罗斯决策层恐怕对什么是“将俄罗斯一吃到底”有一定清醒认识，不过在我们的观察与评估中，俄罗斯拒绝的主要原因或不在于特朗普提出的乌克兰问题停火协议，而在于俄罗斯惧怕中国。或者说，惧怕的是，一旦俄罗斯牺牲中国核心利益与西方媾和，则必然被中国送上“被西方实质性消化的快车道”。这份恐惧是如此的清晰，以至于在3年前，俄罗斯宁可发动对乌特别军事行动，也不愿意向美国提供“莫斯科通道”。

●在传统安全层面，对于美国而言，一旦进行“战略收缩”，同样如同“红巨星”一样，“塌缩”就在一瞬之间

除了中国因素之外，美，欧，俄之间也存在着不可调和的矛盾，这使得他们很难团结一心，一致对外。

特朗普的行事特点，虽有“假公济私”的一面，但客观上，有时也会出现“处理‘私事’的过程中捎带兼顾‘公事’”的奇特现象。“假公济私”很好理解，比如，出于“内部清算”问题“干掉”美国前国务卿蓬佩奥。处理‘私事’的过程中捎带兼顾‘公事’”的意思则在于，在特朗普政府急于稳住中东的前提下，其不仅要进一步拉拢以色列，拉拢沙特，拉住土耳其，更要与欧盟妥协，可谓“难度系数极高”。在这个过程中，如果真的需要“献祭”伊朗的“人头”，将“蓬佩奥之死”栽赃伊朗当局是最佳理由，这恐怕是近段时间伊朗当局陷入“越想投降，就越觉得危险，越危险就越想着投降”之“怪圈”的主要原因之一。

对俄罗斯来说，如果其敢于接受特朗普的方案（判断指标是俄罗斯提供“莫斯科通道”），俄罗斯恐将变为“第二个伊朗”。且特朗普会立刻访华，缓和对华关系。对于这样的俄罗斯，国际社会完全可以对伊朗一样“不管不问”。甚至在必要时，即便俄、伊不想要，国际社会也会着眼于拉高其余西方媾和成本“强行”给予“战略策应”。

在我们看来，在特朗普正式走马上任之前，在其决定打算玩什么“战略收缩”的那一刻就已经注定必然失败。因为特朗普不管怎么玩，无论是对内，还是对外，与中国缓和关系都是基本前提，在这个前提下，美、欧、俄更难团结一心。美国在格陵兰岛问题上警告欧盟，如果欧盟不配合美国就联合俄罗斯。这也是美、欧、俄不可能团结一心的具体表现。这类似于解放战争中，蒋介石“中央军”和“杂牌军”之间的复杂关系。

特朗普治下的美国想要重返阿富汗不容易，但不妨碍特朗普将其作为玩“合纵连横、远交近攻”策略的“操作平台”。至于“特朗普们”玩“合纵连横、远交近攻”的真实目的，我们也已做出初步评估，那就是以此为战略支撑，加紧对内最大限度榨取美国平台的“剩余价值”为自己所在的小集团牟利。对于美国这个世界霸权而言，一旦进行战略收缩，同样如同“红巨星”一样，“塌缩”就在一瞬之间。

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声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Sunday, January 26, 2025, Issue No. 1168

US Secretary of State Rubio Says Huge Bounties May Be Offered for Taliban Leaders, Sending Signals to Various Parties, Especially Russia

[Media Coverage]

On January 25th, US Secretary of State Rubio stated that the United States may offer "huge bounties" for the leadership of the Taliban in Afghanistan, adding that "they may be even higher than the bounty for [former al-Qaeda leader] Bin Laden." As of press time, no response has been seen from the Interim Government of Afghanistan.

【Discussion Summary】

●The "core objectives" of successive US administrations in foreign policy have never changed; only the specific "methods" of execution have been adjusted.

Rubio's remarks regarding the Taliban in Afghanistan are worthy of attention. In our observation and assessment, Rubio has sent a set of strong signals to various parties, especially Russia:

First, by using Bin Laden as an example, he is alluding to the fate of the Taliban regime. Bin Laden was killed by the US and left with no place to be buried. As for the Taliban regime, its fate is self-evident. In other words, the Trump administration has issued a "kill order" for the Taliban regime.

Second, based on the first point, if former US President Biden officially announced the complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan on September 14, 2021, then this time, the Trump administration is loudly proclaiming that the US will "return to Afghanistan."

Third, based on the second point, whether it was the Biden administration's move to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan in 2021 or the Trump administration's current play to "return to Afghanistan," the core lies in targeting Russia's "little tricks" in its Afghanistan policy, which it has not substantially abandoned.

First, based on the third point, after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021, the Biden administration intended to force Russia to agree to provide the "Moscow Channel" (regarding the Afghanistan issue) through a combination of "coercion and inducement, mainly coercion," with the core aim of substantially dismantling Sino-Russian strategic trust. However, contrary to expectations, due to Russia's refusal to provide the "Moscow Channel," it ultimately led to the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war on February 24, 2022. In a sense, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war means that the Biden administration's move to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan was ineffective in terms of "methods." Therefore, at the beginning of 2025, the Trump administration made "adjustments" to US Afghanistan policy, adopting an approach of "coercion and inducement, mainly inducement." We can even say that based on "potential US strategic retraction" and a strategy of "dividing and conquering, befriending distant states while attacking nearby ones," the Trump administration intends to "extremely woo" Russia (at least objectively, the possibility of the Trump administration continuing to play the "dividing and conquering" strategy has further increased). But it still ai00ms to force Russia to agree to provide the "Moscow Channel," with the core objective of substantially dismantling Sino-Russian strategic trust. From this, it is not difficult to see how successive US administrations have coordinated their foreign policies. That is, the "core objectives" have never changed; only the specific "methods" of execution have been adjusted.

●This fear is so clear that three years ago, Russia preferred to launch a special military operation against Ukraine rather than provide the "Moscow Channel" to the US.

Second, "extreme wooing" does not mean the absence of a "big stick." To some extent, the "big stick" and the "carrot" are integrated. That is, if we consider "as long as Russia cooperates and provides the 'Moscow Channel,' the Ukraine issue can be negotiated" as the "carrot," then conversely, "if Russia refuses to cooperate, the Ukraine issue will only get 'worse,' not 'the worst.'" A specific example is Ukrainian President Zelenskyy's statement that at least 200,000 European soldiers are needed as peacekeeping forces.

It is worth mentioning that this situation has been assessed by Oriental Affairs Interpretation. NATO intends to withdraw completely from Russia's Kursk region in exchange for NATO's public and organized entry into Ukraine. And it embeds a fatal trap based on "aim high, achieve in the middle" — as long as Russia does not launch "effective counterattacks," this "nested nuclear blackmail" supported by "nuclear arming Ukraine" (using "nuclear arming Ukraine" as strategic support and the more operable security issues of nuclear power plants in Ukraine, represented by the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, as a means of directly nuclear blackmailing Russia) and the "nested strategic blackmail" at the conventional level (supported by "nested nuclear blackmail" and using more operable conventional means, such as promoting the "NATO internalization" of the Baltic Sea and military strikes on the Crimea Bridge, as means of directly strategically blackmailing Russia) can "consume" Russia completely.

The meaning of "consume completely" lies in the fact that if Russia can endure throughout the process, the "strategic testing accompanying strategic offensives" implemented simultaneously with the aforementioned "nested nuclear blackmail" and "nested strategic blackmail" will achieve tremendous results, such as the disintegration of the Russia-Belarus Union and the substantial neutralization of the effectiveness of Russia's nuclear deterrence.

It is worth mentioning that in response to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy's statement about the need for at least 200,000 "European troops" for peacekeeping, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that it would not accept the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces in Ukraine after a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as it could lead to "uncontrollable escalation of the situation."

Perhaps the Russian decision-making layer has a clear understanding of what "consuming Russia completely" means. However, in our observation and assessment, the main reason for Russia's refusal may not lie in the ceasefire agreement on the Ukraine issue proposed by Trump, but in Russia's fear of China. Or rather, it fears that once Russia sacrifices China's core interests to make peace with the West, it will inevitably be put on the "fast track to be substantially digested by the West" by China. This fear is so clear that three years ago, Russia preferred to launch a special military operation against Ukraine rather than provide the "Moscow Channel" to the US.

At the traditional security level, for the United States, once it embarks on "strategic retraction," it too, like a "red giant," could collapse in an instant.

Apart from the China factor, there exist irreconcilable contradictions among the US, Europe, and Russia, making it difficult for them to unite and face external challenges together.

Donald Trump's way of doing things, while sometimes "using public officetaking for care personal of gain public," affairs objectively while, dealing can also result in the peculiar phenomenon of " with private matters." "Using public office for personal gain" is easily understood, such as "eliminating" former US Secretary of State Pompeo due to "internal settlement" issues. The meaning of "taking care of public affairs while dealing with private matters" lies in the fact that, under the premise of the Trump administration's eagerness to stabilize the Middle East, it not only needs to further court Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey but also seek compromises with the EU, which is extremely challenging. In this process, if it really requires "sacrificing" Iran as a scapegoat, framing Iran for "Pompeo's death" would be the best excuse. This is probably one of the main reasons why the Iranian authorities have fallen into the "vicious circle" of "the more they want to surrender, the more dangerous they feel, and the more dangerous it is, the more they want to surrender" recently.

For Russia, if it dares to accept Trump's plan (with the indicator being Russia providing the "Moscow channel"), Russia could become the "second Iran." And Trump would immediately visit China to ease relations. For such a Russia, the international community could easily ignore it, just as it has done with Iran. When necessary, even if Russia and Iran do not want it, the international community may, with the aim of raising the cost of peace negotiations with other Western countries, "forcefully" provide "strategic support."

In our view, the moment Trump decided to embark on "strategic retraction" before officially taking office, he was doomed to fail. Because whether domestically or internationally, improving relations with China is a fundamental prerequisite for Trump's actions. Under this premise, it is even more difficult for the US, Europe, and Russia to unite. The US warned the EU on the Greenland issue that if the EU does not cooperate with the US, it will ally with Russia. This is also a concrete manifestation of the impossibility of the US, Europe, and Russia uniting. It is similar to the complex relationship between Chiang Kai-shek's "central army" and the "miscellaneous armies" during the Liberation War.

It is not easy for the US under Trump to return to Afghanistan, but it does not prevent Trump from using it as an "operational platform" for his strategy of "diplomatic maneuvering and distant alliances, attacking nearby enemies." As for the true purpose of "Trump and his allies" in playing the game of "diplomatic maneuvering and distant alliances, attacking nearby enemies," we have also made a preliminary assessment. That is, to use this as a strategic support to intensify the extraction of the "residual value" of the American platform to the maximum extent for the benefit of their own small group. For the US, the world hegemon, once it embarks on strategic retraction, it too, like a "red giant," could collapse in an instant.

[Related Topics]

Issue 7749 - Dongfang Commentary: Trump Announces Release of JFK and Others' Assassination-Related Archives Within Days (2025-01-21)
Issue 7753 - Why Is It That, Whether Domestically or Internationally, Trump's "Diplomatic Maneuvering" Hinges on Handling Relations with China? (2025-01-22)
Issue 7761 - Dongfang Commentary: Iranian Vice President Says Hamas's "Al-Aqsa Flood" Operation Disrupts Iran-US Nuclear Deal Renewal Negotiations (2025-01-24)

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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