https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/R2sZufFqvPEOeYZI-z0QfQ
2025年3月7日,星期五,第1197期 东方点评,中国于乌克兰签署“乌克兰豌豆、野生水产品输华议定书” 【媒体报道】 3月6日,中国和乌克兰6日在乌首都基辅签署了两项乌农产品输华议定书,开启乌克兰豌豆和野生水产品进入中国市场的通道。中国驻乌克兰大使马升琨当天在基辅会见乌克兰农业政策与粮食部部长科瓦利。马升琨代表中国海关总署与乌食品安全与消费者保护署署长特卡丘克签署《乌克兰豌豆输华植物检疫要求议定书》和《乌克兰野生水产品输华检验检疫和卫生要求议定书》。 【讨论纪要】 ●随着俄罗斯越来越靠近美国,其传统朋友,尤其是以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家以及一些中东重要国家,如,埃及,正与其渐行渐远 在此前几期的讨论中,东方时事解读首先提出“麻将桌”这个说法。具体来说就是,将特朗普政府围绕充分执行“攘外必先安内”政策,通过“合纵连横,远交近攻”策略,围绕乌克兰问题和中东问题形成,由世界性大国或国际组织(主要指中、美、欧盟和俄罗斯)或主动参与或被动参与,以及地区主要国家(主要指乌克兰问题上的德国、法国等,中东问题上的沙特、土耳其、埃及、伊朗、以色列等),或主动参与或被动参与,以尽可能淘换各自急需利益为至少阶段性目标的这种不断演进的复杂局面描述为“麻将桌”。尤其在经历大概率为“拜登们之索罗斯们”精心策划的,围绕“北溪2”天然气管道重启一事展开的现代版“金刀计”后,“麻将桌”支起速度显然被大大加快,各“主要玩家”以及众多“次要玩家”也纷纷“归位”。 在乌克兰问题这个“麻将桌”上,至少表面上,俄罗斯越来越靠近美国这个现象,似乎也在中东问题这个“麻将桌”上同步显现。而欧盟在乌克兰问题上的利益诉求(拒绝俄美两家瓜分乌克兰,也要分杯羹)与在中东问题上的利益诉求(谋求建立一条摆脱美俄控制的、途经土耳其的中东输欧能源管线)越来越明显地与俄罗斯对立起来。 值得一提的是,在中东问题上,俄罗斯与欧盟的矛盾对立要显得比在乌克兰问题上更复杂一些。由于俄罗斯在对外关系上靠向美国,导致俄罗斯也在变相靠向以色列,这就与以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家以及一些主要中东国家,比如,埃及在巴勒斯坦问题上的利益诉求逐渐对立起来。尽管中国不谋求主动介入叙利亚局势后续发展,但并不代表中国在中东没有影响力。中国对中东局势的影响力更多通过以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家展示出来。所以,这也意味着中俄之间的矛盾也在变相加深。这种矛盾加深则又以俄罗斯以前的朋友,尤其是以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家以及一些主要中东国家,比如,埃及,开始与俄罗斯渐行渐远。 ●法国总统马克龙抛出“向欧洲盟国提供‘核保护伞’”说法的真实目的在于…… 在继续展开讨论前,我们再来看一则新闻报道。 3月5日,法国总统马克龙表示,将就法国向欧洲盟国提供“核保护伞”问题展开战略讨论,并强调“欧洲的未来不应由华盛顿或莫斯科来决定”。 在我们的观察与评估中,法国总统马克龙所谓“向欧洲盟国提供‘核保护伞’”的说法可谓“半真半假”。其真实目的或在于,以所谓“核威慑”(法国的核武器)为战略支撑点,争取在瓜分乌克兰的问题上“上餐桌”。且美俄让,欧盟要上;美俄不让,欧盟也要上! 值得注意的是,在法国总统马克龙强硬表态向欧洲盟国提供“核保护伞”的背后,除了乌克兰问题外,还内嵌了一个让欧盟如坐针毡的重大问题——欧洲的能源安全问题。而目前欧洲的能源现状是:其一,除了“土耳其流”外,俄罗斯对欧输送能源的所有管线都被切断;第二,欧洲只能继续不断从美国购买大量昂贵的液化天然气;第三,中东输欧能源管线还处于“八字没一撇”的状态,且可能遭遇美俄联手“狙击”;第四,北非输欧能源管线出现不稳定迹象——法国与阿尔及利亚的外交关系再次陷入严重危机,甚至呈现出全面恶化的趋势。早在2月27日就有媒体报道,阿尔及利亚外交部发表措辞严厉的声明,痛斥“报复心切、怀恨在心的法国极右翼”煽动敌意。 在继续展开讨论前,我们再来看一则新闻报道。 3月6日,中国和乌克兰6日在乌首都基辅签署了两项乌农产品输华议定书,开启乌克兰豌豆和野生水产品进入中国市场的通道。 法国总统马克龙以“核”明志,瓜分乌克兰的“餐桌”上不能没有欧盟,而落实在具体手段上,就是向乌克兰派遣“欧洲维和部队”。这意味着乌克兰根本无法获得真正意义上的和平,美俄之间在乌克兰问题上恐怕也无法谈真正意义上的乌克兰和平。显然,在中乌就两项乌农产品输华签订议定书的背后,是在美欧瓜分乌克兰却将欧盟撇在一边“气不过”的欧盟(其中或有已经或正计划“逃离”美国准备到欧洲“安营寨扎”的“拜登们之索罗斯们”的影子)想到了中国。而中国就用这样一种微妙的形式,在欧盟的“公开邀请”下欣然加入,且为恼怒中的欧盟“指出了一条明路”。 ●欧洲方面对中国会给欧盟“指出的这条明路”,尤其是“过程匹配‘时间函数’”究竟意味着什么有所感悟 所谓“指出了一条明路”,还得从乌克兰与欧盟的关系说起。 2022年2月24日爆发俄乌战争至今已经超过3个年头。即便如此,中国仍是乌克兰的第一大贸易伙伴。2024年,中乌双边贸易总额达到了568.5亿元(人民币,大约78亿美元)。2024年,截至12月26日,在乌克兰已出口价值约410.4亿美元的货物中,对欧盟出口额约为245亿美元,约占出口总额的59%。 从上述数据不难看出,欧盟与乌克兰双边关系的首要特征就是经贸。乌克兰大约60%的商品出口地是欧盟国家。当然,欧盟是一个国际组织,不同于中国是单一国家。此外,欧盟与乌克兰双边关系的另一个特征就是乌克兰属于欧洲国家,严格意义上说是东欧国家。可以说就在欧盟的“家门口”。 到目前为止,欧盟在处理乌克兰问题上的方式简单概括就是“玩武的”,主要体现在欧盟为了尽量坐上瓜分乌克兰的“餐桌”,在美俄关系至少表面上迅速缓和且有意将欧盟排除在瓜分乌克兰之外的背景下,欧盟一直坚持向乌克兰派遣“欧洲维和部队”。这与中国发展与乌克兰的双边贸易且始终强调处理乌克兰问题不应将主要当事国乌克兰排除在外的方式和立场有本质区别。 在我们的观察与评估中,中国给欧盟“指出了一条明路”的大体内容是:建议欧盟和中国合作,且在应对乌克兰问题的过程中不一定要走“瓜分之路”,而是要在致力于维护乌克兰和平的基础上,推动乌克兰重建进程。当然,更可以和中国一道就乌克兰和平问题和中东和平问题“轮推”起来。如果欧盟愿意,则可以将自己对乌克兰的最大优势——商贸,发挥到极致。更何况乌克兰重建需要大量物资和商品,而这些都将通过中欧班列源源不断从中国运往欧洲。也就是说,欧盟和中国在乌克兰问题上基于经济利益层面有广阔合作空间。且这一合作的重点在于,不要纠结结果,只去关注过程。而与过程相匹配的是“时间函数”,只要有足够的时间,中欧主要基于非传统安全层面的合作完全可以还给世界一个奇迹。 避短扬长的道理欧盟应该懂。在传统安全层面,我们希望欧盟减少或停止去做没有意义的事情,比如挑拨中美对立,尽快将“戴高乐”号航母开回去维修保养。与之“交接”的应该是欧盟的商贸人员和各国政要。共同瞄准美国的内部恶斗做文章。此外,如上文所说,除了乌克兰问题外,这桌“麻将”也可以支到中东去嘛,慢慢搓麻,找机拆掉目前阶段靠近的美俄关系,也许真的搓出个“第四轮排列组合”的有效重启也未可知。 值得一提的是,从乌克兰方面欣然和中国签署相关农产品输华协议的情况看,显然欧洲方面对中国会给欧盟“指出的这条明路”,尤其是“过程匹配‘时间函数’”究竟意味着什么有所感悟。 ●欧洲急需的,从中东拉出来的不依赖美俄的能源管线,中国是唯一真正能够提供帮助的 在展开本次回顾最后一段讨论前,我们再来看一则新闻报道。 3月6日,叙利亚安全部队与效忠前总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的武装分子发生激烈交火,造成48人死亡。 在我们的观察与评估中,效忠于叙利亚前总统阿萨德的阿拉维派(伊斯兰教什叶派的伊斯玛仪派支派的派别之一。因该派崇拜和神化阿里,故又称阿拉维派)攻击现在的叙利亚临时政府属下的“政府军”,在俄美关系至少表面上开始缓和的背景下,在急于在叙利亚问题上寻找“切入点”的俄罗斯的操作下,可能性是存在的。所以,某种意义上说,俄罗斯在伊核问题上协助美国,甚至撮合所谓“伊以新关系”就是公开向美国提出协助其“有效重返叙利亚”的利益诉求。至少在目前阶段,美国内部恶斗不断激化,特朗普政府明显有求于俄罗斯的情况下,至少俄罗斯决策层有理由要求美国把所谓美俄在乌克兰问题上的合作扩大到叙利亚问题上。 需要提醒欧盟的是,在俄罗斯要求美国把所谓美俄在乌克兰问题上的合作扩大到叙利亚问题上的同时,美俄对欧洲利益的损害也同时从乌克兰问题上扩大到叙利亚问题上。至少在阻止出现一条试图摆脱美俄控制的,从中东经土耳其通向欧洲的能源管线,美国和俄罗斯有合作的空间。所以,中欧合作可以从乌克兰问题上同样扩展到中东问题上,某种意义上说也是有基础的。中国在中东问题上,尤其在非传统安全层面上,有着自己独特的影响力,这一点通过以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家可以观察得很清楚。 此外,同样需要提醒欧盟注意的是,欧洲内部,尤其是欧盟主要国家,比如,德国和法国之间的团结问题。毛泽东主席当年对到访的德国前总理施密特就曾明确指出欧盟的最大弱点,那就是,欧洲太弱太软,又不统一,怕战争怕得要死。且明确表示,假使(欧盟)今后一些年内不能在政治、经济、军事上联合起来,就会为此付出代价。 再次提醒欧盟,欧洲急需的,从中东拉出来的不依赖美俄的能源管线,中国是唯一真正能够提供帮助的,某种意义上说,“大欧罗巴计划”,尤其是非传统安全层面,是完全有可能在中东地区和“一带一路”倡议相对接的。我们希望欧盟主要国家的领导人能够真正懂得求同存异,放下意识形态上的分歧,把经贸先搞起来,是为正途。
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第7865期-透过错综复杂的“北溪-2”天然气管道重启事件再观察,是否会上演美版“土木堡之变”(2025-3-4) 声明:具体内容如有出入,请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。
Friday, March 7, 2025, Issue No. 1197 China and Ukraine Sign Protocols on Export of Ukrainian Peas and Wild Aquatic Products to China [Media Coverage] On March 6, China and Ukraine signed two protocols in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, paving the way for Ukrainian peas and wild aquatic products to enter the Chinese market. On the same day, Ma Shengkun, the Chinese Ambassador to Ukraine, met with Ukrainian Minister of Agricultural Policy and Food, Mykola Solskyi. Representing the General Administration of Customs of China, Ma Shengkun signed the "Protocol on Phytosanitary Requirements for the Export of Ukrainian Peas to China" and the "Protocol on Inspection, Quarantine, and Sanitary Requirements for the Export of Ukrainian Wild Aquatic Products to China" with the Head of the State Service of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer Protection, Vladyslava Mahaletska. 【Discussion Summary】 ● As Russia increasingly aligns with the United States, its traditional allies, particularly Gulf Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia and key Middle Eastern nations like Egypt, are gradually distancing themselves from Russia. In previous discussions, the concept of the "Mahjong Table" was introduced by Dongfang Shishi. This metaphor describes the evolving and complex situation surrounding the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern issues, where major global powers or international organizations (primarily China, the U.S., the EU, and Russia) and regional key players (such as Germany and France in the Ukrainian context, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Israel in the Middle Eastern context) are either actively or passively involved, all vying for their respective urgent interests. This "Mahjong Table" scenario has accelerated, especially after the likely orchestrated "modern version of the Golden Dagger Scheme" surrounding the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, with major and minor players taking their positions. On the "Mahjong Table" of the Ukrainian issue, Russia's increasing alignment with the U.S. seems to be mirrored in the Middle Eastern context. Meanwhile, the EU's interests in Ukraine (refusing to let Russia and the U.S. divide Ukraine without a share) and in the Middle East (seeking to establish an energy pipeline through Turkey independent of U.S. and Russian control) are increasingly conflicting with Russia's stance. It is worth noting that the contradictions between Russia and the EU in the Middle East are more complex than in the Ukrainian context. As Russia leans closer to the U.S., it also indirectly aligns with Israel, which puts it at odds with Gulf Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia and other major Middle Eastern nations like Egypt, especially regarding the Palestinian issue. Although China does not actively intervene in the Syrian situation, it still holds significant influence in the Middle East, primarily through Gulf Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia. This also means that the contradictions between China and Russia are indirectly deepening, as Russia's traditional allies, particularly Gulf Arab countries and key Middle Eastern nations like Egypt, begin to drift away from Russia. ● The true intention behind French President Macron's proposal to provide a "nuclear umbrella" to European allies is... Before continuing the discussion, let us look at another news report. On March 5, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that France would initiate strategic discussions on providing a "nuclear umbrella" to European allies, emphasizing that "Europe's future should not be decided by Washington or Moscow." In our observation and assessment, Macron's proposal to provide a "nuclear umbrella" to European allies is "half-truthful." Its real purpose may be to use the so-called "nuclear deterrence" (France's nuclear weapons) as a strategic leverage to secure a seat at the table in the division of Ukraine. Whether the U.S. and Russia allow it or not, the EU intends to join the table! It is noteworthy that behind Macron's strong stance on providing a "nuclear umbrella" lies a pressing issue for the EU—energy security. The current energy situation in Europe is as follows: First, except for the "Turkish Stream," all Russian energy pipelines to Europe have been cut off. Second, Europe continues to purchase expensive liquefied natural gas from the U.S. Third, the Middle Eastern energy pipeline to Europe is still in its infancy and may face joint obstruction by the U.S. and Russia. Fourth, the North African energy pipeline to Europe shows signs of instability—France's diplomatic relations with Algeria have again fallen into severe crisis, even trending toward complete deterioration. As early as February 27, reports emerged that Algeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a stern statement condemning "the vengeful and resentful French far-right" for inciting hostility. Before continuing the discussion, let us look at another news report. On March 6, China and Ukraine signed two protocols in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, paving the way for Ukrainian peas and wild aquatic products to enter the Chinese market. French President Macron uses "nuclear deterrence" to assert that the EU must be included in the division of Ukraine, and the specific means to achieve this is by deploying "European peacekeeping forces" to Ukraine. This means that Ukraine cannot achieve true peace, and the U.S. and Russia may not truly negotiate peace in Ukraine. Clearly, behind the signing of the two protocols on Ukrainian agricultural exports to China, the EU, frustrated by being excluded from the U.S.-Russia division of Ukraine, has turned to China. In a subtle manner, China has joined the scene under the EU's "open invitation," pointing a way forward for the aggrieved EU. ● The EU has begun to grasp the implications of China's "pointed way forward," especially the concept of "process matching the time function." The so-called "pointed way forward" must be understood in the context of Ukraine-EU relations. The Russia-Ukraine war, which broke out on February 24, 2022, has now lasted over three years. Despite this, China remains Ukraine's largest trading partner. In 2024, the bilateral trade volume between China and Ukraine reached 56.85 billion yuan (approximately $7.8 billion). As of December 26, 2024, out of Ukraine's total exports worth approximately $41.04 billion, exports to the EU accounted for about $24.5 billion, or 59% of total exports. From the above data, it is clear that the primary feature of Ukraine-EU relations is economic and trade. About 60% of Ukraine's exports go to EU countries. Of course, the EU is an international organization, unlike China, which is a single country. Another feature of Ukraine-EU relations is that Ukraine is a European country, strictly speaking, an Eastern European country, located right at the EU's "doorstep." So far, the EU's approach to the Ukrainian issue can be summarized as "playing tough," primarily by insisting on deploying "European peacekeeping forces" to Ukraine in an attempt to secure a seat at the table in the division of Ukraine, especially as U.S.-Russia relations have rapidly improved, at least superficially, and seem intent on excluding the EU. This approach fundamentally differs from China's stance of developing bilateral trade with Ukraine and consistently emphasizing that Ukraine, as a primary party, should not be excluded from the resolution of its own issues. In our observation and assessment, China's "pointed way forward" for the EU suggests that the EU should cooperate with China and not necessarily follow the path of "division" in addressing the Ukrainian issue. Instead, it should focus on maintaining peace in Ukraine and promoting its reconstruction process. Of course, the EU can also work with China to "alternately push" for peace in Ukraine and the Middle East. If the EU is willing, it can maximize its greatest advantage in Ukraine—trade. Moreover, Ukraine's reconstruction will require a large amount of materials and goods, which can be continuously transported from China to Europe via the China-Europe Railway. In other words, there is vast potential for EU-China cooperation on the Ukrainian issue based on economic interests. The focus of this cooperation should be on not obsessing over the outcome but paying attention to the process. The process, matched with the "time function," means that with sufficient time, EU-China cooperation, primarily based on non-traditional security, can bring about a miracle for the world. The EU should understand the principle of leveraging strengths and avoiding weaknesses. In the realm of traditional security, we hope the EU reduces or stops engaging in meaningless actions, such as provoking U.S.-China confrontation, and quickly returns the aircraft carrier "Charles de Gaulle" for maintenance. Instead, EU trade officials and political leaders should take the stage, focusing on the internal strife within the U.S. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, apart from the Ukrainian issue, this "Mahjong Table" can also extend to the Middle East, slowly playing the game and finding opportunities to dismantle the current U.S.-Russia alignment, perhaps even leading to an effective restart of the "fourth round of permutations." It is worth noting that Ukraine's willingness to sign agricultural export agreements with China suggests that the EU has begun to grasp the implications of China's "pointed way forward," especially the concept of "process matching the time function." ● The EU urgently needs an energy pipeline from the Middle East independent of the U.S. and Russia, and China is the only one that can truly help. Before concluding this discussion, let us look at another news report. On March 6, Syrian security forces clashed with militants loyal to former President Bashar al-Assad, resulting in 48 deaths. In our observation and assessment, the Alawite faction (a branch of Shia Islam that worships and deifies Ali, hence also called the Alawite sect) loyal to former Syrian President Assad attacking the "government forces" of the current Syrian interim government is a possibility, especially as U.S.-Russia relations have at least superficially begun to improve, and Russia is eager to find a "point of entry" in the Syrian issue. Therefore, in a sense, Russia's assistance to the U.S. on the Iranian nuclear issue and even its mediation of the so-called "new Israel-Iran relations" is an open request for the U.S. to help it "effectively return to Syria." At least at this stage, with the intensifying internal strife in the U.S. and the Trump administration clearly seeking Russia's help, Russia's decision-makers have reason to demand that the U.S. extend its so-called U.S.-Russia cooperation on Ukraine to Syria. The EU should be reminded that as Russia demands the U.S. extend its cooperation on Ukraine to Syria, the harm to European interests also extends from Ukraine to Syria. At least in preventing the emergence of an energy pipeline from the Middle East through Turkey to Europe independent of U.S. and Russian control, the U.S. and Russia have room for cooperation. Therefore, EU-China cooperation can similarly extend from Ukraine to the Middle East, and in a sense, there is a foundation for this. China has unique influence in the Middle East, especially in the realm of non-traditional security, which is evident through Gulf Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the EU should be reminded of the unity issues within Europe, particularly among major EU countries like Germany and France. Chairman Mao once pointed out to former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt during his visit that the EU's greatest weakness is that Europe is too weak, too soft, and not unified, fearing war to the extreme. He explicitly stated that if the EU does not unite politically, economically, and militarily in the coming years, it will pay the price. We again remind the EU that the energy pipeline it urgently needs from the Middle East, independent of the U.S. and Russia, is something only China can truly help with. In a sense, the "Greater Europe Plan," especially in the realm of non-traditional security, could very well align with the Middle East and the Belt and Road Initiative. We hope the leaders of major EU countries can truly understand the principle of seeking common ground while reserving differences, setting aside ideological disputes, and prioritizing economic and trade cooperation as the right path forward.
[Related Topics]
Issue 7865 - Observing the Complex Restart of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline: Will a U.S. Version of the "Tumu Fortress Incident" Occur? (March 4, 2025)
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