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第1205期

原文出处: 衍射 2025年3月16日

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/R2sZufFqvPEOeYZI-z0QfQ

Issue 1205

Original: Diffraction Mar.17,2025

 

2025年3月17日,星期一,第1205期

或接替基辛格成为“新朋友”的美国前财长保尔森来华的真实目的为何?

【媒体报道】

3月17日,中国人民银行行长潘功胜会见来访的美国前财政部长亨利·保尔森一行。双方就全球经济金融形势、中美经贸关系、中国宏观经济政策等议题进行了交流。

【讨论纪要】

●特朗普政府对外政策的一切不顺均源自至今未能有效缓和中美关系

今天的回顾我们首先关注乌克兰局势的最新变化。

3月16日,俄罗斯联邦安全会议副主席梅德韦杰夫警告称,北约成员国向乌克兰部署“维和人员”将引发北约与俄罗斯之间的全面战争。

在我们看来,俄罗斯联邦安全会议副主席梅德韦杰夫的言论,可以看作是俄罗斯官方对此前美国和乌克兰(欧盟)在沙特吉达举行会晤的正式表态。恰恰在这次会晤中,俄罗斯被赶下了旨在瓜分乌克兰的“餐桌”。

尽管俄罗斯总统普京在3月13日表示,同意美国关于在乌克兰停止军事行动的提议,但普京也同时强调,停火必须走向长期和平和危机根源消除的方向。同时就如何监督停火提出了诸多疑问——这30 天(停火)将用来做什么呢?用来在乌克兰继续强制征兵?用来向那里输送武器吗?用于动员的新部队训练吗?抑或上述情况均不会发生?那么,问题来了:怎么做呢,监督、核查问题将如何去解决?我们如何能够以及通过何种方式确保上述情况不会发生?将如何建立监督?

显然,俄罗斯总统普京是在拿“明斯克协议”的历史教训说事儿。或者说,俄罗斯到目前为止明确表示,不同意美国版(临时)“停火协议”。此前,德国前总理默克尔和法国前总统奥朗德的“惊天坦白”引发国际震动,《明斯克协议》竟是一场精心策划的“缓兵之计”。

在继续展开讨论前,我们再来看一则新闻报道。

3月15日,英国首相基尔·斯塔默宣布,由英法牵头的“自愿联盟”已决定加快向乌克兰派遣维和部队的计划正式进入“行动阶段”。在主持完长达90分钟的“自愿联盟”线上会议后,斯塔默指责俄罗斯对美国与乌克兰提出的停火提议的回应“不够好”,并表示联盟成员一致同意继续对俄施压。

如果按照上文中俄方所提条件去执行,也就是以彻底消除俄方疑虑的方式去执行,那这份“停火协议”显然叫作“永久性停火协议”更为合适。由此不难看出,斯塔默的说法是在用施压的方式对俄官方反对美国版(临时)“停火协议”的一种反制——俄罗斯,小心点,我们(欧美)还有很多牌可打。比如,向乌克兰派遣“维和部队”。

事实上,之所以能够有“停火协议”出现,无论是基于什么目的,或者是谁提出的,都说明一件事,那就是俄乌战争的交战双方都已筋疲力尽,都有意停火。但是,尽管西方和俄罗斯都在继续俄乌战争的问题上承受巨大压力,两者在“承受力”上还是存在“温差”的。或者说,在这个问题上,美国承受的压力最大,是最希望得到“停火协议”的一方。

也就是说,俄罗斯就是吃定美国内部恶斗不断让特朗普政府承压巨大,且相比之下俄罗斯还能“再坚持一下”这一点,在“停火协议”的问题上,不达目的决不罢休。意图将“停火协议”一劳永逸地定格在“永久性停火协议”上。更何况,对于特朗普这样一个毫无诚信的“商人总统”,即便其现在承诺什么,事后随时可以变脸。相比之下,特朗普政府更多关心的是得到“停火协议”,而非“停火协议”的性质。

特朗普一心想做“希特勒二世”,通过独裁统治,避免4年后(按美国宪法,4年后特朗普不能再谋求连任。当然,如果特朗普修改了美国宪法,则另当别论)不被再次政治清算以及继续享受荣华富贵(所谓“西方民主”的本质就是极其落后的“门阀政治”)。可以说,如何尽快稳定外部环境,将所有精力用于“平定内乱”,巩固政权并在这一过程中大赚特赚,对特朗普和“特朗普们”来说,绝对是“压倒性的重要任务”。

如果有助于实现这一目的,恐怕普京提出什么条件,特朗普都会答应,俄罗斯恐怕也是看到这一点。但问题在于,特朗普上位2个月,到今天,仍然未能搞定中美关系,而中美关系不仅是特朗普执行“攘内必先安外”之“务必缓和对华、对欧、对俄关系中‘大多数’”中的一边,而且还是“必选项”。没有搞定中美关系,美俄关系也无从定性。

于是,特朗普政府只能:

其一,通过不断压缩欧盟在乌克兰问题上的利益对俄罗斯让步,推动美俄关系逐步缓和,从正面促成“停火协议”尽快签署;

其二,在“其一”的基础上,借美俄关系缓和的趋势按住欧盟,尽量防止欧盟在乌克兰问题上,中东问题上给美国找麻烦;

其三,在“其二”的基础上,和欧盟“唱双簧”,借欧盟之力施压俄罗斯,从反面(相对“其一”)促成“停火协议”尽快签署;

其四,“其二”和“其三”构成了美欧关系复杂且微妙的“一枚硬币的两面”。“其二”偏重于威逼,“其三”则偏重于利诱。

值得一提的是,如此复杂的美欧和美俄关系反映在叙利亚问题上就是,美国一边拿“协助俄罗斯实质性重返叙利亚”威胁欧盟;另一边拿“实在不行我退出,放任欧盟更深入介入叙利亚问题后续发展”威胁俄罗斯(这对欧盟也是一种利诱)。

●本次保尔森进京的目的很直接,主要就是为美国总统特朗普求得一张尽快访华的“机票”

特朗普政府也许到了今天才真正感到事态的严重性,那就是未能有效缓和中美关系。换句话说,就算美国现在搞定了美俄关系,美欧关系,但因为未能搞定中美关系这一“有效缓和对华、对欧和对俄关系中‘大多数’”之“必选项”,一切都将归零。归零的最严重后果就是,特朗普政府的对外政策一片愁云惨雾,由于缺少足够稳定的外部环境做战略支撑,特朗普政府只能坐视内恶斗日甚一日,既无法缓和更无法阻止。

在继续展开讨论之前,我们再来看一则新闻报道。

3月15日,美国前财政部长保尔森到访北京,与中方进行接触,双方就中美经贸关系和全球经济发展展开交流。

保尔森,多么熟悉的名字,此前,在所谓“第一次排列组合”至“第二交排列组合”转换的关键时刻,更准确地描述是,“2008年北京奥运会-格鲁吉亚战争回合”期间,美国次贷危机向纵深发展的高危期,通过一系列复杂手段引爆欧洲债务危机的“操盘手”,正是这位当时担任着美国财政部长的保尔森(小布什政府)。

值得一提的是,就在2008年华盛顿互惠银行倒闭所指明的金融危机越演越烈之际,美国国会内部对“7000亿美元救市计划”依然有反对声音之际,这让该计划的制定者保尔森十分着急。据当时多家美国知名媒体爆料,为尽快让计划获得通过,保尔森甚至在众议院女议长佩洛西面前单膝下跪。

保尔森在尼克松时代曾担任过美国助理国防部长的助手和尼克松本人的总统助理(不是美国国家安全事务助理)。水门事件后,他脱离了政治,加入了华尔街,加入了高盛,并在金融领域深耕了几十年。1994年,升任高盛总裁兼首席运营官,并首次被提名为首席执行官。1998年,成为高盛公司高级合伙人之一。1999年,高盛上市后,保尔森成为高盛董事长兼首席执行官。

显然,这样一位“既能屈却也能伸、但本就手眼通天的人物”此时进京,在东方时事解读的观察与评估中,其“目的性”非常直截了当:为美国总统特朗普尽快订上那张“访华机票”。

某种意义上说,保尔森对中国的了解要比基辛格更深刻一些。在基辛格这位“老朋友”已经过世后,保尔森接替基辛格这位所谓“中国人民的老朋友”成为“新朋友”是有可能的。在我们看来,保尔森首先代表华尔街,是华尔街的真正的话事者。当然,毕竟特朗普是现在的美国总统,是名分上的“华尔街代言人”,所以,说保尔森访华为特朗普带话并不违和。此外,保尔森还是博鳌经济论坛的理事,是一个“三面人”。也就是说,至少在保尔森这里,在“西方资本利益复杂转进”的问题上,无论是转进“美国平台”,还是转进“欧洲平台”,亦或是接受“基因改造”而转进“一带一路”倡议,都是有可能走通的。

●台湾只是中国的一个省,台湾问题纯属中国内政问题,所以,中美之间就所谓“美国围绕‘台湾问题’做交易”没有什么可谈的

大家不妨关注有关韩国总统尹锡悦和菲律宾前总统杜特尔特的新闻报道。当然,对国际社会而言,更感兴趣的是菲律宾前总统杜特尔特被捕一事的后续发展。或者说,这位“进京求票”的美国前财长如何在菲律宾问题上,南海问题上,亦或是传统安全层面的西太问题上,非传统安全层面的世界金融秩序改革问题上有什么新说法,如何有新说法。

特朗普政府当然知道这张访华的“机票”想要求下来没有那么容易,所以,恐怕也不会,更不想轻易答应什么,其仍妄图通过打“台湾牌”和中国讨价还价。但问题是,中国对此根本就不予理睬!

所谓不予理睬:

第一,我们愿意再次强调,无论是美方之前炒作的“抛弃台湾”论,还是之后炒作的“将台湾作价卖给中国”论,中国一律将其视为胡说八道,不予理睬。台湾只是中国的一个省,台湾问题纯属中国内政问题,所以,中美之间就所谓“美国围绕‘台湾问题’做交易”没有什么可谈的;

第二,我们也愿意再次强调,收复台湾早已处于“或今晚就行动”的状态之中。尽管中国仍在尽一切努力争取“河渡人”的局面延长每一天,但在原则性问题上绝不会因此有任何改变。也就是说,如果局势真的发展到,中国在“收台”和“河渡人”之间必须二选其一的地步,中国会毫不犹豫选择前者;

第三,近段时间,中国不断向外界展示,中国可以随时收台的具体手段。除了上次和大家聊到的,被网友称为“重型抢滩攻城塔”的“收台神器”——大型特种两栖作战驳船外,各种新科技、新装备更是接二连三出现在大众视野之中。这里着重和大家介绍一款新型155mm舰炮。

3月12日,有媒体爆料称,中国军方很可能正在试装155mm大口径舰炮。有消息称,这或是中国海军现代化以来,装备过的口径最大、最先进的化学能舰炮。

此前,网络上曾流传一张正在我国某港口进行休整改造的071型两栖船坞运输舰首舰“昆仑山”号的图片。其舰艏装备的H/PJ-26 76mm主炮被换成了一个体型更大、并且被笼罩在炮衣内的“新型火炮”。其很可能就是传说中的新型“国产155mm舰炮”。有网友发现,早在2024年,位于内蒙古的北方重工业集团就已在其官方媒体的公开报道中明确提及155mm舰炮已经诞生。

相比于陆军使用的火炮,现代军舰上使用的中大口径舰炮,一般在127毫米到155毫米之间。这类舰炮不仅威力巨大,而且用途广泛。既可以用于对海、对岸打击,也可以用于防空和反导。055万吨大驱所装备的H/PJ-45型130毫米舰炮就属于中大口径舰炮中的佼佼者。它不仅口径大、威力猛,而且射速高、精度高,具有极强的火力打击能力。该舰炮的射速竟然高达每分钟40发,足足是MK-45型127毫米舰炮(美国FMC公司)每分钟不超过20发射速的两倍。而陆军榴弹炮营一般每分钟也就发射36发炮弹。一门H/PJ-45型舰炮的火力输出,几乎可以与一个榴弹炮营(装备18门火炮)的火力强度相媲美。

●如果一个月内,特朗普政府在访华的事情仍无定论,特朗普政府能否继续维持存在,恐怕要打上一个大大的问号了

某种意义上说,保尔森是一个带有一些理想主义色彩的人物,其在美国,乃至整个西方世界都算得上一个较为特殊的存在。恐怕不是到了万不得已,华尔街也不会让保尔森此时此刻火急火燎地进京。

需要补充的是,保尔森访华一事,对欧盟,对俄罗斯来说,都是一个冲击,至少特朗普政府摆出了一副实在不行,为了能够让特朗普尽快访华,美国只能按中国所提条件去谈的姿态。所以,对欧盟和俄罗斯而言,如何拉高中美关系缓和的门槛儿似乎显得比较急迫。

不排除欧盟和俄罗斯就乌克兰问题,中东问题对特朗普政府有所让步的可能性,但做出实质性让步的可能性不高。某种意义上说,他们也很好奇,特朗普政府到底会不会按中国所提条件去谈。也就是说,如果特朗普政府治下的美国这次对中国“一跪到底”,也就是真的做出了实质性妥协或让步,想必此时此刻的欧盟和俄罗斯也要调整各自的对美政策与对华政策了。

大家不妨密切关注美前财长保尔森如何访华后,特朗普访华行程能否敲定,在我们的观察与评估中,如果一个月内,特朗普政府在访华的事情仍无定论,特朗普政府能否继续维持存在,恐怕要打上一个大大的问号了。

声明:具体内容如有出入,请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

 

Monday, March 17, 2025, Issue No. 1205

What Is the Real Purpose of Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson’s Visit to China, Who May Replace Kissinger as the "New Friend"?

[Media Coverage]

On March 17, Pan Gongsheng, Governor of the People's Bank of China, met with former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and his delegation. The two sides exchanged views on global economic and financial trends, China-U.S. economic and trade relations, and China’s macroeconomic policies.

【Discussion Summary】

● All the Setbacks in the Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy Stem from Its Failure to Effectively Ease China-U.S. Relations

Today’s review begins with the latest developments in the Ukraine situation.

On March 16, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, warned that NATO member states deploying "peacekeepers" to Ukraine would trigger a full-scale war between NATO and Russia.

In our view, Medvedev’s remarks can be seen as Russia’s official response to the recent U.S.-Ukraine (EU) meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It was precisely at this meeting that Russia was pushed off the "table" aimed at dividing Ukraine.

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on March 13 that he agreed with the U.S. proposal to halt military operations in Ukraine, Putin also emphasized that the ceasefire must lead to long-term peace and address the root causes of the crisis. At the same time, he raised many questions about how to supervise the ceasefire—what will these 30 days (of ceasefire) be used for? To continue forced conscription in Ukraine? To send weapons there? To train newly mobilized troops? Or will none of the above happen? Then, the question arises: how will it be done? How will supervision and verification issues be resolved? How can we ensure that the above situations do not occur? How will supervision be established?

Clearly, President Putin is drawing lessons from the history of the "Minsk Agreement." In other words, Russia has so far explicitly stated that it does not agree with the U.S. version of the (temporary) "ceasefire agreement." Previously, the "shocking confessions" of former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former French President François Hollande caused an international uproar—the "Minsk Agreement" was actually a carefully planned "delaying tactic."

Before continuing the discussion, let’s look at another news report.

On March 15, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the "voluntary coalition" led by the UK and France had decided to accelerate plans to send peacekeeping forces to Ukraine, officially entering the "action phase." After chairing a 90-minute online meeting of the "voluntary coalition," Starmer criticized Russia’s response to the U.S. and Ukraine’s ceasefire proposal as "not good enough" and stated that coalition members unanimously agreed to continue pressuring Russia.

If the conditions proposed by Russia are implemented, that is, in a way that completely eliminates Russia’s concerns, then this "ceasefire agreement" would more appropriately be called a "permanent ceasefire agreement." From this, it is not hard to see that Starmer’s statement is a countermeasure to Russia’s official opposition to the U.S. version of the (temporary) "ceasefire agreement"—Russia, be careful, we (the West) still have many cards to play. For example, sending "peacekeeping forces" to Ukraine.

In fact, the emergence of a "ceasefire agreement," regardless of its purpose or who proposed it, indicates one thing: both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war are exhausted and willing to cease fire. However, although both the West and Russia are under tremendous pressure to continue the Russia-Ukraine war, there is a "temperature difference" in their "endurance." In other words, on this issue, the U.S. is under the most pressure and is the party most eager to obtain a "ceasefire agreement."

This means that Russia is banking on the fact that the Trump administration is under immense pressure due to internal strife in the U.S., and that Russia can "hold on a bit longer." On the issue of the "ceasefire agreement," Russia will not stop until it achieves its goal—to permanently fix the "ceasefire agreement" as a "permanent ceasefire agreement." Moreover, for Trump, a "businessman president" with no credibility, even if he makes promises now, he can change his stance at any time. In contrast, the Trump administration is more concerned with obtaining a "ceasefire agreement" rather than its nature.

Trump is eager to become "Hitler II," using authoritarian rule to avoid political purges after four years (according to the U.S. Constitution, Trump cannot seek re-election after four years. Of course, if Trump amends the U.S. Constitution, that’s another matter) and to continue enjoying wealth and luxury (the essence of so-called "Western democracy" is an extremely backward "clan politics"). For Trump and the "Trump faction," how to quickly stabilize the external environment and focus all efforts on "quelling internal unrest," consolidating power, and making a fortune in the process is absolutely the "overwhelmingly important task."

If it helps achieve this goal, Trump would likely agree to any conditions Putin proposes, and Russia probably sees this. However, the problem is that after two months in office, Trump has still not managed to stabilize China-U.S. relations, and China-U.S. relations are not only one side of "must ease relations with China, Europe, and Russia" in Trump’s strategy of "securing the internal before addressing the external," but also a "must." Without stabilizing China-U.S. relations, U.S.-Russia relations cannot be defined.

Thus, the Trump administration can only:

First, gradually ease U.S.-Russia relations by continuously compressing EU interests in Ukraine, promoting the signing of a "ceasefire agreement" as soon as possible;

Second, on the basis of the first, use the trend of easing U.S.-Russia relations to restrain the EU and prevent the EU from causing trouble for the U.S. on the Ukraine and Middle East issues;

Third, on the basis of the second, "play a double act" with the EU, using the EU’s strength to pressure Russia, and from the opposite side (relative to the first), promote the signing of a "ceasefire agreement" as soon as possible;

Fourth, the second and third constitute the complex and delicate "two sides of the same coin" of U.S.-EU relations. The second leans more toward coercion, while the third leans more toward inducement.

It is worth noting that such complex U.S.-EU and U.S.-Russia relations are reflected in the Syria issue as follows: the U.S. threatens the EU with "assisting Russia in substantially returning to Syria," while threatening Russia with "if all else fails, I will withdraw, allowing the EU to intervene more deeply in the subsequent development of the Syria issue" (this is also an inducement to the EU).

● The Purpose of Paulson’s Visit to Beijing Is Very Direct: To Secure a "Ticket" for U.S. President Trump to Visit China as Soon as Possible

The Trump administration may have only now truly realized the severity of the situation—its failure to effectively ease China-U.S. relations. In other words, even if the U.S. now stabilizes U.S.-Russia and U.S.-EU relations, without stabilizing China-U.S. relations, which is the "must" in "must ease relations with China, Europe, and Russia," everything will return to zero. The most serious consequence of this is that the Trump administration’s foreign policy will be in shambles, and without a sufficiently stable external environment as strategic support, the Trump administration can only watch as internal strife intensifies, unable to ease or stop it.

Before continuing the discussion, let’s look at another news report.

On March 15, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson visited Beijing and engaged with Chinese officials. The two sides discussed China-U.S. economic and trade relations and global economic development.

Paulson—what a familiar name. Previously, at the critical moment of the transition from the so-called "first permutation and combination" to the "second permutation and combination," more accurately described as during the "2008 Beijing Olympics-Georgia War round," when the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis was deepening, it was Paulson, then U.S. Treasury Secretary (in the Bush administration), who orchestrated a series of complex measures to trigger the European debt crisis.

It is worth noting that at the time when the financial crisis indicated by the collapse of Washington Mutual Bank in 2008 was intensifying, and there was still opposition within the U.S. Congress to the "$700 billion bailout plan," Paulson, the architect of the plan, was very anxious. According to reports from several well-known U.S. media outlets at the time, in order to get the plan passed as soon as possible, Paulson even knelt on one knee in front of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

Paulson served as an assistant to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and as a presidential assistant to Nixon himself (not the U.S. National Security Advisor) during the Nixon era. After the Watergate scandal, he left politics, joined Wall Street, and worked in the financial sector for decades. In 1994, he was promoted to President and Chief Operating Officer of Goldman Sachs and was first nominated as CEO. In 1998, he became one of Goldman Sachs’ senior partners. In 1999, after Goldman Sachs went public, Paulson became Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs.

Clearly, such a "flexible and influential figure" visiting Beijing at this time, in the observations and assessments of Eastern Commentary, has a very straightforward "purpose": to secure a "ticket" for U.S. President Trump to visit China as soon as possible.

In a sense, Paulson’s understanding of China is deeper than Kissinger’s. After the passing of Kissinger, the "old friend of the Chinese people," it is possible for Paulson to replace Kissinger as the "new friend." In our view, Paulson first represents Wall Street and is the true decision-maker of Wall Street. Of course, since Trump is the current U.S. President and the nominal "spokesperson for Wall Street," it is not inappropriate to say that Paulson’s visit to China is to convey a message for Trump. Additionally, Paulson is a director of the Boao Economic Forum, making him a "three-faced person." In other words, at least in Paulson’s case, on the issue of "complex transitions of Western capital interests," whether transitioning to the "U.S. platform," the "European platform," or accepting "genetic modification" to transition to the "Belt and Road" initiative, all are possible paths.

● Taiwan Is Just a Province of China, and the Taiwan Issue Is Purely China’s Internal Affair. Therefore, There Is Nothing to Discuss Between China and the U.S. on the So-Called "U.S. Making Deals Around the Taiwan Issue"

Everyone should pay attention to news reports about South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Of course, for the international community, the more interesting development is the follow-up to the arrest of former Philippine President Duterte. In other words, how this "Beijing ticket-seeking" former U.S. Treasury Secretary will have new things to say on the Philippines issue, the South China Sea issue, or the traditional security issues in the Western Pacific, and non-traditional security issues in the reform of the global financial order.

The Trump administration certainly knows that securing this "ticket" to visit China is not easy, so it probably will not, and does not want to, easily agree to anything. It still attempts to use the "Taiwan card" to bargain with China. However, the problem is that China simply ignores this!

The so-called "ignoring" means:

First, we are willing to reiterate that whether it is the U.S. hype about "abandoning Taiwan" or later about "selling Taiwan cheaply to China," China considers it all nonsense and ignores it. Taiwan is just a province of China, and the Taiwan issue is purely China’s internal affair. Therefore, there is nothing to discuss between China and the U.S. on the so-called "U.S. making deals around the Taiwan issue";

Second, we are also willing to reiterate that the recovery of Taiwan has long been in a state of "action may be taken tonight." Although China is still making every effort to extend the favorable situation of "crossing the river by feeling the stones" day by day, there will be no change on principled issues. In other words, if the situation really develops to the point where China must choose between "recovering Taiwan" and "crossing the river by feeling the stones," China will not hesitate to choose the former;

Third, recently, China has continuously demonstrated to the outside world the specific means by which it can recover Taiwan at any time. In addition to the "heavy amphibious assault tower" called the "Taiwan recovery device" by netizens—the large special amphibious combat barge—various new technologies and equipment have also appeared one after another in the public eye. Here, we will focus on introducing a new 155mm naval gun.

On March 12, some media reported that the Chinese military is likely testing a 155mm large-caliber naval gun. There are reports that this may be the largest and most advanced chemical-powered naval gun ever equipped by the Chinese Navy since its modernization.

Previously, a picture circulated online of the Type 071 amphibious transport dock ship "Kunlun Shan," which was undergoing maintenance and renovation at a Chinese port. Its bow-mounted H/PJ-26 76mm main gun was replaced by a larger "new type of gun" covered by a gun cover. It is likely the rumored new "domestic 155mm naval gun." Some netizens discovered that as early as 2024, the Inner Mongolia North Heavy Industries Group had explicitly mentioned in a public report by its official media that the 155mm naval gun had been developed.

Compared to army artillery, medium and large-caliber naval guns used on modern warships generally range from 127mm to 155mm. These naval guns are not only powerful but also versatile. They can be used for sea and shore strikes, as well as for air defense and missile defense. The H/PJ-45 130mm naval gun equipped on the Type 055 10,000-ton destroyer is one of the best in medium and large-caliber naval guns. It not only has a large caliber and strong power but also a high rate of fire and accuracy, with extremely strong firepower. The rate of fire of this naval gun is as high as 40 rounds per minute, twice that of the MK-45 127mm naval gun (produced by the U.S. FMC Company), which has a rate of fire of no more than 20 rounds per minute. An army howitzer battalion generally fires 36 rounds per minute. The firepower output of one H/PJ-45 naval gun is almost comparable to that of a howitzer battalion (equipped with 18 guns).

● If the Trump Administration Still Has No Conclusion on the Visit to China Within a Month, Whether the Trump Administration Can Continue to Exist May Be a Big Question Mark

In a sense, Paulson is a somewhat idealistic figure, and he is a relatively special existence in the U.S. and even the entire Western world. It is likely that Wall Street would not have sent Paulson to Beijing in such a hurry unless it was absolutely necessary.

It should be added that Paulson’s visit to China is a shock to both the EU and Russia. At the very least, the Trump administration has shown that if all else fails, in order to get Trump to visit China as soon as possible, the U.S. can only negotiate according to the conditions set by China. Therefore, for the EU and Russia, how to raise the threshold for easing China-U.S. relations seems quite urgent.

It is not impossible that the EU and Russia will make some concessions to the Trump administration on the Ukraine and Middle East issues, but the possibility of making substantive concessions is not high. In a sense, they are also curious about whether the Trump administration will negotiate according to the conditions set by China. In other words, if the Trump administration-controlled U.S. really "kneels all the way" to China this time, that is, really makes substantive compromises or concessions, then the EU and Russia will likely have to adjust their respective policies toward the U.S. and China.

Everyone should pay close attention to how former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson’s visit to China unfolds and whether Trump’s visit to China can be finalized. In our observations and assessments, if the Trump administration still has no conclusion on the visit to China within a month, whether the Trump administration can continue to exist may be a big question mark.

 

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

 

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