2025年3月1日，星期五，第1208期

【媒体报道】

日前，某知名美媒抛出一爆炸性大新闻，声称马斯克将在五角大楼“听取美国军方有关潜在对华战争计划的绝密简报”。在多方紧急辟谣后，当地时间3月21日，美国总统特朗普在白宫椭圆形办公室再次否认了有关计划在五角大楼举行此类简报会的报道。

据这家美媒报道，在当天宣布一份美军新型战斗机国防合同的记者会上，特朗普回应称，“美国不想与中国发生任何潜在战争”。但他同时声称，如果战争真的爆发，美国“完全有能力应对”。“他们编造了这个故事，因为这是一个好故事。他们都是非常不诚实的人。”特朗普称该媒体的报道让他大感意外，“我打电话给（美国国防部长）皮特，我问：‘（报道说的）是真的吗？’绝对不是，他（马斯克）是为了政府效率部的事来的，不是为了中国。如果你提到中国，我想他会走出房间。”

【讨论纪要】

●特朗普访华的急迫性达到了无以复加的地步

在美前财长保尔森访华基本以失败告终，美俄达成“临时不全面停火协议”，特朗普政府不得不在美俄关系和美欧关系中进一步选择损害欧美关系以向俄罗斯进一步妥协让步，在美国金融维稳因种种原因，尤其是“中国因素”（比如，“DeepSeek+华为”）的猛烈冲击下惨不忍睹的背景下，特朗普访华的急迫性达到了无以复加的地步。

中国对美国这一轮的猛烈冲击，主要集中在2024年年底，涵盖传统安全层面和非传统安全层面。当年日本之所以在“广场协议”上吃如此暴亏，主要一条就在日本在传统安全层面是一个侏儒。

相比之下，PLA至少在中国周边地区已经成为美军无论如何也无法战胜的存在。在非传统安全层面，通过雅鲁藏布江下游水电站工程正式获得国家核准，展示随时可以进入“最低经济内循环”的能力。

值得一提的是，在我们的观察中，特朗普是有史以来对华最强硬的一位美国总统。拜登政府总体上继承了特朗普第一任期制定的强硬对华路线。当特朗普卷土重来后，更是变本加厉：在一中原则上再做文章，利用“台湾问题”讹诈中国；妄图在全球打造“关税反华同盟”；企图通过展示美国有能力控制世界范围内的主要海峡、运河、航线和港口威胁中国海上贸易路线安全等。面对这样一个穷凶极恶的美国政府，中国本着“敌不动，我不动；敌欲动，我先动”的斗争原则，在传统安全层面和非传统安全层面打出一套强有力的“组合拳”，以至于特朗普政府上台2个月后，无论是外交，还是内政，均交了“白卷儿”。于是，特朗普政府不得不转身先去处理美俄关系，期待通过处理美俄关系取得进展撬动推进处理中美关系。

几经周折，特朗普政府和俄罗斯终于签署了协议，只是这个协议看上去非常奇怪，故而我们将其调侃为“临时不全面停火协议”。但对特朗普政府来说，这并不重要，签署协议就可以立刻拿来利用。

●特朗普政府的外交现状是……

在我们的观察与评估中，特朗普政府的外交现状是：

第一，“务必处理好对华、对欧、对俄三大关系中的‘大多数’才有可能获得‘内斗’的胜利”；

第二，在“第一”的基础上，“对华关系是必选项”；

第三，在“第一”“第二”的基础上，妥善处理中美关系显然是特朗普政府目前外交工作的首要任务；

第四，中国坚持原则毫不动摇，不满足中国所提条件——坚决不与特朗普政府谈所谓“交易台湾”的话题，要谈就谈南海问题，以及如何具体落地施行“太平洋足够大，容得下中美两国”，就是不给特朗普发放访华“机票”；

第五，不得已，特朗普政府开始摆出“愿意和中国谈‘南海问题’”的姿态，伙同欧盟策划并施行“菲律宾前总统杜特尔特被捕”事件；

第六，对俄罗斯来说，认定这是一个千载难逢地从美国人手中尽量淘换到急需利益的机会，比如，有效重返叙利亚，实质性解除对俄罗斯的经济，尤其是金融制裁等。且特朗普政府因“时间因素”越被动，俄罗斯索取利益越多、越急；

第七，所谓“特朗普政府因‘时间因素’越被动”，在俄罗斯看来，既包括中美关系，俄美关系，也包括欧美关系。也就是说，随着特朗普政府进一步对俄罗斯妥协让步，随着特朗普访华之急迫溢于言表，欧美关系也变得愈加复杂和微妙。

●特朗普政府大肆鼓吹的“合纵连横，远交近攻”就被玩成了，将自己最大的传统盟友——欧盟，玩到了其最大的敌人——中国这边

在继续展开讨论前，来看一则新闻报道。

3月19日，据俄媒报道，当被俄罗斯媒体问及俄美是否讨论过潜在的元首会晤举行地，美国总统中东问题特使威特科夫提到的沙特阿拉伯是否为可能地点时，佩斯科夫说，“这一方案不能被排除，但目前还没有关于这个问题的具体细节”。 报道称，威特科夫此前接受媒体采访时暗示，俄美两国领导人会晤可以在沙特举行。威特科夫说，他不能代表普京和特朗普发言，但他“最确信的是（双方会晤）会发生”。

从美方的描述来看，俄方对于俄美沙特再次会晤并不反对，只是具体的会晤细节有待商榷。表面看，双方这一次的沙特会晤谈的是乌克兰问题，但从会晤地点，也就是“中东-沙特”来看，双方谈的显然不仅是乌克兰问题，更有俄罗斯关心的中东问题。与此同时，伴随着俄罗斯联邦安全会议副主席没得味耶夫的揶揄和以色列内塔尼亚胡小集团在巴勒斯坦加沙地带和约旦河西岸的倒行逆施，欧盟则在“菜单”中瑟瑟发抖。

在这一背景下，我们又注意到了另外两则新闻报道：

第一，3月18日，中共中央政治局委员、中央外办主任王毅应约同法国总统外事顾问博纳通电话；

第二，3月20日，法国总统马克龙在布鲁塞尔宣布，他将于4月7日和8日访问埃及，届时他将讨论阿拉伯国家的加沙重建计划。

也许欧盟的主要国家领导人，比如，法国总统马克龙，已经深刻意识到，如果想要爬上“餐桌”，仅靠欧盟自己似乎是不够的，必须找“帮手”。于是，在特朗普政府于美欧关系和美俄关系中选择后者之际，欧盟则在欧美关系和中欧关系中同样选择了后者。如此，此前东方时事解读形象形容的，围绕乌克兰问题和中东问题形成的“两桌儿麻将”基本正式成型。讽刺的是，特朗普政府大肆鼓吹的“合纵连横，远交近攻”就被玩成了，将自己最大的传统盟友——欧盟，玩到了其最大的敌人——中国这边。

不过，从特朗普政府真正关心的不是外交，不是经济，而是内斗的角度去观察也算“有情可原”。在特朗普眼中，除非做大“蛋糕”，否则既不能“化敌为友”，更无法阻止“化友为敌”。然而，做大“蛋糕”的“钥匙”在于必须尽快妥善处理中美关系。

●虽然欧盟不会公开找美国人的麻烦，但不代表不能暗中找美国人的麻烦

尽管目前欧美关系还没有恶化到“公开争吵”的程度，但也不意味着欧美关系对特朗普政府而言轻松到哪里去。以乌克兰问题为例，虽然欧盟不会公开找美国人的麻烦，但不代表欧盟不能暗中找美国人的麻烦。

3月20日凌晨，俄罗斯萨拉托夫州的恩格斯空军基地遭到乌军大规模无人机攻击。据西方媒体披露，袭击当时，爆炸声震天响，弹药库殉爆导致一朵巨大的橘色蘑菇云直冲天际。恩格斯空军基地是俄空天军的大本营之一，基地经常会有“图-160”战略轰炸机、“图-95MS”战略轰炸机停留。恐怕这次袭击，俄军损失不小。此外，3月21日凌晨，乌军在从库尔斯克州撤退时炸毁该州境内苏贾天然气计量站。

对此，俄方“反应强烈”，俄国防部称这次爆炸是基辅的蓄意挑衅，是对刚刚达成的“临时停火协议”的恶意破坏。而乌军总参谋部则为自己辩解，指责俄罗斯是发动袭击的罪魁祸首。俄外交部发言人扎哈罗娃则一边强烈敦促特朗普政府就此恶意破坏行为给俄方一个交代，另一边强硬表示，如果基辅继续攻击俄罗斯的能源基础设施，莫斯科保留对其作出对称反应的权利。

在我们的观察与评估中，除了特朗普和“特朗普们”之外的北约，恐怕是以上一系列针对俄罗斯军事基地、能源基础设施进行军事打击的幕后黑手。这部分势力构成复杂，既包括已经逃往，或正计划逃往欧洲“安营扎寨”、伺机东山再起的“拜登们之索罗斯们”，也包括“欧洲利益”（欧洲国家利益和欧洲资本利益）的一部分（比如，“老欧洲”们）。我们可以将其看作是此前我们提到的现代版“金刀计”的最新演化。对此，特朗普恐怕是“哑巴吃黄连，有苦说不出”，无论如何，在俄罗斯看来，这就是“美国人”干的，而特朗普政府目前正执政美国。

在我们看来，也许俄罗斯很清楚，这一系列袭击并不是特朗普政府所为，但这却是俄罗斯趁机拉高要价的绝佳机会。有趣的是，俄方一面对所谓“特朗普政府违反协议”大加指责，另一方面则“爽快”地表示愿意在沙特和美国继续展开会晤。俄罗斯的意思很明白，那就是，“出了这档子事儿，特朗普政府要如何补偿”？

更何况，美国内部恶斗仍然在如火如荼地进行之中。话说，特朗普政府公开的有关美国前总统肯尼迪遇刺案未删减的几万页文件中，虽然没有明确指出“凶手是谁”，但字里行间却处处指向拜登和“拜登们”，甚至影影绰绰的有以色列情报机关摩萨德的影子。显然，这非常类似“爱泼斯坦案件”的曝光方式，就是让大家就“几万页文件之外的什么什么”，猜、猜、再猜！

●美国内部恶斗愈演愈烈，使得特朗普政府的中东政策前所未有地被动

尽管在乌克兰问题上欧盟“不便”公开找美国人的麻烦，但不代表欧盟“方便”在其他战略方向，比如，中东问题上，找美国人的麻烦。

由于美国内部恶斗愈演愈烈，特朗普政府的中东政策前所未有地被动，以至于其现在不得不选择继续支持内塔尼亚胡小集团。如此一来，势必与以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家，以及一些中东主要国家，如，埃及，尤其是与对继续深入介入叙利亚局势后续发展抱有强烈期待的欧盟，逐渐形成对立的局面。这让我们观察到了“欧美公开争吵”在乌克兰问题之外，也就是中东问题上，出现进一步趋向“正式形成”的苗头。

我们注意到，以色列国防军当地时间3月20日表示，以军当天在约旦河西岸城市伯利恒抓捕了9名巴勒斯坦人。以军称，他们在民用道路上向以色列车辆投掷石头。

显然，内塔尼亚胡政府也在抓紧时间，利用这一千载难逢的好时机，为巩固政权，避免被政治清算而不遗余力。这显然是在给特朗普政府“上眼药”，更是在进一步刺激本就已经复杂化的欧美关系。也许内塔尼亚胡会这样对特朗普说：我也是被逼无奈，谁让法庭总惦记着审判我呢，要不特朗普去劝劝美国内部拜登和“拜登们”那些人，不要总和我过不去？

与此同时，内塔尼亚胡内心的独白也是这样的：既然你特朗普在公开肯尼迪遇刺案文件的问题上影射以色列，对我内塔尼亚胡不仁，就别怪我在巴以问题（特朗普政府的中东政策）上对你不义！正所谓，人不为己天诛地灭，何况你特朗普也是这种人！

●在也门胡塞武装可能成立“也门临时政府”的假设下，是否会形成某种意义上的“中、欧、俄战略协调”？

在继续展开讨论之前，来看一则新闻报道。

3月19日，美媒援引消息人士的话称，美国总统特朗普3月初已致信伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊。特朗普在该信件中“措辞强硬”，一方面提议就新的核协议进行谈判，另一方面警告伊朗如果拒绝该提议并继续推进其核计划，将面临严重后果。特朗普在信中表示，他不希望进行无限期的谈判，并提到了两个月期限。该媒体称，目前尚不清楚这两个月的期限是从信件送达之时算起，还是从谈判开始之时算起。报道还表示，在这封信被送至伊朗前，白宫已向包括以色列、沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋在内的几个美国盟友简要说明了信件内容。

特朗普写给哈梅内伊的信是在3月初，在美国媒体公布信件大体内容后，伊朗方面才被动应对：伊朗外长阿拉格齐在3月20日回应称，特朗普的来信“更多是威胁”。而伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊则在3月21日表示，美国应该知道，跟伊朗打交道靠威胁起不到任何作用。

伊朗最高精神领袖哈梅内伊对特朗普来信的回应，尤其是回应时间让人感到费解。特朗普如此“虎狼之词”，作为伊朗最高决策者，为何从3月初拖到3月中下旬，且在美方主动公开信件内容的情况下如此被动地做出回应？此外，据此前美媒爆料的消息，美方共给伊方写去了两封信，另一封写给伊朗总统佩泽希齐杨，他是伊朗当局的最高行政长官。

对此，我们不禁要问，为什么美国人只公开了写给哈梅内伊的信？写给佩泽希齐杨的那封信中又写了什么？不难感觉出，特朗普政府通过这样一手操作，让包括伊朗社会在内的方方面面，对于伊朗决策层内部矛盾有了更加公开、深刻地认识。对于刚刚与伊朗进行“和平纽带-2025”的中国和俄罗斯恐怕也会对这样的伊朗感到疑虑——伊朗是不是接受了美国的威胁？伊朗的对外政策是不是又要摇摆回“投降路线”？

不难看出，伊朗决策层由于此前一连串的重大战略决策失误，不仅赔了夫人（苦心经营多年的“什叶派抵抗之弧”土崩瓦解）又折兵（伊朗在中东地区，伊斯兰世界和全球范围内，国家声望和信用遭受沉重打击）。这让方方面面更难对这样的伊朗形成信任。而特朗普政府如此做的主要意图之一就是转移目标、转移火力，于是，已经沦落到“姥姥不亲，舅舅不爱”的伊朗，就成了战略处境极其被动的特朗普政府，寻求调整行棋步调之“抓手”的“接盘侠”。

某种意义上说，特朗普政府和哈梅内伊为最高精神领袖、佩泽希齐杨为总统的伊朗是一对儿“难兄难弟”，都把压力集中在自己身上。而唯一的区别就是，如果伊朗决策层最终顶不住压力再次对美国妥协、投降，其成为特朗普政府的“出气筒”也就再自然不过了。然而，伊朗的尴尬之处却在于，由于以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家（背后是中国）在中东问题上的影响力一天强过一天，特朗普政府恐怕不敢彻底得罪沙特，自然也就不敢接受“投美”的伊朗。

值得一提的是，尽管胡塞武装目前没人公开表示支持，但方方面面恐怕都在“暗中观察”，其中也许也包括欧盟。所谓“暗中观察”，其一，考察胡塞武装到底是不是“有为青年”；其二，考察伊朗，面对胡塞武装遭遇美军空袭，伊朗这位当下的“什叶派穆斯林领袖”有何反应；其三，在“其一”“其二”的基础上，动态评估，未来“什叶派穆斯林”的“大旗”到底应该由谁来扛。

我们不妨做一个假设，如果真的有一天，中、俄，尤其是欧盟，三方都认为，胡塞武装很有可能占据整个也门，甚至可以成立“也门临时政府”，那么，撇去中、俄，这是否算是欧美关系向“欧美公开争吵”方向进一步发展的具体表现？如果加入俄罗斯因素，这是否算是俄罗斯以另外一种模式，也就是“非美国协助”模式有效重返中东吗？

一旦欧美矛盾进一步激化，俄罗斯一定会首先将其服务于在乌克兰问题上，中东问题上，更多地攫取自己急需的利益。那么，在特朗普政府眼中，如果这个时候的特朗普政府仍然执政美国的话，这算不算是某种意义上的“中、欧、俄战略协调”呢？

●贝莱德像极了，东方时事解读自“埃及之乱”提出的，公开游离于欧美平台之外的，代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益

在本次回顾的最后，我们再来看一则新闻报道。

3月20日，美国企业家埃隆·马斯克领导的xAI公司宣布，将参与美国资产管理公司贝莱德牵头的人工智能（AI）基础设施投资基金。这清楚地表明，xAI想要与竞争对手开放人工智能研究中心（OpenAI）正在推动的“星际之门”投资计划展开竞争。此前，贝莱德集团在3月19日宣布，xAI和英伟达将参与其推出的AI基金。目前尚不清楚xAI和英伟达将以何种方式参与其中，比如它们是否会向该基金注资。

种种迹象表明，马斯克似乎有意和贝莱德集团搞出一个“新联盟”。

在漫长且仍在继续的俄乌战争中，马斯克的“星链”系统发挥了极其重要的作用。前不久，马斯克旗下的美国太空探索技术公司（SpaceX）刚刚用“龙”飞船将受困太空9个月之久的“玄冥二老”接回。不难看出，“新军工复合体”在加紧行动中。如果我们将其放在美国内部恶斗愈演愈烈的背景下去观察，特朗普和“特朗普们”显然摆出了一副准备选择“新军工复合体”的姿态，潜台词就是：我的耐心是有限的，不要逼我（对内）“摊牌”！

值得一提的是，贝莱德集团原本就与美国的“旧军工复合体”瓜葛甚深，而现在却和马斯克打得火热，这像什么？在我们看来，贝莱德像极了，东方时事解读自“埃及之乱”提出的，公开游离于欧美平台之外的，代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益。而现在，贝莱德集团似乎正游离于“新、旧美国军工复合体”之外。

贝莱德集团的表现，让我们想起了前不久访华的美前财长保尔森，在我们看来，其是真正意义上的“华尔街叙事人”，更是“三面人”。所谓“三面人”就是，它们既可以选择“复杂转进”至“美国平台”，也可以选择“复杂转进”至“欧洲平台”，更可以接受“基因改造”进而“复杂转进”至“一带一路”。对此，国际社会不妨善加利用，正所谓，围三阙一。别忘了，贝莱德集团和马斯克都在中国有大量的利益关切，他们完全有可能选择依托“DeepSeek+华为”对付OpenAI，对付美国的“旧军工复合体”。只要能够继续赚钱，便百无禁忌。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Friday, March 21, 2025, Issue No. 1208

Behind the rumor that "Elon Musk is briefed on the US's secret war plan against China," could there be a "fatal trap" targeting the Trump administration?

[Media Coverage]

Recently, a well-known US media outlet dropped a bombshell, claiming that Musk would be briefed at the Pentagon on the "top-secret war plan of the US military regarding a potential war with China." After multiple urgent denials, on March 21 local time, US President Trump once again denied in the Oval Office of the White House the reports about such a briefing being held at the Pentagon.

According to this US media report, at a press conference announcing a new US military fighter jet defense contract that day, Trump responded, "The United States does not want any potential war with China." However, he also claimed that if a war really broke out, the United States was "fully capable of responding." "They made up this story because it's a good story. They are all very dishonest people," Trump said, expressing his surprise at the media report. "I called (US Defense Secretary) Pete and asked, 'Is this true?' Absolutely not. He (Musk) came for the matter of the Efficiency Department, not for China. If you mention China, I think he will walk out of the room."

【Discussion Summary】

● The urgency of Trump's visit to China has reached an unprecedented level

Against the backdrop of former US Treasury Secretary Paulson's visit to China ending in failure, the US and Russia reaching a "temporary non-comprehensive ceasefire agreement," and the Trump administration having to further choose between harming US-European relations to make further concessions to Russia in the context of US-Russia and US-European relations, and with the financial stability of the United States in a miserable state due to various reasons, especially the "China factor" (such as "DeepSeek + Huawei"), the urgency of Trump's visit to China has reached an unprecedented level.

China's fierce impact on the United States this round mainly occurred at the end of 2024, covering both traditional security and non-traditional security aspects. The main reason Japan suffered such a huge loss in the "Plaza Accord" back then was that Japan was a dwarf in the traditional security aspect.

In contrast, the PLA has become an existence that the US military can no longer defeat in any way at least in the surrounding areas of China. In the non-traditional security aspect, the official approval of the downstream hydropower station project of the Yarlung Zangbo River demonstrates the ability to enter a "minimum economic internal circulation" at any time.

It is worth mentioning that in our observation, Trump is the most tough US president ever against China. The Biden administration has generally inherited the tough anti-China line set by Trump during his first term. When Trump made a comeback, he went even further: making more trouble on the one-China principle, blackmailing China with the "Taiwan issue"; attempting to build a "tariff anti-China alliance" globally; trying to threaten the security of China's maritime trade routes by showing that the United States has the ability to control major straits, canals, shipping lanes, and ports around the world. Faced with such a vicious US government, China adheres to the principle of "if the enemy does not move, I will not move; if the enemy moves, I will move first" in the struggle. It has played a strong "combination punch" on both traditional security and non-traditional security aspects. As a result, two months after the Trump administration took office, it handed in a "blank sheet" in both diplomacy and domestic affairs. Thus, the Trump administration had to turn to deal with US-Russian relations first, hoping to make progress in handling US-China relations by making headway in handling US-Russian relations.

After several twists and turns, the Trump administration and Russia finally signed an agreement, but this agreement looks very strange, so we joked about it as a "temporary non-comprehensive ceasefire agreement." But for the Trump administration, this doesn't matter. Signing the agreement can be immediately utilized.

● The diplomatic status quo of the Trump administration is...

In our observation and assessment, the diplomatic status quo of the Trump administration is as follows:

First, "only by properly handling the 'majority' of the three major relationships with China, Europe, and Russia can there be a chance of winning the 'internal struggle'";

Second, on the basis of "first," "the relationship with China is a must";

Third, on the basis of "first" and "second," properly handling Sino-US relations is obviously the top priority of the Trump administration's current diplomatic work;

Fourth, China adheres to its principles unswervingly and will not meet the conditions put forward by China - resolutely not discussing the so-called "Taiwan deal" with the Trump administration. If there is a discussion, it will be about the South China Sea issue and how to specifically implement "the Pacific is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States," that is, not issuing a "ticket" for Trump's visit to China;

Fifth, out of necessity, the Trump administration began to show a willingness to "talk about the 'South China Sea issue' with China" and colluded with the EU to plan and carry out the incident of the arrest of former Philippine President Duterte;

Sixth, for Russia, this is seen as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to exchange as many urgently needed interests as possible from the Americans, such as effectively returning to Syria and substantially lifting economic, especially financial, sanctions on Russia. And the more passive the Trump administration is due to "time factors," the more and faster Russia will demand benefits;

Seventh, the so-called "the Trump administration is more passive due to 'time factors'" in the eyes of Russia includes not only Sino-US relations and Russia-US relations but also EU-US relations. That is to say, as the Trump administration further compromises with Russia and the urgency of Trump's visit to China becomes more apparent, EU-US relations have also become increasingly complex and delicate.

● The "vertical and horizontal alliance, making friends far and attacking near" hyped by the Trump administration has turned into playing its biggest traditional ally - the EU - into its biggest enemy - China

Before continuing the discussion, let's take a look at a news report.

On March 19, according to Russian media reports, when asked by Russian media whether the United States and Russia had discussed the possible venue for a potential summit meeting, US President's Special Envoy for the Middle East Peace Process Jason Greenblatt mentioned whether Saudi Arabia could be a possible location. Dmitry Peskov said, "This option cannot be ruled out, but there are no specific details about this issue at present."

The report said that Greenblatt had previously hinted in an interview with the media that a meeting between the leaders of Russia and the United States could be held in Saudi Arabia. Greenblatt said that he could not speak on behalf of Putin and Trump, but he was "most confident that (the meeting) will take place."

From the US description, Russia does not oppose another meeting between Russia and the United States in Saudi Arabia, but the specific details of the meeting remain to be discussed. On the surface, the two sides' meeting in Saudi Arabia this time is about the Ukraine issue, but from the meeting location, that is, "the Middle East - Saudi Arabia," it is obvious that the two sides are talking not only about the Ukraine issue but also about the Middle East issues that Russia cares about. Meanwhile, accompanied by the mockery of Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and the outrageous actions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's group in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan River, the EU is shivering on the "menu."

Against this backdrop, we have noticed two other news reports:

First, on March 18, Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee, talked with Bernard Cazeneuve, foreign policy advisor to French President Emmanuel Macron, as called.

Second, on March 20, French President Emmanuel Macron announced in Brussels that he will visit Egypt on April 7 and 8. At that time, he will discuss the reconstruction plan for Gaza of Arab countries.

Perhaps the main leaders of EU countries, such as French President Emmanuel Macron, have deeply realized that if they want to climb onto the "table," relying solely on the EU seems insufficient, and they must find a "helper." Thus, while the Trump administration chose the latter between US-EU relations and US-Russia relations, the EU has similarly chosen the latter between EU-US relations and EU-China relations. In this way, the "two mahjong tables" formed around the Ukraine issue and the Middle East issue, which we described vividly before, have basically officially taken shape. Ironically, the "vertical and horizontal alliance, making friends far and attacking near" hyped by the Trump administration has turned into playing its biggest traditional ally - the EU - into its biggest enemy - China.

However, from the perspective that what the Trump administration really cares about is not diplomacy or the economy but internal struggle, it can be considered "understandable." In Trump's eyes, unless the "cake" is enlarged, it is impossible to "turn enemies into friends," let alone prevent "turning friends into enemies." However, the "key" to enlarging the "cake" lies in properly handling Sino-US relations as soon as possible.

● Although the EU will not openly cause trouble for the Americans, it does not mean that it cannot secretly cause trouble for the Americans

Although the EU "does not conveniently" openly cause trouble for the Americans on the Ukraine issue at present, it does not mean that the EU "conveniently" cannot cause trouble for the Americans in other strategic directions, such as the Middle East issue.

Due to the increasingly fierce internal struggle in the United States, the Trump administration's Middle East policy is unprecedentedly passive, so that it now has to choose to continue supporting Netanyahu's group. As a result, it will inevitably form an opposition with the Gulf Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia and some major Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, especially with the EU, which has strong expectations for further in-depth involvement in the subsequent development of the Syrian situation. This has made us observe the further tendency of the "public quarrel between the EU and the US" on the Middle East issue, apart from the Ukraine issue.

We have noticed that the Israeli Defense Forces said on the evening of March 20 local time that the IDF arrested nine Palestinians in the city of Bethlehem in the West Bank on the same day. The IDF said that they threw stones at Israeli vehicles on a civilian road.

Obviously, the Netanyahu government is also seizing this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to consolidate its regime and avoid political liquidation. This is obviously "putting eye drops" on the Trump administration and further stimulating the already complex EU-US relations. Maybe Netanyahu will say to Trump like this: I have no choice either. Who made the court always keep thinking about trying me? Why doesn't Trump go and persuade those people like Biden in the United States not to always be against me?

At the same time, Netanyahu's inner monologue is also like this: Since you, Trump, alluded to Israel in the matter of publicly releasing the files of the Kennedy assassination case and were unkind to me, Netanyahu, don't blame me for being unrighteous in the Palestinian-Israeli issue (Trump's Middle East policy)! As the saying goes, if you don't work for yourself, heaven will destroy you and the earth will perish. Besides, you, Trump, are also such a person!

● Under the assumption that the Houthi armed forces may establish a "provisional government of Yemen," will there be some form of "strategic coordination among China, the EU, and Russia"?

Before continuing the discussion, let's take a look at a news report.

On March 19, US media quoted sources as saying that US President Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in early March. Trump was "tough in tone" in this letter. On the one hand, he proposed to negotiate a new nuclear agreement. On the other hand, he warned Iran that if it rejected the proposal and continued to advance its nuclear program, it would face serious consequences. Trump said in the letter that he did not want to conduct indefinite negotiations and mentioned a two-month deadline. The media said that it is currently unclear whether this two-month deadline is calculated from the time the letter was delivered or from the start of the negotiations. The report also said that before this letter was sent to Iran, the White House had briefly briefed several US allies, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, on the content of the letter.

Trump's letter to Khamenei was in early March. After the general content of the letter was made public by US media, Iran responded passively: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said on March 20 that Trump's letter "was more of a threat." Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on March 21 that the United States should know that threats are useless in dealing with Iran.

The response of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to Trump's letter, especially the timing of the response, is puzzling. As the top decision-maker in Iran, why did he drag from early March to mid-to-late March and respond so passively when the US side took the initiative to make the content of the letter public? In addition, according to previous reports by US media, the US sent two letters to Iran. The other one was addressed to Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who is the highest administrative official of the Iranian authorities.

We can't help but ask, why did the Americans only make public the letter to Khamenei? What was written in the letter to Raisi? It is not difficult to feel that through such an operation, the Trump administration has made all parties, including Iranian society, have a more open and profound understanding of the internal contradictions within the Iranian decision-making level. China and Russia, which have just conducted the "Peace Bond-2025" with Iran, may also be suspicious of such an Iran - Has Iran accepted US threats? Will Iran's foreign policy swing back to the "surrender line"?

It is obvious that due to a series of major strategic decision-making mistakes before, the Iranian decision-making level has not only lost its wife (the "Shiite resistance arc" painstakingly built up over the years has collapsed) but also lost its soldiers (Iran's national prestige and credit in the Middle East, the Islamic world, and globally have suffered a heavy blow). This makes it even more difficult for all parties to trust such an Iran. One of the main intentions of the Trump administration is to shift the target and firepower. Thus, Iran, which has fallen into an extremely passive strategic situation, has become the "scapegoat" that the Trump administration, seeking to adjust its strategy, wants to "pick up."

In a sense, the Trump administration and Khamenei, as the Supreme Leader, and Raisi as the President of Iran are a pair of "poor brothers," both concentrating pressure on themselves. The only difference is that if the Iranian decision-making level finally succumbs to pressure and compromises or surrenders to the United States again, it will naturally become the "punching bag" of the Trump administration. However, the embarrassing thing about Iran is that due to the increasing influence of Gulf Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia (behind which is China) on the Middle East issue day by day, the Trump administration probably dares not completely offend Saudi Arabia and naturally dares not accept an "Iran that has turned to the US."

It is worth mentioning that although no one from the Houthi armed forces has publicly expressed support, all parties may be "secretly observing," including perhaps the EU. The so-called "secret observation" includes: first, examining whether the Houthi armed forces are really "capable youths"; second, examining Iran's reaction as the current "Shiite Muslim leader" in the face of the Houthi armed forces being attacked by US air strikes; third, on the basis of "first" and "second," dynamically evaluating who should carry the "big flag" of "Shiite Muslims" in the future.

Let's make an assumption. If one day, China, Russia, especially the EU, all believe that the Houthi armed forces are very likely to occupy the whole of Yemen and may even establish a "provisional government of Yemen," then, aside from China and Russia, does this count as a concrete manifestation of the EU-US relationship developing further in the direction of "public quarrels between the EU and the US"? If Russia is included, does this count as Russia effectively returning to the Middle East in another mode, that is, the "non-US assistance" mode?

Once the EU-US contradiction further intensifies, Russia will surely first serve it in the Ukraine issue and the Middle East issue to seize more urgently needed interests. Then, in the eyes of the Trump administration, if the Trump administration is still in power in the United States at this time, does this count as some form of "strategic coordination among China, the EU, and Russia"?

● BlackRock is very similar to the American capital interests representing Western capital interests that are publicly detached from the European and American platforms, as put forward by Oriental Current Affairs Interpretation since the "Egyptian turmoil"

At the end of this review, let's take a look at another news report.

On March 20, xAI, a company led by US entrepreneur Elon Musk, announced that it would participate in an artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure investment fund led by US asset management company BlackRock. This clearly shows that xAI wants to compete with the "Star Gate" investment plan being promoted by OpenAI, its competitor. Previously, BlackRock Group announced on March 19 that xAI and Nvidia would participate in the AI fund it launched. It is currently unclear how xAI and Nvidia will participate, such as whether they will inject funds into the fund.

There are various signs that Musk seems to intend to form a "new alliance" with BlackRock Group.

In the long and ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Musk's "Starlink" system has played an extremely important role. Not long ago, Musk's US space exploration technology company (SpaceX) just used the "Dragon" spacecraft to bring back the "two old men trapped in space for nine months." It is not difficult to see that the "new military-industrial complex" is intensifying its actions. If we observe it against the backdrop of the increasingly fierce internal struggle in the United States, Trump and "Trump's people" clearly show a posture of being ready to choose the "new military-industrial complex." The subtext is: My patience is limited. Don't force me to "lay my cards on the table" (internally)!

It is worth mentioning that BlackRock Group was originally deeply involved with the "old American military-industrial complex," but now it is getting along very well with Musk. What does this look like? In our view, BlackRock is very similar to the American capital interests representing Western capital interests that are publicly detached from the European and American platforms as put forward by Oriental Current Affairs Interpretation since the "Egyptian turmoil." And now, BlackRock Group seems to be detached from both the "new and old American military-industrial complexes."

The performance of BlackRock Group reminds us of former US Treasury Secretary Paulson who visited China not long ago. In our view, he is a true "narrator on Wall Street" and even a "three-sided figure." The so-called "three-sided figure" means that it can choose to "make a complex transition" to the "US platform," or it can choose to "make a complex transition" to the "European platform," and it can even accept "genetic modification" to then "make a complex transition" to the "Belt and Road Initiative." The international community might as well make good use of this. As the saying goes, "Besiege three sides and leave one side open." Don't forget that both BlackRock Group and Musk have significant interests in China. They are entirely likely to choose to rely on "DeepSeek + Huawei" to counter OpenAI and the US "old military-industrial complex." As long as they can continue to make money, there are no taboos.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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