2025年4月18日，星期五，第1229期

结合当前阶段中东地区神经最为紧张的伊朗与埃及之现状，再谈中埃“文明之鹰-2025”联合训练的重要意义

【媒体报道】

4月20日，中国空军同埃及空军的“文明之鹰-2025”联合训练在埃及埃及开罗当地时间4月19日上午正式迎来首个训练日。而中国的运油-20大型空中加油机，也首次现身埃及。中国空军除了出动运油-20大型空中加油机之外，还出动了歼-10C战斗机和歼-10S战斗机这两款歼-10战斗机，以及空警500空中预警机。而埃及空军方面则出动了米格-29战斗机，和中方军机展开了联合训练。

【讨论纪要】

●技术服务费本身就属于虚拟经济，而以此为基础再去参与各类金融衍生品交易就是“虚上加虚”，这是美国经济现状的一个缩影

在正式开始本期讨论之前，我们就中国暂停接收波音飞机，零部件及设备一事做一些内容补充。

需要补充的是，“运20”是我国自主研发的，具有完全自主知识产权，包括加工、材料、航电等，且是涡扇大型运军用输机。大型运军用输机的制造难度比民用大飞机更高，因为军用运输机的使用条件要比用大飞机苛刻的多得多。以法国的空客为例，虽然其能制造A350、A380这样的民用大飞机，但却无法制造涡扇军用运输机，只能制造涡桨军用运输机。而全球能范围内，够制造涡扇大型军用运输机的只有三家，中国，美国和俄罗斯。当然，民航客机在舒适性上比军用运输机要优越一些。

近日，国产大飞机C919的“心脏”国产化进程迎来重大突破。在江苏太仓刚刚结束的2025第九届商用航空发动机技术大会上，中国航发集团董事史坚忠透露，为C919配套的“长江-1000”发动机“试运行表现远超预期”，他补充道，这款发动机的成功将体现中国供应链的韧性。至于航电系统，那是中国的强项，自然不在话下。

有了这些核心技术储备，搞C929（是我国首款按照国际通行适航标准自行研制、具有自主知识产权的喷气式远程宽体客机）自然水到渠成。退一步说，即便中美市场隔绝、脱钩断链，中国完全可以依靠自己的技术积累和强大的工业制造能力对这几千架波音飞机进行维护，比如，顺丰航空近日宣布，他们顺利成功完成了编号为B-2506波音飞机的龙骨梁裂纹的修复工作。之所以原来没有这样干，更多受到的是合同的约束。

说到合同的约束，这里顺便提一句所谓欧美高科技公司的赚钱方式，其中之一就是收取昂贵的技术服务费。在他们看来，虽然飞机、超算和盾构机之类的购买是一次性的，但售后维修则是多次的，对他们来说这就是“印钞机”，就是“摇钱树”。以波音为例，尽管其经营越来越依赖虚拟经济，但基于其产品，无论是民用还是军用，在世界范围内的高额存量都已经形成某种垄断性，其仍可通过收取昂贵的技术服务费产生的现金流（注：生产飞机出售后，通过培训，飞机维修和升级就可以赚取源源不断的金钱。在他们看来，购买也许是偶然，但后续的维修售后是必然，而且可以长期产生稳定的收入。与之类似的还有“W-I”联盟，通过软硬件的轮番升级，也就是不断“讲故事”，彼此“狼狈为奸”来赚取户的钱）去参与各类金融衍生品交易赚钱。

值得一提的是，技术服务费本身就属于虚拟经济，而以此为基础再去参与各类金融衍生品交易就是“虚上加虚”，这就是美国经济现状的一个缩影。但话说回来，没有“售前”，何来“售后”？也就是说，失去强大制造业保障下的“售前”支撑的“售后”是难以为继的。这次暂停接收波音飞机事件中，中国既瞄准其“售前”，更瞄准其“售后”产生的多层次金融衍生交易进行打击。

类似的打击还有美国农业。现在，“特朗普们”中的一部分，也就曾投票给特朗普的美国农场主们开始指责特朗普让他们无法生产，更无从赚钱。还有一个例子就是马斯克，其在特朗普开始关税战的时候并没有第一时间站出来反对，而在中国对美国全面犀利反击并造成美国金融市场上蹿下跳，在自己股票短期内大幅缩水后，开始公开反对特朗普的关税政策。

有趣的是，当西方媒体注意到中国外交部发言人毛宁引用毛主席关于抗美援朝讲话视频——敌人要打多久就打多久，认定这次中国对特朗普“关税战”的反击是玩真的。可以说，这次中国全面且犀利的反击打得特朗普政府措手不及，以至于令“关税战”在短时间内就处于“脱稿运行”状态。

所以，从这个角度来观察，中国宣布暂停接收波音飞机、零部件及设备，不仅打击了美国硕果仅存的制造业，更是对其相应服务业及金融稳定的“精准狙击”。

●特朗普政府“变脸”后“再变脸”的具体表现

如果我们将4月17日，特朗普暗示其不想继续提高对华关税看做是某种“胡萝卜”，与之相对的，特朗普政府宣布将对中国建造船只加征“港口费”就是“大棒”。而这样做的目的则在于特朗普宣称与中国的协议可能在未来3到4周达成。

从以上特朗普政府的最新言行来看，在美国媒体再度炒作马斯克进入五角大楼听取“对华作战计划简报”一事的背后，特朗普的确想要保住的马斯克进出中国的合法性。其也进一步验证了我们就特朗普在“关税战”本质上已经失败的背景下，在美国白宫贸易与制造业高级顾问纳瓦罗被“打入冷宫”并由美国财长贝森特取而代之后，特朗普比之以往更为急于访华的初步评估。

在“关税战”失败后，特朗普政府将非传统安全层面的“摊牌”（本质上是极限战略讹诈）氛围向传统安全层面外溢的意图愈发明显。这也是我们多次提醒大家关注黄渤海军演后续发展是否有大杀器现身，包括新型潜射战略导弹、战略导弹核潜艇以及战略高能武器等的主要原因。也就是说，我们不排除特朗普政府通过学俄罗斯“常规军力不够就用核武来凑”这种更为极端的方式讹诈国际社会，比如，对外宣称研究下一代战略核武器或战略武器投送平台等。尽管，目前还没有正式进入这个阶段，但特朗普政府在西太方向，基于传统安全层面挑衅国际社会的事件越来越多，比如，由B-1B战略轰炸机参与的美韩军演，菲律宾小马科斯政府在南海问题上的不断挑衅，美国航母“尼米兹号”进入西太等。

所以，这次国家最高领导人出访越南（最有可能在南海给中国找麻烦的国家。我们最重视的是越南愿意和中国一道推南海行为准则，也就是不与中国找麻烦）、马来西亚（东盟轮值主席国，也通过中老铁路看到了巨大商机，对修建高铁非常感兴趣）和柬埔寨（前半段跑偏，后半段浪子回头金不换），显然带有事先告知、通气的意味，比如，中国在必要时刻对菲律宾小马斯克政府进行“必要敲打”。

此外，除了西太方向之外，大家还应格外注意中东方向，也就是伊朗方面的最新动向。在我们的观察与评估中，彻底搞乱波斯湾很可能是特朗普政府在忌惮在西太方向战略风险过大的情况下，对国际社会进行极限战略讹诈的另一手段。其最大特点是：其一，表面上看，这种氛围涉及的是传统安全层面的所谓“摊牌”（极限战略讹诈），而实际上内嵌了非传统安全层面“摊牌””（极限战略讹诈）；其二，其极限战略讹诈可以说是“既对外，更对内”。在特朗普看来，如果因波斯湾的稳定被彻底颠覆导致美国金融市场崩溃，更多影响到的是美国国家利益。更何况这其中还有“索罗斯们”“拜登们”等这些特朗普的“敌人们”的利益。原理无非两句话：“我不好过，你们谁都别想好过”“我死之后，管他洪水滔天”。

以上是特朗普政府“变脸”（偷偷摸摸豁免部分商品）后“再变脸”（示好无果后恼羞成怒，更加变本加厉的对国际社会进行极限战略讹诈）的具体表现。

●时间已经成为当今国际博弈中的最重要的战略资源之一

在进一步展开讨论之前，我们再来看一则新闻报道。

4月17日，俄外交部表示，解除针对塔利班活动的禁令为俄阿建立伙伴关系铺平道路。

不难看出，注意到特朗普政府对外政策上“变脸”后“再变脸”的还有俄罗斯，尤其对特朗普政府通过彻底搞乱波斯湾对外，对内进行“双向极限战略讹诈”很感兴趣。不难想象，如果波斯湾真的因为美国打击伊朗核设施彻底混乱，俄罗斯的石油有望再次成为“硬通货”，别的不说，中国、欧盟的石油、天然气进口对俄罗斯的依赖性将会大幅提高（注：曾经两个超级大国都逐渐沦为“破落户”，两国的经济结构越来越相似，比如，能源，农业等。过去，苏联和美国一说到能源，互相看对方也会“顺眼”一点，也就是基于非传统安全层面的某种合作默契）。

至少俄罗斯看懂了特朗普政府“变脸”也好，“再变脸”也罢；基于非传统安全层面也好，基于传统安全也罢，这番折腾本质上还是极限战略讹诈。既然如此，俄罗斯就此玩起了“朝秦暮楚”的剧本——至少表面上，和谁都去搞好关系，进而在中美之间反复横跳以攫取所谓最大利益。

可以说，在中美于非传统安全层面这种无限接近于“摊牌”的关系现状出现后，俄罗斯的渔翁心态空前高涨。正是在这种心态下，俄罗斯从目前美国和伊朗之间关系逐渐趋于紧张之中，尤其是波斯湾稳定可能会出大问题之中看到了巨大商机。但问题在于，基于特朗普政府“远交近攻，合纵连横”的层面也好，基于俄罗斯“朝秦暮楚”的层面也罢，俄罗斯到底是得的多还是失的多？

也许用“赌徒心态”去形容目前阶段的俄罗斯或较为准确。

尽管俄乌战争还在继续，尽管从“叙利亚之乱”到“中东时间陷阱”，再从“两机事件”到“叙利亚再乱”，俄罗斯失去的比得到的要多得多，但是，在俄罗斯当局看来，至少目前这一圈麻将中有翻盘之可能性。至于以前的损失，权且为为发现这一“可能性”缴纳的“学费”。

所谓“翻盘之可能性”，在俄罗斯当局看来，一旦波斯湾的稳定真的除了大问题，上文中提到的中国、欧盟在能源进口问题上不得不对俄罗斯更为依赖就是其主要内容之一。值得一提的是，即便在俄乌战争爆发之后，俄罗斯总统普京也曾就俄罗斯输华能源价格公开抱怨过中国。俄方认为，中国是借俄乌战争，西方对俄罗斯进行经济金融制裁，刻意压低天然气价格。但中方认为，本质上俄乌战争和中国无关，中国不过是随行就市。所以，在俄罗斯当局看来，当波斯湾向外再也运不出一桶原油的时候，俄罗斯对中国在能源价格问题上“狮子大开口”也是一种随行就市。而这种心态也会反应在非传统安全层面的其它产业上，比如，稀土、铝制品等，总体上表现为俄美关系基于非传统安全层面的快速靠近，而其背景墙则是俄罗斯根深蒂固的“阿富汗政策小九九”对中国的忌惮、提防甚至恐惧。

“朝秦暮楚”策略中也体现了俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”的另一面，也就是借中国之力抵抗西方，主要体现在“俄罗斯和美国与中国都试图搞好关系”中的“与中国搞好关系”，尤其体现在，基于传统安全层面，俄罗斯在响应特朗普政府多次或明或暗就“南亚破局”进程提出配合美国的问题上显得非常谨慎和小心，毕竟俄乌战争还在继续，而中国是俄罗斯无可争议的最大外在战略策应来源。

俄罗斯的“朝秦暮楚”也好，“渔翁心态”也罢，中国都可以接受，只要你们在中国第一时间，第一个对美国就“关税战”问题上做出全面犀利反击后不去跟从特朗普政府组建什么“关税反华同盟”就是胜利。而对特朗普政府来说，其“合纵连横，远交近攻”策略虽然让中俄战略互信有所松动，但也只不过让俄罗斯“朝秦暮楚”而已。而把自己传统盟友欧盟玩成了“渔翁心态”，和中国一道抵制自己的关税政策。而对中国来说，玩的就是时间。尽管时间这种东西无法创造，也无法控制，看不见摸不到，甚至有的科学家认为宇宙中根本就没有时间，但似乎时间已经成为当今国际博弈中的最重要的战略资源之一。

●解放军的“先头部队”通过“兵进埃及这个中东国家、非洲国家”的方式，来熟悉战场了

说到中东局势，面对波斯湾的问题随时可能出大问题的伊朗自然是神经紧张的一方，还有一方比之伊朗同样神经紧张，甚至比之更甚的就是埃及。当前阶段，以色列在中东地区的倒行逆施可谓变本加厉，成立“大以色列”的野心已经昭然若揭，不加丝毫掩饰。而一旦难民潮形成，第一波遭殃的就是拉法口岸一侧的埃及和约旦河东岸的约旦。

面对以色列的横行霸道、咄咄逼人，中东国家越来越感觉到需要引入外来势力加以制约，在我们看来，在众多中东国家严重，欧盟，尤其是中国是重要的可以借用的外部力量。

多年前，准确讲是10多年前，围绕“欧美初步合流，由俄罗斯错误应对、中国通过‘中国在中东没有私利’、从而在中东果断止损，退而于外经略南海、于内坚定践行一切依靠人民、以全面破解西方则精心为中俄为核心的国际社会（后，主要是俄罗斯掉进去了）设置了所谓中东时间陷阱”的相关内容，东方时事解读就明确强调：

中东，时机不到时，即便是想请我们去，我们也不会去，比如，当时的德国代表西方，公开要求中国在中东发挥更大作用，然而中国根本就不接球；时机到时，不请我们也会去。现在，这个时机虽然还没有完全成熟，但随着中国公开主张“中东，是中东人的中东”显然已经快了！

所以，中国可以有所动作。更何况美国在陷入几个战线的同时，竟然又在错误的时间、错误的地点选择了错误的对手、挑起了一场“旨在伴随战略攻击之战略讹诈”的错误战争，除了遭到中国在非传统安全层面的坚定有效的反击之外，于传统安全层面，相应的反击必然随之而来。这不，中东，这个“当今国际形势”下的所谓“中原（大别山）”也好，非洲，这个“全球格局”下的所谓中原（大别山）也罢，解放军的“先头部队”、通过“兵进埃及这个中东国家、非洲国家”的方式，来熟悉战场了！

在我们看来，即便还仅仅是“熟悉”的层面，准备借特朗普内斗之需，通过搞“大以色列”、以摆脱清算的的以色列极端复国主义者，特别是内塔尼亚胡小集团，恐怕心里怕极了！以中东为战略重中之重的美帝国主义，心里恐怕更怕了！既然有人一定要拿中国当对手，那么，中国必将是一个合格且强大的对手。

值得一提的是，以色列在‌1967年6月‌的第三次中东战争中占领过埃及的西奈半岛。以色列实际控制西奈半岛一直到1982年，后根据1979年“戴维营协议”，以色列开始分阶段撤军，并最终于1982年4月将西奈半岛完全归还埃及。期间在半岛建立犹太人定居点并驻军。

以色列长期以来对西奈半岛都存在领土野心，西奈半岛是埃及与以色列之间的缓冲地带，控制该地区可保障以色列南部安全，更有机会染指苏伊士运河。而在埃及看来，以色列借制造难民潮为借口，完全可能借机再次入侵西奈半岛。

让我们把话题拉回到这一次中埃联合军演上。观察的要点在于，除了军演具体内容与解放军投入的武器之外，去的时候是“指战员+重装”，回来的时候是否“指战员回，重装‘实质性’留下”？这些，值得网友们密切关注！尤其是“雷达”相关的。而埃及作为中东地区名副其实的人口大国，与以色列素有历史恩怨，且中东地区一直以来都流行着“没有埃及就没有中东战争”的传说。当美以倒行逆施再次真切威胁到埃及的国家安全之际，当埃及有可能从非西方的第三方手中获得某些神兵利器之后，以色列也好，美军也罢，不说解放军的制式武器、即便是带“E”的，恐怕也足够对美以形成实实在在的军事威慑。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Friday, April 18, 2025, Issue No. 1229

In light of the current highly tense situation in the Middle East, particularly between Iran and Egypt, we will now discuss the significance of the China-Egypt "Eagle of Civilizations-2025" joint training exercise.

[Media Coverage]

On April 20th, the China-Egypt "Eagle of Civilizations-2025" joint air force training officially commenced its first training day on April 19th local time in Cairo, Egypt. China's Y-20 large aerial refueling aircraft made its debut in Egypt for this exercise. In addition to the Y-20, the Chinese Air Force also deployed J-10C and J-10S fighter jets, as well as the KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft. The Egyptian Air Force, in turn, contributed MiG-29 fighter jets for joint training with their Chinese counterparts.

【Discussion Summary】

● Technical service fees are inherently part of the virtual economy, and using them as a basis for participating in various financial derivatives trading is "compounding virtuality," reflecting a snapshot of the current state of the U.S. economy.

Before delving into the main discussion, we will provide some supplementary information regarding China's suspension of receiving Boeing aircraft, components, and equipment.

It is important to note that the Y-20 is China's independently developed large military transport aircraft with complete intellectual property rights, encompassing processing, materials, avionics, and more. The manufacturing difficulty of large military transport aircraft exceeds that of civilian airliners due to the much harsher operating conditions military aircraft must endure. For example, while Airbus can manufacture civilian airliners like the A350 and A380, it can only produce turboprop military transport aircraft, not turbofan ones. Globally, only three countries—China, the United States, and Russia—are capable of manufacturing turbofan large military transport aircraft. Of course, civilian airliners offer superior comfort compared to military transport aircraft.

Recently, China's domestically produced C919 airliner's "heart"—its engine—has achieved a significant breakthrough in localization. At the 2025 9th Commercial Aviation Engine Technology Conference held in Taicang, Jiangsu, Shi Jianzhong, a board member of the China Aviation Engine Group, revealed that the "Changjiang-1000" engine designed for the C919 has performed "far beyond expectations" during trials. He added that the success of this engine demonstrates the resilience of China's supply chain. As for avionics systems, which are China's forte, there are no concerns.

With these core technological advancements, the development of the C929—China's first self-developed wide-body jetliner in accordance with international airworthiness standards—is a natural progression. Even in the event of market isolation or decoupling between China and the United States, China can rely on its technological prowess and robust industrial manufacturing capabilities to maintain and repair its fleet of thousands of Boeing aircraft. For instance, SF Airlines recently announced the successful repair of a cracked keel beam on a Boeing aircraft with the registration number B-2506. The reason such maintenance was not previously undertaken was primarily due to contractual obligations.

Speaking of contractual obligations, it is worth mentioning the business model of European and American high-tech companies, which often involves charging exorbitant technical service fees. In their view, while the sale of aircraft, supercomputers, and tunnel boring machines is a one-time transaction, post-sale maintenance represents a recurring revenue stream, akin to a "cash cow" or "money tree." Boeing, for example, increasingly relies on the virtual economy, but its substantial global installed base of both civilian and military aircraft grants it a quasi-monopoly, enabling it to generate cash flow through costly technical service fees and participate in various financial derivatives trading. Similarly, the "W-I" alliance profits from continuous software and hardware upgrades, telling "stories" and collaborating to extract money from customers.

It is noteworthy that technical service fees are inherently part of the virtual economy, and using them as a basis for participating in various financial derivatives trading is "compounding virtuality," reflecting a snapshot of the current state of the U.S. economy. However, without a robust manufacturing foundation to support pre-sale activities, post-sale services are unsustainable. In this context, China's suspension of receiving Boeing aircraft, components, and equipment not only targets the U.S.'s dwindling manufacturing sector but also aims to disrupt its service sector and financial stability through multi-layered financial derivative transactions.

Similar disruptions have affected the U.S. agricultural sector. Some U.S. farmers who voted for Trump are now criticizing him for impeding their production and profitability. Another example is Elon Musk, who initially remained silent during Trump's tariff war but later publicly opposed it after China's comprehensive and sharp counterattacks caused significant fluctuations in the U.S. financial market and a sharp decline in his stock value.

Interestingly, Western media noted that Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning's citation of Chairman Mao's remarks on the Korean War—“We will fight as long as the enemy wants to fight”—suggests China's seriousness in countering Trump's "tariff war." This comprehensive and sharp counterattack has caught the Trump administration off guard, leading to "off-script" operations in the "tariff war."

● Specific manifestations of the Trump administration's "changing face" and then "changing face again"

If we view Trump's April 17th hint that he does not intend to further raise tariffs on China as a "carrot," his administration's announcement of imposing "port fees" on Chinese-built vessels is a "stick." The objective is to claim that a deal with China may be reached within the next three to four weeks.

From these recent actions and statements by the Trump administration, it is evident that amidst renewed media speculation about Musk attending a Pentagon briefing on "war plans against China," Trump indeed seeks to preserve Musk's legal access to China. This further validates our initial assessment that, in the aftermath of the "tariff war's" failure, with the ouster of Trump's White House trade and manufacturing senior adviser Navarro and his replacement by U.S. Treasury Secretary Besent, Trump is more eager than ever to visit China.

Following the failure of the "tariff war," the Trump administration's intention to escalate the atmosphere of "confrontation" (essentially, extreme strategic blackmail) from non-traditional security dimensions to traditional security dimensions is increasingly apparent. This is why we have repeatedly emphasized the need to monitor potential developments in the Yellow Sea and Bohai Sea military exercises, including the emergence of major weapons systems such as new submarine-launched strategic missiles, strategic missile submarines, and strategic high-energy weapons. In other words, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Trump administration may resort to more extreme methods, such as emulating Russia's approach of "compensating for conventional military inadequacies with nuclear capabilities," to blackmail the international community. This could involve announcing research into next-generation strategic nuclear weapons or strategic weapon delivery platforms. Although this stage has not yet been reached, the Trump administration's provocations against the international community in the traditional security dimension in the Western Pacific are increasing, such as the U.S.-South Korea military exercises involving B-1B strategic bombers, continuous provocations by the Philippine government under Rodrigo Duterte in the South China Sea, and the deployment of the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Nimitz into the Western Pacific.

Therefore, the recent visits by China's top leader to Vietnam (the country most likely to cause trouble for China in the South China Sea, with China emphasizing Vietnam's willingness to advance the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, i.e., not causing trouble for China), Malaysia (the rotating chair of ASEAN, which sees significant business opportunities through the China-Laos Railway and is highly interested in building high-speed rail), and Cambodia (which initially deviated but later returned to the right path) appear to carry the intention of prior notification and communication, such as informing relevant parties of China's necessary response to any provocations by the Philippine government under Rodrigo Duterte.

In addition to the Western Pacific direction, special attention should be paid to the Middle East, particularly Iran's latest developments. In our observation and assessment, thoroughly destabilizing the Persian Gulf is likely another means by which the Trump administration, fearing excessive strategic risks in the Western Pacific, engages in extreme strategic blackmail against the international community. Its key characteristics are: first, on the surface, this atmosphere involves traditional security-related "confrontation" (extreme strategic blackmail), but it actually encompasses non-traditional security-related "confrontation" (extreme strategic blackmail); second, its extreme strategic blackmail is "both outward and inward-facing." In Trump's view, if the stability of the Persian Gulf is completely disrupted, leading to a collapse of the U.S. financial market, it would primarily affect U.S. national interests, not to mention the interests of "Soros-types," "Biden-types," and other "enemies" of Trump. The principle is simple: "If I suffer, none of you will fare well" and "After I'm gone, let the floodwaters rage."

The above are specific manifestations of the Trump administration's "changing face" (covertly exempting some goods) and then "changing face again" (resorting to more aggressive actions after failed attempts at conciliation, escalating extreme strategic blackmail against the international community).

● Time has become one of the most important strategic resources in today’s international power games.

Before delving further into the discussion, let’s take a look at another news report.

On April 17th, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that lifting the ban on Taliban activities paves the way for establishing a partnership between Russia and Afghanistan.

It is not difficult to see that Russia has also noticed the Trump administration’s "face-changing" tactics—first a shift in policy, followed by another reversal. In particular, Russia seems interested in how the Trump administration uses extreme strategic blackmail—both externally (destabilizing the Persian Gulf) and internally (extracting concessions through coercion). It is not hard to imagine that if the Persian Gulf were to descend into chaos due to U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Russian oil could once again become a "hard currency." For instance, China and the EU’s reliance on Russian oil and gas imports would likely increase significantly. *(Note: Both former superpowers have gradually become "struggling states," with increasingly similar economic structures—such as energy and agriculture. In the past, when the Soviet Union and the U.S. discussed energy, they might at least show some mutual understanding, based on a tacit non-traditional security cooperation.)*

At the very least, Russia understands the Trump administration’s "face-changing" tactics—whether based on non-traditional or traditional security concerns, the essence remains extreme strategic blackmail. Consequently, Russia has adopted a "shifting allegiances" strategy—on the surface, improving relations with all parties while playing both sides (China and the U.S.) to maximize its own interests.

It can be said that, following the near-"showdown" in non-traditional security between China and the U.S., Russia’s opportunistic mindset has reached unprecedented heights. Leveraging the growing tensions between the U.S. and Iran—especially the potential destabilization of the Persian Gulf—Russia sees a lucrative opportunity. But the question remains: Does Russia gain more than it loses through the Trump administration’s "befriend distant states, attack nearby ones" strategy or its own "shifting allegiances"?

Perhaps describing Russia’s current stance as "gambler’s psychology" is apt.

Although the Russia-Ukraine war continues, and despite losses in "Syria’s chaos," the "Middle East time trap," the "two aircraft incidents," and renewed Syrian instability, Russia still sees a chance to turn the tables in this geopolitical poker game. Past losses are but the "tuition fee" for discovering this opportunity.

The so-called "turning the tables" refers to Russia’s expectation that if the Persian Gulf’s stability collapses, China and the EU would become more dependent on Russian energy imports—especially since even during the Russia-Ukraine war, Russian President Putin publicly complained about China allegedly suppressing natural gas prices due to Western sanctions. However, China argues that the war is irrelevant to energy pricing, which should follow market principles. Thus, if the Persian Gulf can no longer export oil, Russia might "name its price" for Chinese energy imports—a mindset that could extend to other non-traditional security sectors like rare earths and aluminum. Overall, this reflects a rapid rapprochement between Russia and the U.S. on non-traditional security issues, underpinned by Russia’s deep-seated caution (even fear) of China’s "Afghanistan policy calculations."

Russia’s "shifting allegiances" also reflect another facet of its "Afghanistan strategy"—using China to counterbalance the West, particularly in traditional security matters. For instance, Russia has been cautious in responding to U.S. overtures regarding "South Asian developments," given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and China’s irreplaceable role as Russia’s primary external strategic counterweight.

Whether it’s Russia’s "shifting allegiances" or "gambler’s psychology," China can tolerate it—as long as Russia does not join a "tariff anti-China alliance" after China’s decisive counterattack against U.S. tariffs. For the Trump administration, its "alliances and confrontations" strategy may have shaken Sino-Russian trust but only pushed Russia into opportunism while inadvertently driving the EU (China’s ally) to resist U.S. tariffs alongside China.

For China, time is the ultimate resource. While time cannot be created or controlled—it is invisible, intangible, and some scientists even argue it doesn’t exist in the universe—it has become one of the most critical strategic assets in today’s global power games.

● The PLA’s "vanguard forces" are familiarizing themselves with the battlefield by "advancing into Egypt"—a Middle Eastern and African nation.

Regarding the Middle East situation, while Iran is understandably anxious about potential Persian Gulf instability, another equally (if not more) nervous party is Egypt. Currently, Israel’s provocations in the region have become increasingly blatant, with its ambition to establish a "Greater Israel" no longer concealed. If a refugee crisis erupts, Egypt (on the Rafah border) and Jordan (east of the Jordan River) would be the first to suffer.

Faced with Israel’s aggression, Middle Eastern nations increasingly feel the need for external powers to counterbalance it. From our perspective, the EU (especially China) is seen as a crucial external force.

Middle Eastern and African nation—to familiarize themselves with the battlefield.

Even at this "familiarization" stage, those hoping to exploit Trump’s internal strife by pushing for a "Greater Israel" (e.g., Netanyahu’s clique) must be deeply alarmed. The U.S., which prioritizes the Middle East, is likely even more fearful. If someone insists on treating China as an adversary, China will be a qualified and formidable one.

Notably, Israel occupied Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula during the 1967 Six-Day War and controlled it until 1982, establishing settlements and military bases. While Israel returned Sinai under the 1979 Camp David Accords, its historical territorial ambitions persist. Egypt fears that Israel could use a refugee crisis as a pretext to invade Sinai again.

As a populous Middle Eastern nation with historical grievances against Israel, Egypt’s potential acquisition of Chinese military technology (even if labeled "E" for export) could pose a significant deterrent to U.S.-Israeli forces—even without PLA-standard equipment.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

原文作者公众号：

广州市贯日翻译服务有限公司为东方时评-衍射传媒/衍射咨询提供翻译支持

翻译请联系http://www.en-ch.com/chcontact.htm

手机微信13924166640

广州市越秀区环市东路世界贸易中心大厦南塔24楼 020-86266990