2025年4月24日，星期四，第1233期

为什么俄外长赶在美副总统万斯访印后，印巴关系骤然紧张之际，表示“不能接受将北约设施移回中亚”？

【媒体报道】

4月24日，有记者问，近来美方不断有消息称中美之间正在谈判，甚至将会达成协议。请问您能否证实双方有没有开始谈判？“这些都是假消息。”外交部发言人郭嘉昆表示，“据我了解，中美双方并没有就关税问题进行磋商或谈判，更谈不上达成协议。这场关税战是由美方发起的，中方的态度是一贯的、明确的。打，奉陪到底；谈，大门敞开，对话谈判必须是平等、尊重、互惠的。”

【讨论纪要】

●在中国明确表示不接“球”后，特朗普的阴谋不仅就此破产，而且将美方才是迫不及待的真相暴露无遗

4月23日，就对华关税问题，美国总统特朗普一边表示，145%是非常高的，它将大幅下降，但不会是零。另一边表示，我们会表现得很友好，中国也会表现得很友好。显然，这是一种典型的将“球”踢给中国的表现。

从4月23日、24日外交部新闻发言人的回应来看，中方明确发出了两个信号：

第一，表达坚定决心——中方的态度是一贯的、明确的。打，奉陪到底；谈，大门敞开，对话谈判必须是平等、尊重、互惠的。

第二，不接“球”——这场关税战是美方发起的，中方的态度是一贯的、明确的，如果美方真的想通过对话谈判来解决问题，就应该放弃极限施压那一套，停止威胁讹诈，在平等、尊重、互惠的基础上同中方对话。

可以说，24日外交部发言人针对相关问题的回复，明确表示中方不接“球”，是我们昨天点评的后续发展。

由此大家也就不难理解，为什么在昨天的讨论中，我们并不将特朗普就对华关税问题再次“自己打脸”看作是彻底妥协、认怂，而只是一种策略性的手段。在我们的评估中，除了借机大赚一笔外，也有喘口气，寻找下一步行棋步调之意，且笃定他们一定会再搞事情（注：当然，也和特朗普人生经历有关。此人多次破产但仍能“咸鱼翻身”，是一个很顽固，不易妥协的人。这一次是真的压力太大了，尤其是来自对外，中美关系没有打开局面。对内，美国金融市场动荡）。

别的不说，在特朗普将对华关税问题这枚“球”踢给中国的过程中就内嵌了给中国“挖坑”的歪心思。不难想象的是，中国接“球”的一瞬间就已掉“坑”。特朗普会借机大肆炒作，是中国迫不及待要和美国谈，而非反之。而在中国明确表示不接“球”后，特朗普的阴谋不仅就此破产，而且将美方才是迫不及待的真相暴露无遗。

这就是斗争，就是策略。由此也能看出，这位美国总统特朗普狡猾得很。对于这类小人，战略上自然藐视他，但务必在战术上重视他。

●在“B方案”中那份包罗万象的“讹诈计划”中，特朗普政府留有后手，且“后手”的关键就在俄罗斯

以上中美之间围绕“关税战”的你来我往，情节虽然精彩，但斗争却很复杂，即便是在如何说话的问题上都处处是门道，稍不注意就会落入陷阱。中方的应对方式总体上是阳谋对阴谋。特朗普政府上台百日，中国应对基本无误，这让特朗普政府不仅一点便宜没占到，反而给搞得如此狼狈。正因美国至今未能有效处理对华关系，以至于特朗普政府在应对美沙关系的过程中都只能低调地处理。

再次强调，特朗普访问沙特，表面上是“A方案”，实际上准备的是“B方案”，且内嵌于“B方案”之中的，瞄着波斯湾稳定问题施展的讹诈范围极广，表面看涉及的是传统安全层面，实际上涵盖非传统安全领域。对象不仅包括沙特、伊朗等中东国家，也包括中国、欧盟、东盟等，这些希望世界经济维持基本稳定的国家、组织，更包括美国内部特朗普和“特朗普们”的对头冤家，如，“拜登们”“索罗斯们”，以及“特朗普阵营”内部的所谓“持异见者”等等，甚至会对俄罗斯产生战略牵动作用。

这也是我们在上一期讨论中，提及美国中东问题特使威特科夫访问俄罗斯，与俄罗斯总统普京就乌克兰问题进行新一轮会谈，这一话题是给出如下评估：

美国中东问题特使访问莫斯科，表面看是谈乌克兰问题，实际谈的是中东问题，或者说“B方案”。核心内容就是：实在不行，我（注：美国）要动伊朗了，而波斯湾一乱我们两家都是“黄金万两”（注：传统能源价格一飞冲天），这也不失为一种帮助俄罗斯有效重返中东的途径。当然，作为回报，俄罗斯也要帮助美国继续维持在中东的影响和存在。至少在特朗普政府全力搅乱波斯湾之际，俄罗斯要选择袖手旁观。

不难看出，特朗普政府的动作很迅速，由于与中国的关系没有处理好，不得不携带那份内嵌了“B方案”的“A方案”，将首访放在沙特。在我们看来，在“B方案”中那份包罗万象的“讹诈计划”中，特朗普政府留有后手，且“后手”的关键就在俄罗斯。

●如此心态复杂的俄罗斯恰恰是特朗普政府通过“远交近攻，合纵联合”策略精心鼓励出来的

为了更好展开讨论，我们来看两则新闻报道：

4月23日，俄罗斯外交部网站发布消息称，俄方当天向阿富汗方面通报，决定将阿富汗驻俄外交代表机构等级提升至大使级。

4月23日，俄罗斯外交部长拉夫罗夫在结束对乌兹别克斯坦的访问前举行了新闻发布会。拉夫罗夫表示，欧盟成员国正试图在中亚五国推行反俄议程。俄罗斯坚决反对将与中亚国家的合作进程“政治化”，以各种借口将北约军事设施移回中亚是不可接受的。

针对以上两则新闻报道，我们想要着重强调的是：

第一，俄罗斯已经注意到了特朗普准备访问沙特，尤其注意到了其携带的那份内嵌了“B方案”的“A方案”。如果说，有人能够在“B方案”获益，它就是俄罗斯。这也是俄美所谓“基于非传统安全层面展开合作”的基础；

第二，以上两则新闻，表面看都对中国有利，但实际上却暗藏玄机。尤其是第二则新闻——为什么俄外长赶在美副总统万斯访印后，印巴关系骤然紧张之际，尤其在美国中东问题特使访问俄罗斯、表面上谈乌克兰问题，实际上谈中东问题，或干脆说谈“B方案”后，表示“不能接受将北约设施移回中亚”？

第三，俄罗斯外长“以各种借口将北约军事设施移回中亚是不可接受的”这句话中的北约，显然包括了美国和欧盟；

第四，这套玩法我们似曾相识，此前，在美国和俄罗斯谈乌克兰问题的时候有过类似操作，通过北约将欧盟在乌克兰问题上的利益诉求（注：欧盟要求在乌克兰驻军）扯入其中，以此作为和俄罗斯讨价还价的筹码；

第五，让我们再次回顾上次讨论中的一段内容：

美国中东问题特使访问莫斯科，表面看是谈乌克兰问题，实际谈的是中东问题，或者说“B方案”。核心内容就是：实在不行，我（注：美国）要动伊朗了，而波斯湾一乱我们两家都是“黄金万两”（注：传统能源价格一飞冲天），这也不失为一种帮助俄罗斯有效重返中东的途径。当然，作为回报，俄罗斯也要帮助美国继续维持在中东的影响和存在。至少在特朗普政府全力搅乱波斯湾之际，俄罗斯要选择袖手旁观。

不难看出，上述四点内容就是俄美所谓“基于非传统安全层面展开合作”的后续发展。在美国看来，俄罗斯如果对美国必要时候军事打击伊朗、进而彻底搞乱波斯湾持默许台独，特朗普的那份内嵌“B方案”的“A方案”将会更加行之有效。在俄罗斯看来，除了在美国帮助其有效重返中东问题上或有所得外，其至今仍未实质性放弃的“阿富汗政策小九九”似乎又有了再度“闪闪发光”的空间（注：这里主要指的是俄罗斯借西方之力遏制中国这一面）。

需要补充的是，对美国来说，从特朗普政府从宣布首访沙特，到那份内嵌“B方案”的“A方案”。从美国中东问题特使访问俄罗斯，表面谈乌克兰问题，实际上谈中东问题（注：谈“B方案”），通过波斯湾的问题和中亚问题涉及中国，这条“讹诈链条”就此形成闭环。对俄罗斯来说，如我们在4月18日讨论中所评估的那样，继续玩“朝秦暮楚”的剧本——在和中美都搞好关系的基础上，通过在两者之间反复横跳以攫取最大利益，包括乌克兰问题，中东问题，更包括中亚问题。至少俄罗斯可以和中国讲：俄罗斯的立场和中国是一致的，俄罗斯准备努力和中国一道稳定中亚，俄罗斯拒绝了北约将军事设施移回中亚。所以，如果未来，俄罗斯在乌克兰问题上，中东问题上“被迫”做出一些让中国感到不悦的决定，希望中国能够谅解。另外，作为俄罗斯在中亚方向顶住来自北约压力的回报，中国是不是在中东问题上帮帮俄罗斯的忙？

值得一提的是，特朗普政府一边瞄着首访沙特以及那份内嵌“B方案”之“A方案”，一边瞄着俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”炒作“北约欲重返中亚”这一话题的过程中，也没有将其简单处理为“中俄之间的事情”，它还挂记着中东问题和乌克兰问题。为此，便将在中东问题上和乌克兰问题上对美国“有所要求”的欧盟通过“北约”扯入其中，拉入到中、美、俄之间展开的这个“小游戏”中。玩法上类似此前美国借台湾问题瞄着俄罗斯和欧盟各自的小心思“塞筹码”。虽然俄罗斯对此“有贼心，没贼胆”，但欧盟会接纳。

通过上述讨论，大家不难感受到博弈的复杂性，其中一个主要原因就是俄罗斯的心态非常复杂。俄罗斯怀揣“阿富汗政策小九九”，既想要借西方之力遏制中国，比如在中亚方向；又想借中国之力对抗西方，比如在乌克兰方向；尤其在日思夜想如何有效重返中东的问题上，在中美之间反复横跳。某种意义上说，如此心态复杂的俄罗斯恰恰是特朗普政府通过“远交近攻，合纵联合”策略精心鼓励出来的，包括俄美之间所谓“基于非传统安全层面”展开的相关合作。

●特朗普之所以还认为“还可以再试试”，原因就在希腊前财长所说的那句：只有当美国统治阶级承受的代价足够惨重时，政策才会转向

如果用围棋术语去形容特朗普政府目前的心态就是“寻找劫材，四处打劫”，一方面，寻找行棋步调；另一方面，抱着侥幸离心期待找到咸鱼翻身的机会或解决方案。当然，这些在特朗普眼中都是美国的外交问题，并不是最重要的，其只是用于实现自身利益的手段，正所谓，攘外必先安内。值得一提的是，日甚一日的美国内斗不仅发生在“特朗普们”与“拜登们”之间，更发生在“特朗普阵营”的内部。

在继续展开讨论前，再来看一则新闻报道。

4月24日，有美国媒体援引消息人士的话说，美国政府效率部负责人、亿万富翁埃隆•马斯克和美国财政部长斯科特•贝森特在白宫就美国国税局相关问题爆发激烈争吵。

“特朗普阵营”可以看作是华尔街的一部分，随着华尔街内部矛盾日趋尖锐，自然也就投射到“特朗普阵营”内部的分裂上。这或是马斯克和贝森特在白宫发生公开对骂的主要原因所在。

贝森特就是华尔街的操盘手之一，某种意义上说，他和马斯克，亦或是“拜登们”“特朗普们”都是华尔街“一个妈养的”——所有人的核心目标都是赚钱。只不过现在不仅赚不到钱，而且还开始赔钱，甚至“华尔街金融永动机”也要停摆，矛盾这样才一下子爆发了出来。在我们的观察与评估中，至少当前阶段，马斯克的意见或占据主流，也就是说，华尔街内部的相当部分人认为，对华“关税战”打到今天这个地步是很荒唐的，应该收手了。但在以特朗普为代表的华尔街内部的另一部分看来，还要再试一试。于是也就有了前面我们讨论的特朗普还想着如何给中国设局、挖坑的内容。无奈，中国就是不接“球”。

值得一提的是，特朗普的“坚持”也并非没有一点根据，被赶出刚刚成立的“关税应急小组”的现任美国白宫贸易与制造业高级顾问，特朗普第一总统任期期间的白宫贸易顾问纳瓦罗在当年针对中国中兴公司的制裁中尝过讹诈成功的甜头。

中兴公司确实与华为不同，对于美国生产的芯片较为依赖，一旦出现美国“卡脖子”这样的问题就很难解决。再加上中国当时并没有像今天这样充分准备，甚至没有光刻机、华为Mate60使用的自研芯片等，因此，中兴公司最后为了生存不得不做出让步。而这在纳瓦罗之流眼中就是讹诈成功的典型案例。所以他们在今天发动对华“关税战”的问题上非常傲慢地认为，这一案例可以推而广之，让中国最终屈服。但是他们似乎选择性地忘记了一件事，当年他们的讹诈对象不仅有中兴，还有华为，而针对华为的讹诈，他们失败了。再次强调，中兴也是一家非常优秀的公司，只是和华为在不同时期起到各自独特不同的作用。显然，特朗普在赌，但赌输了，而赌输的结果就是——纳瓦罗出局。尽管如此，特朗普之所以还认为“还可以再试试”，原因就在希腊前财长所说的那句：只有当美国统治阶级承受的代价足够惨重时，政策才会转向。

●俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”永远为美西方挑拨中俄战略互信提供源源不断的“素材”

特朗普的“还可以再试试”，除了开始我们讨论的，在对华关税战问题上将“球”踢给中国，给中国设局之外，还有瞄着俄罗斯至今仍不肯实质性放弃的“阿富汗政策小九九”，在中国周边地区搞事情，中亚如此，南亚也是如此。

在我们的观察与评估中，前不久发生的阿塞拜疆总统访华一事，对俄罗斯是有刺激作用的。对俄罗斯来说，诸如，白俄罗斯，中亚五国这些前苏联加盟共和国和中国越走越近都是令其忌惮的。而在里海地区，就有一条中欧班列路线绕开了俄罗斯，这些都可以成为美西方挑拨中俄关系的“切入点”，也是我们此前评估“中吉乌铁路”项目以后还会有变数的原因所在。这恐怕是特朗普政府瞄着俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”在中国周边地区搞事情的“灵感”的来源。

值得注意的是，在此前发生在印控克什米尔的恐怖袭击事件发生过，美国，欧盟，连同以色列纷纷跳出，用极其夸张的外交辞令表达对此事件的“严重关切”。显然，特朗普政府在借中亚问题，南亚问题挑拨中俄关系的同时，也在挑拨中欧关系，甚至公开嘲笑以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家将国运压给中国。此外，美国也借策动印控克什米尔以及紧随而来的印巴关系迅速紧张，一定程度上对冲国际社会在联合国层面就近段时间美国倒行逆施进行的“公开批斗”（注：中国在联合国安理会召开非正式会议，强烈谴责美国滥用关税破坏全球经济，呼吁193国共同抵制单边霸凌）。

●即便现在特朗普政府关税战败象已现，但在其选择“孤注一掷，战略冒险”与选择接受“河渡人”局面之50%对50%，仍没有任何调整的余地

近日，我们注意到芝加哥大学“叫兽”米尔斯海默警告中国“不要低估美国的残暴”的相关言论。

米尔斯海默“给中国提了个醒”，别太把美国自由主义当回事。美国嘴上总挂着民主、自由、人权这些词，但其实这只是他们用来遮盖自己残暴真面目的政治说辞。身为美国人，又是研究美国和国际政治的专家，米尔斯海默心里跟明镜似的。美国作为霸权国家，一方面会直接动用武力威胁别人听话，另一方面他也清楚，为了让霸权地位更稳固，美国肯定会整出一套花言巧语。他们宣扬民主、人权、自由这些意识形态价值观，就是想用软实力或者巧实力来掩盖自己的真实意图

作为美国知名大学的一名学者，米尔斯海默的言论却充满了威胁、恐吓和讹诈，但在这背后，却是美国对中国已经无计可施，无可奈何，只能通过“嘴炮”去吓唬人的尴尬现实。这种“尴尬现实”还体现在，就算中美双方最终撤销之前彼此加征的关税，但有一点美国是无论如何也撤不回去的，那就是如美国前国务卿布林肯所说的，美国在软实力方面造成的巨大损失。

当然，另一方面，米尔斯海默的言论也提醒了国际社会，战略上可以藐视敌人，但在战术上务必重视敌人，即便特朗普政府已经内焦外困，即便特朗普政府在“关税战”的问题上败象已现，但在其是选择“孤注一掷，战略冒险”还是选择接受“河渡人”的问题上，概率仍然是50%对50%，且没有任何调整的余地。

最后我们就“非核氢弹”这个话题再做一个简单补充，我们更多从非传统安全层面看这个问题，比如，中国的能源安全多元化（还有光伏，比如超薄光伏，煤转油等）的角度，新能源合作以及未来汽车产业，尤其是新能源车产业布局的角度。在军事层面，再次强调，的确不是我们常说的核武器，无论是聚变核武器，还是裂变核武器，都不是，只是常规武器，只是类似核武器，具有大规模毁伤效应，且威力惊人。其可能的使用场景，比如，在应对台湾叛军修建的永久军事工事，地下掩体的问题上，就可以起到较好的毁伤效果。此外，大家不要过度纠结于技术层面的细节，更要从类似舆论战、心理战的多维度角度加以观察。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Thursday, April 24, 2025, Issue No. 1233

Why did the Russian Foreign Minister state that "the return of NATO facilities to Central Asia is unacceptable" right after the visit of US Vice President Vance to India and when India - Pakistan relations suddenly became tense?

[Media Coverage]

On April 24, a reporter asked whether there were any negotiations between China and the United States recently, and even reports that an agreement would be reached. Can you confirm whether the two sides have started negotiations? "These are all false news," said Guo Jia Kun, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "As far as I know, the Chinese and American sides have not conducted consultations or negotiations on tariff issues, let alone reached an agreement. This tariff war was initiated by the US side. China's attitude has been consistent and clear. If they want to fight, we will accompany them to the end; if they want to talk, the door is wide open. Dialogue and negotiation must be based on equality, respect, and mutual benefit."

【Discussion Summary】

·After China Clearly Stated It Wouldn't "Catch the Ball", Trump's Conspiracy Not Only Failed but Also Exposed the Truth that the US Side Was Desperate

On April 23, regarding the issue of tariffs on China, US President Donald Trump said on one hand that 145% was extremely high and the tariff rate would be significantly reduced, but it wouldn't be zero. On the other hand, he claimed that the United States would act in a friendly manner and so would China. Obviously, this was a typical move of "kicking the ball" to China.

From the responses of the spokespersons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 23 and 24, the Chinese side sent out two clear signals:

First, expressing firm determination - China's attitude has been consistent and clear. If there is a fight, China will accompany to the end; if there is a talk, the door is wide open. Dialogue and negotiation must be based on equality, respect, and mutual benefit.

Second, not catching the "ball" - The US side initiated this tariff war. China's attitude has been consistent and clear. If the US side really wants to solve the problem through dialogue and negotiation, it should abandon the approach of maximum pressure, stop threats and extortion, and conduct dialogue with China on the basis of equality, respect, and mutual benefit.

It can be said that the response of the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 24, clearly stating that China would not catch the "ball", was a follow - up development of our comment yesterday.

From this, it is not difficult to understand why, in yesterday's discussion, we did not regard Trump's self - contradiction on the issue of tariffs on China as a complete concession or backing down, but rather as a strategic move. In our assessment, apart from trying to make a big profit, it also had the intention of taking a breather and figuring out the next step. And they are surely determined to stir up trouble again (Note: Of course, this is also related to Trump's life experiences. This man has gone bankrupt many times but still managed to make a comeback. He is very stubborn and not easy to compromise. This time, he is really under great pressure, especially externally, as Sino - US relations have not made progress. Internally, the US financial market has been in turmoil)./p>

To name just one thing, during the process of Trump "kicking the ball" of the tariff issue on China to China, there were ulterior motives of "digging a pit" for China. It is not hard to imagine that as soon as China "caught the ball", it would fall into the "pit". Trump would take the opportunity to hype up that it was China that was eager to talk to the United States, rather than the other way around. However, after China clearly stated that it would not catch the "ball", not only did Trump's conspiracy fail, but also the truth that the US side was the one eager to talk was completely exposed.

This is a struggle, and it is a strategy. From this, we can also see that this US President, Trump, is very cunning. For such a petty person, we should naturally despise him strategically, but we must pay close attention to him tactically.

·In the All - encompassing "Blackmail Plan" of "Plan B", the Trump Administration Has a Secret Move, and the Key to This "Secret Move" Lies in Russia

Although the exchanges between China and the United States regarding the "tariff war" are exciting, the struggle is quite complex. Even in terms of how to speak, there are subtleties everywhere, and one may easily fall into a trap if not careful. Overall, China's response to the US has been a strategy of open - handedness against underhandedness. Since the Trump administration took office a hundred days ago, China's responses have been basically correct, leaving the Trump administration not only without any gain but also in a very embarrassing situation. Precisely because the United States has failed to effectively handle Sino - US relations so far, the Trump administration has had to deal with US - Saudi relations in a low - key manner.

Once again, it should be emphasized that Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia is presented as "Plan A" on the surface, but in reality, he is prepared with "Plan B". And within "Plan B", the scope of blackmail targeting the stability of the Persian Gulf is extremely wide. On the surface, it seems to involve the traditional security level, but in fact, it covers the non - traditional security field. The targets include not only Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran but also countries and organizations like China, the European Union, and ASEAN that hope to maintain basic stability in the world economy. It also includes Trump's domestic opponents, such as the "Biden camp", "Soros and his ilk", and the so - called "dissenters" within the "Trump camp". Moreover, it may even have a strategic impact on Russia.

This is also what we mentioned in the previous discussion when US Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs Brett McGurk visited Russia and held a new round of talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the Ukrainian issue. Our assessment is as follows:

The visit of the US Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs to Moscow seems to be about the Ukrainian issue on the surface, but in fact, it is about the Middle East issue, or rather, "Plan B". The core content is: If necessary, the United States will take action against Iran, and once the Persian Gulf is in chaos, both sides will benefit greatly (Note: The prices of traditional energy sources will soar). This can also be regarded as a way to help Russia effectively return to the Middle East. Of course, in return, Russia is expected to help the United States maintain its influence and presence in the Middle East. At least when the Trump administration is fully focused on disrupting the Persian Gulf, Russia should choose to stand by.

It is not difficult to see that the Trump administration has acted swiftly. Due to the failure to properly handle relations with China, it had to bring the "Plan A" embedded with "Plan B" and make Saudi Arabia the destination of its first visit. In our view, within the all - encompassing "blackmail plan" in "Plan B", the Trump administration has a secret move, and the key to this "secret move" lies in Russia.

·Such a Complex - minded Russia Is Exactly What the Trump Administration Has Encouraged through Its "Befriend Distant States while Attacking Neighboring Ones and Form Alliances" Strategy

To facilitate a more in - depth discussion, let's look at two news reports:

On April 23, the website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Russia had informed the Afghan side on the same day that it had decided to upgrade the diplomatic representation level of the Afghan diplomatic mission in Russia to the ambassadorial level.

On April 23, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a press conference before the end of his visit to Uzbekistan. Lavrov stated that EU member states were trying to push an anti - Russian agenda in the five Central Asian countries. Russia firmly opposes the "politicization" of the cooperation process with Central Asian countries, and it is unacceptable to use various pretexts to move NATO military facilities back to Central Asia.

Regarding the above two news reports, we would like to emphasize the following points:

First, Russia has noticed that Trump is about to visit Saudi Arabia, especially the "Plan A" embedded with "Plan B" that he is bringing along. If anyone can benefit from "Plan B", it is Russia. This is also the basis for the so - called "cooperation between Russia and the United States at the non - traditional security level".

Second, on the surface, both of the above news reports seem to be beneficial to China, but in fact, there are hidden implications. Especially the second news report - why did the Russian foreign minister, right after US Vice President Vance's visit to India when India - Pakistan relations suddenly became tense, and especially after the US Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs visited Russia (ostensibly to discuss the Ukrainian issue but actually to discuss the Middle East issue, or rather, "Plan B"), state that "it is unacceptable to move NATO facilities back to Central Asia"?

Third, the "NATO" mentioned by the Russian foreign minister in the statement "it is unacceptable to use various pretexts to move NATO military facilities back to Central Asia" obviously includes the United States and the European Union.

Fourth, this kind of approach seems familiar to us. Previously, during the US - Russia talks on the Ukrainian issue, there was a similar operation. The United States tried to drag the EU's interest demands in the Ukrainian issue (Note: The EU demanded to station troops in Ukraine) into the talks and used them as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Russia.

Fifth, let's review a part of the previous discussion:

The US Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs' visit to Moscow, ostensibly to discuss the Ukrainian issue, was actually about the Middle East issue, or rather, "Plan B". The core content was: If necessary, the United States will take action against Iran, and once the Persian Gulf is in chaos, both sides will benefit greatly (Note: The prices of traditional energy sources will soar). This can also be regarded as a way to help Russia effectively return to the Middle East. Of course, in return, Russia is expected to help the United States maintain its influence and presence in the Middle East. At least when the Trump administration is fully focused on disrupting the Persian Gulf, Russia should choose to stand by.

It is not difficult to see that the above four points are the subsequent development of the so - called "cooperation between Russia and the United States at the non - traditional security level". In the eyes of the United States, if Russia tacitly approves of the United States' possible military strike on Iran and the subsequent complete disruption of the Persian Gulf at a necessary time, Trump's "Plan A" embedded with "Plan B" will be more effective. In Russia's view, apart from possibly gaining something in the issue of the United States helping it effectively return to the Middle East, its long - standing "Afghanistan policy little scheme" seems to have a chance to "shine" again (Note: Here, it mainly refers to the aspect of Russia using Western power to contain China).

It should be added that for the United States, from the announcement of Trump's first visit to Saudi Arabia to the "Plan A" embedded with "Plan B", from the US Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs' visit to Russia (ostensibly to discuss the Ukrainian issue but actually to discuss the Middle East issue, or "Plan B"), and through the issues of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia to involve China, this "blackmail chain" has formed a closed loop. For Russia, as we assessed on April 18, it continues to play the old trick of "playing both sides" - trying to maintain good relations with both China and the United States and reaping maximum benefits by repeatedly switching between the two on issues such as Ukraine, the Middle East, and Central Asia. At least Russia can tell China: Russia's position is consistent with China's. Russia is ready to work hard with China to stabilize Central Asia. Russia has rejected NATO's attempt to move military facilities back to Central Asia. So, if in the future, Russia is "forced" to make some decisions on the Ukrainian or Middle East issues that may displease China, we hope China can understand. In addition, as a reward for Russia's efforts in withstanding NATO's pressure in Central Asia, will China help Russia on the Middle East issue?

It is worth mentioning that while the Trump administration is focusing on Trump's first visit to Saudi Arabia and the "Plan A" embedded with "Plan B", and at the same time hyping up the topic of Russia's "Afghanistan policy little scheme" and "NATO's intention to return to Central Asia", it does not simply treat this as a matter between China and Russia. It also takes into account the Middle East and Ukrainian issues. To this end, it drags the European Union, which has "demands" on the United States regarding the Middle East and Ukrainian issues, into the "small game" being played among China, the United States, and Russia through NATO. The approach is similar to the previous US move of using the Taiwan issue to "place chips" by targeting the respective concerns of Russia and the European Union. Although Russia has the intention but not the courage to act, the European Union may accept it.

Through the above discussion, we can clearly feel the complexity of the game. One of the main reasons is that Russia's mentality is very complex. Russia, harboring the "Afghanistan policy little scheme", wants to use Western power to contain China, for example, in Central Asia, and at the same time use China's power to resist the West, for example, in the Ukrainian direction. Especially when it comes to the issue of effectively returning to the Middle East, which it has been thinking about day and night, it keeps switching between China and the United States. In a sense, such a complex - minded Russia is exactly what the Trump administration has encouraged through its "befriend distant states while attacking neighboring ones and form alliances" strategy, including the so - called "cooperation between Russia and the United States at the non - traditional security level".

·Why Trump Still Thinks "We Can Try Again": Insights from the Former Greek Finance Minister

The reason Trump still believes that "we can give it another shot" lies in what the former Greek finance minister said: "Only when the American ruling class bears a sufficiently heavy price will the policy change."

If we were to describe the current mindset of the Trump administration using Go terminology, it would be "searching for ko threats and launching attacks everywhere." On one hand, they are looking for the right moves in the game of politics; on the other hand, they are clinging to the slim hope of finding an opportunity or solution to turn the tables, like a dried - up fish coming back to life. Of course, in Trump's eyes, these are all diplomatic issues for the United States, not the most crucial ones. They are merely means to achieve his own interests. As the saying goes, "Secure the domestic front before dealing with external affairs."

It is worth noting that the internal strife within the United States, which is getting worse day by day, does not only occur between the "Trump camp" and the "Biden camp." It is even more pronounced within the "Trump camp" itself.

Before continuing the discussion, let's look at another news report.

On April 24, a US media outlet quoted sources as saying that Elon Musk, the head of the US government efficiency department and a billionaire, and Scott Bessenet, the US Secretary of the Treasury, had a fierce argument at the White House over issues related to the US Internal Revenue Service.

The "Trump camp" can be regarded as a part of Wall Street. As the contradictions within Wall Street become increasingly acute, they naturally spill over into the internal divisions of the "Trump camp." This may be the main reason for the public quarrel between Musk and Bessenet at the White House.

Bessenet is one of the operators on Wall Street. In a sense, he, along with Musk, or the "Biden camp" and the "Trump camp," are all "born of the same mother" on Wall Street - everyone's core goal is to make money. But now, they are not only failing to make money but also starting to lose money, and even the so - called "Wall Street financial perpetual motion machine" is about to stop. This is why the contradictions have suddenly erupted.

In our observation and assessment, at least at the current stage, Musk's opinion may prevail. That is to say, a considerable number of people on Wall Street think that it is absurd to continue the "tariff war" against China to this point and it should be ended. However, from the perspective of another part of Wall Street represented by Trump, they still want to give it another try. This is exactly what we discussed earlier, where Trump is thinking about how to set traps and dig pits for China. Unfortunately, China refuses to take the "ball."

It is worth mentioning that Trump's "persistence" is not completely groundless. Navarro, who was recently kicked out of the newly established "Tariff Emergency Group" and was Trump's White House trade adviser during his first presidential term, once tasted the sweetness of successful blackmail against China in the sanctions against ZTE.

ZTE is indeed different from Huawei. It is more dependent on chips produced in the United States. Once faced with the problem of being "held by the throat" by the US, it is very difficult to find a solution. Moreover, at that time, China was not as fully prepared as it is today. It didn't even have photolithography machines or self - developed chips like those used in Huawei Mate60. As a result, ZTE had to make concessions in the end for its survival. In the eyes of people like Navarro, this is a typical case of successful blackmail. So, when it comes to launching the current "tariff war" against China, they are arrogantly convinced that this case can be generalized to force China to finally yield. However, they seem to have selectively forgotten one thing. At that time, their blackmail targets included not only ZTE but also Huawei, and their blackmail against Huawei failed.

Once again, it should be emphasized that ZTE is also an excellent company, but it played different and unique roles compared to Huawei in different periods. Clearly, Trump is gambling, but he has lost. And the result of losing the bet is that Navarro has been ousted. Nevertheless, the reason why Trump still thinks "we can try again" lies in what the former Greek finance minister said: Only when the American ruling class bears a sufficiently heavy price will the policy change.

Russia's "Afghanistan Policy Scheme" Continuously Provides "Materials" for the US and the West to Undermine China - Russia Strategic Mutual Trust

Trump's idea of "giving it another try" not only involves kicking the "ball" to China in the tariff war against China and setting traps for China, as we discussed at the beginning, but also targets Russia's still - un - abandoned "Afghanistan policy scheme". The US attempts to stir up trouble in China's neighboring regions, including Central Asia and South Asia.

In our observation and assessment, the recent visit of the President of Azerbaijan to China has had a stimulating effect on Russia. For Russia, the increasing closeness of former Soviet republics such as Belarus and the five Central Asian countries to China is a matter of concern. In the Caspian Sea region, there is a China - Europe freight train route that bypasses Russia. These can all serve as "entry points" for the US and the West to sow discord between China and Russia, and are also the reasons why we previously assessed that there would still be uncertainties regarding the "China - Kyrgyzstan - Uzbekistan railway" project. This is probably the source of the "inspiration" for the Trump administration to stir up trouble in China's neighboring regions while targeting Russia's "Afghanistan policy scheme".

It is worth noting that after the terrorist attack in Indian - controlled Kashmir, the United States, the European Union, and Israel all jumped out and expressed their "grave concern" about this incident in extremely exaggerated diplomatic rhetoric. Obviously, while the Trump administration is using Central Asian and South Asian issues to sow discord between China and Russia, it is also trying to undermine China - Europe relations. Moreover, it openly mocks the Gulf Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia for pinning their national fortunes on China.

In addition, the United States, by instigating the situation in Indian - controlled Kashmir and the subsequent rapid deterioration of India - Pakistan relations, has, to a certain extent, offset the international community's "public condemnation" of the United States' recent wrongdoings at the United Nations level (Note: China held an informal meeting in the UN Security Council, strongly condemning the United States for abusing tariffs to undermine the global economy and calling on 193 countries to jointly resist unilateral bullying).

·Even Though the Signs of Defeat in the Tariff War Are Evident, the Trump Administration Is Still at a 50 - 50 Stalemate between "All - or - Nothing Strategic Adventure" and Accepting the "Crossing - the - River-by - Letting - People - Cross" Situation

Recently, we noticed that John Mearsheimer, a professor at the University of Chicago, warned China not to underestimate America's brutality.

Mearsheimer "gave China a reminder" not to take American liberalism too seriously. The United States always mouths words like democracy, freedom, and human rights, but in fact, these are just political rhetoric to cover up its brutal true colors. As an American and an expert in American and international politics, Mearsheimer is well - aware of this. As a hegemonic country, on the one hand, the United States will directly use military force to threaten others to obey; on the other hand, it knows that to make its hegemonic position more stable, it will surely come up with a bunch of sweet - sounding words. By promoting ideological values such as democracy, human rights, and freedom, it attempts to use soft power or smart power to conceal its real intentions.

As a scholar from a well - known American university, Mearsheimer's remarks are full of threats, intimidation, and blackmail. But behind this lies the embarrassing reality that the United States has no way out against China and can only try to scare people with "empty rhetoric." This "embarrassing reality" is also reflected in the fact that even if China and the United States eventually revoke the tariffs previously imposed on each other, there is one thing that the United States can never take back, which is the huge loss in soft power as former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said.

On the other hand, Mearsheimer's remarks also remind the international community that strategically, we can look down upon the enemy, but tactically, we must attach great importance to the enemy. Even though the Trump administration is in internal and external difficulties and the signs of defeat in the "tariff war" are obvious, when it comes to choosing between "going all - in with strategic adventure" and accepting the "crossing - the - river - by - letting - people - cross" situation, the probability is still 50 - 50, and there is no room for adjustment.

Finally, let's make a brief supplement regarding the topic of the "non - nuclear hydrogen bomb." We will look at this issue more from the non - traditional security level. For example, from the perspective of China's energy security diversification (including photovoltaics, such as ultra - thin photovoltaics, coal - to - oil, etc.), new energy cooperation, and the future layout of the automotive industry, especially the new - energy vehicle industry. At the military level, once again, it should be emphasized that it is not what we usually call nuclear weapons, whether fusion nuclear weapons or fission nuclear weapons. It is just a conventional weapon with effects similar to nuclear weapons, having large - scale destructive power and amazing explosive force. Its possible application scenarios include dealing with the permanent military fortifications and underground shelters built by Taiwan separatists, where it can achieve good destructive effects. In addition, everyone should not be overly obsessed with technical details but should observe it from multiple dimensions such as public opinion warfare and psychological warfare.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

原文作者公众号：

广州市贯日翻译服务有限公司为东方时评-衍射传媒/衍射咨询提供翻译支持

翻译请联系http://www.en-ch.com/chcontact.htm

手机微信13924166640

广州市越秀区环市东路世界贸易中心大厦南塔24楼 020-86266990