2025年4月28日，星期一，第1235期

结合伊朗阿巴斯港爆炸事件，小谈国际社会需警惕“以色列极端犹太复国主义者袭击伊朗核设施”之可能性

【媒体报道】

4月28日，伊朗红新月会发言人表示，伊朗阿巴斯港沙希德拉贾伊港口爆炸事件受伤人数已达1200人。26日，位于伊朗南部阿巴斯港的沙希德拉贾伊港口发生爆炸。伊朗霍尔木兹甘省省长27日表示，阿巴斯港爆炸事件已经导致40人死亡。

●国际社会需警惕“以色列极端犹太复国主义者袭击伊朗核设施”之可能性

过去这段时间大家比较的重大国际事件大体有二。一个是印巴关系骤然紧张；另一个是伊朗最大港口，也就是阿巴斯港发生的严重爆炸事件。

而对美国总统特朗普来说，时间让其倍感煎熬。其中主要原因之一是随时间嘀嗒流逝而不断增加的金融压力，比如，6月份即将来临的美债到期潮，大致算了一下，2025年年底之前，或将有约10万亿美元规模的债务到期。

在外交层面，特朗普政府更是焦头烂额，仍未能有效处理的中美关系让特朗普政府举步维艰，处境被动。一方面，在乌克兰问题上要继续稳住俄罗斯，与之周旋；一方面，面对中国在关税战问题上的全面犀利反击疲于应对但又毫无办法；另一方面，为了讨好以色列内塔尼亚胡政府、争取到美国内部支持以色列那部分资本势力的支持以利于内斗，不仅对伊朗威逼利诱，对沙特小心谨慎，甚至在盘算如何通过彻底搞乱中东，搞乱波斯湾，对美，对外，同时施行极限战略讹诈。

再次强调，如果我们将特朗普欲通过改善与以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家之间的关系、维稳美国中东政策，为后续有效处理中美关系寻找切入点，看作是特朗普将首访放在沙特，在“公文包”中塞入的“A方案”的话，与之相对的，通过更好地服务、甚至取悦于内塔尼亚胡小集团，对内外极限战略讹诈，以利内斗就是“B方案”。其中，“A方案”是次要的，“B方案”是主要的。反过来，再用“B方案”去推动“A方案”。特朗普表面上拿着的是“A方案”，实际上准备的是“B方案”。值得一提的是，“B方案”的极限战略讹诈对象不仅有沙特、国际社会，更有美国内部，特朗普的冤家对头们。具体的讹诈手段，包括但不局限于，军事打击伊朗，尤其是军事打击伊朗的核设施，使其彻底丧失研制核武的能力，彻底搞乱波斯湾。

特朗普政府的窘境，内塔尼亚胡小集团自然看在眼中，以至于让其对特朗普政府能不能顶得住、还能顶多久产生强烈质疑。内塔尼亚胡小集团同样认为时间有限，必须在有限的时间内，利用特朗普政府为自己尽最大可能牟利。比如，对内塔尼亚胡本人来说，成为所谓“大以色列”的国父，这样一来，内塔尼亚胡就是以色列的“英雄”，再没人敢对其进行政治清算。

在我们的观察与评估中，这一次阿巴斯港爆炸事件的直接策动者，不排除以色列的可能性。需要着重提醒国际社会的是，需警惕“以色列极端犹太复国主义者袭击伊朗核设施”之可能性，将局势向非常极端的方向推进。一旦变为现实，恐怕特朗普政府也没有多少转圜。当然，对伊朗当局而言，也很难对内有所交代。

【讨论纪要】

●中国在2018年之前，即便在传统安全层面上都做好了随时和美帝彻底摊牌，掀桌子的准备，何况非传统安全层面？

也许有的网友会问，为什么以色列对伊朗不一步就位，直接打击其核设施？在我们看来，这既体现出内塔尼亚胡小集团的残暴，也暴露其色厉内荏的本质。类似的还有美国的几任总统，他们在对外政策上，尤其是对华政策上是一丘之貉。总在不断的挑衅、推动局势升级，对中国百般讹诈，但关键时刻又不敢一步到位和中国彻底摊牌。

在2018年，特朗普第一任期，对中国发动贸易战之前的几年，基于传统安全层面的美帝不断挑衅，在中国周边制造混乱局面，中国当时的应对策略就是，立足准备打仗，时刻在战场上准备摊牌，比如，2016年的南海对峙和2017年的洞朗战役。

2016年7月12日，海牙国际仲裁法庭对南海仲裁案做出“最终裁决”，判菲律宾“胜诉”，并否定了“九段线”，还宣称中国对南海海域没有“历史性所有权”“南海仲裁案”事件爆发。“南海非法仲裁案”也称“菲律宾控告中国案”，是一个临时组建的非法仲裁庭，就菲律宾阿基诺三世政府单方面提起的南海仲裁案进行的所谓“裁决”，其实质是披着法律外衣的政治闹剧。而当时围绕非法的“南海仲裁案”跳得最高的，除了菲律宾以外就是越南（唯一能在“南海问题”上给中国找麻烦）。为应对美国等西方国家一手炮制的非法的“南海非法仲裁案”，震慑南海方向的宵小，2016年7月12日下午4点33分，海军三大舰队的近百舰艇和数十架飞机齐聚海南岛至西沙某海域，一场复杂电磁环境下的实兵实弹对抗演习正式开幕。这场大规模军事演习是以“真打”为基础进行准备的（当时进行了局部动员，很多指战员都立下遗书，甚至收殓烈士遗骸的后事都有所准备。此外，刚刚下水正在海试的052D型驱逐舰相关技术人员和专家拒绝中央要求他们在湛江下舰的要求，以“岂曰无衣”的大无畏精神与前线官兵共赴前线。他们的理由很简单，刚刚上舰的解放军官兵对此军舰尚不熟悉，而目前最熟悉军舰的反而是这些工程技术人员和专家），即：如果越南敢于在南海方向冒出来为它国“火中取栗”，则中国会动用一切手段将越南“按下去”（日本能在“台湾问题”上给中国找麻烦，如果日本敢飞出来，就将其“打下来”）。

2017年的“洞朗事件”也是类似，不再赘述。简单说就是，在打印度之前一定会首先打击幕后黑手——美帝，比如，冲着直接掀了“西太安全框架”一棒子打过去（注：以钓鱼岛问题为切入点），绝不让美帝将“洞朗事件”玩成代理人战争。正是由于中国在2017年的“洞朗事件”中应对正确，使得美帝因惧怕“西太安全框架”被颠覆，进而导致其全球战略就此破产未敢在印度最需要其撑腰、策应的时候出头，反而收手后撤，以至于时任印度海军司令痛斥，美日澳印“菱形包围圈”在军事上没有什么意义，只是一个局限于经济安全合作的联盟。

中国在2018年之前，即便在传统安全层面上都做好了随时和美帝彻底摊牌，掀桌子的准备，何况非传统安全层面？之所以在2018年到2025年之间，我们没有在，诸如，管控三稀金属制品出口问题上做到今天这种严格程度，其一，是我们当时准备得不如今天充分，这是重要原因；其二，主要原因在于，在这期间，对方也没有摆出类似今天这种准备对中国彻底摊牌（注：性质上属于“前一秒战略冒险，后一秒见势不好立刻妥协、让步”）的姿态。

●为了更好地巩固政权，莫迪政府需要足够的外部空间加以支撑

在继续展开讨论前，再来看一则新闻报道。

4月28日，中国外交部发言人郭嘉昆主持例行记者会。

有记者提问：此前，巴基斯坦国防部长赫瓦贾·穆罕默德·阿西夫在接受俄媒采访时表示，俄罗斯和中国可以参与克什米尔恐怖袭击事件的国际调查，请问中方是否有计划参与此次恐怖袭击事件的调查？

郭嘉昆：中方欢迎一切有利于当前局势降温的举措，支持尽快开展公正调查。作为印度和巴基斯坦的共同邻国，中方希望印巴双方保持克制，相向而行，通过对话协商妥善处理有关分歧，共同维护地区和平稳定。

在上一节讨论中，我们提到了2017年的“洞朗事件”，结合历史，针对本轮印巴关系紧张，在我们的观察与评估中：

第一，奉劝于内（如，巩固政权）外（如，扩展中东影响力）小心思颇多的莫迪政府，与美帝共谋本轮印巴关系紧张，小心“请神容易送神难”；

第二，对中国来说，南亚局势不稳，甚至会波及“巴基斯坦通道”的稳定，对中国经济当然有负面影响，但类似波斯湾一旦大乱对中国经济存在发酵时间一样，同样有一条“反射弧”。但对美国和西方经济，尤其是金融市场的冲击，恐怕也类似波斯湾一旦大乱一样，秒到！何况，印巴一旦爆发全面冲突，局势是否就会按美国设想的那样发展，比如，印度会不会对美国言听计从，恐怕特朗普政府自己也是心里没底！

第三，鉴于印度和巴基斯坦都是上合正式成员，尽管因俄罗斯的一己私心导致上合组织至今仍处于“实质性停摆”状态，但毕竟中俄是上合组织的缔造国，也是核心成员国，巴基斯坦“有事先找组织”的做法总体上是正确的，不排除巴基斯坦已经与中、俄分别通气，且得到中、俄某种默许态度后才公开宣布邀请中、俄参与克什米尔恐怖袭击事件国际调查的可能性。

现在，巴基斯坦正式提出中，俄参与调查，接下来就看印度是否同意。在我们看来，如果印度同意，大概率会提出自己的条件。而这个提条件的腾挪空间就是莫迪政府在中美“关税战”仍在继续之大背景下，为了更好地巩固政权，对外拓展影响力所需要的。也就是说，莫迪政府在和美国一起共同推动本轮印巴关系紧张的过程中，就“出口儿”问题有所思考。

所谓“出口儿”，在我们看来，在印度眼中，恐怕最理想的方向并不在中、俄这边，而在于沙特能够成为“调停人”：

第一，沙特作为巴基斯坦的“金主”，代表逊尼派穆斯林（注：巴基斯坦也是逊尼派穆斯林），代表伊斯兰世界来调停，巴基斯坦乐见；

第二，在印控克什米尔地区，尽管莫迪政府大量投资，但导致宗印度教和伊斯兰教冲突日益尖锐，沙特参与调停，有利于莫迪政府减轻内部压力，缓解印度内部宗教矛盾；

第三，有利于印度和中东地区主要国家进一步发展关系，比如，劳务派遣、能源安全等方面。并在这一过程中，通过对中东地区施加自己的影响力，反向对冲中国在尼泊尔、孟加拉两国日益增长的影响力。

从以上三点的角度来观察，莫迪政府显然在“请神”，甚至在“玩火”，所以上文中我们奉劝莫迪政府小心“请神容易送神难”，这里充满了变数。其中一种对印度不利的可能性就是，也许美帝在“关税战”问题上不敢和中国死磕到底，但反手制裁印度的可能性很大。

对特朗普政府来说，现在要印度配合美国，威胁“巴基斯坦通道”，加入“反华关税同盟”，因中巴关系紧密，巴基斯坦在中国国内素有“巴铁”之称，所以，印度就足够的理由加入其中。

值得一提的是，特朗普希望印度配合威胁“巴基斯坦通道”，有针对伊朗施压的因素。而对印度而言，一旦波斯湾彻底大乱，对印度来说，既是一个威胁，也是一个机会。此时，印度可以选择和美、俄合作，也可能被美、俄踢出圈外，但无论走哪条路，印度都要捞取足够的筹码，增加足够的影响，尤其在中东地区。其中，对中国造成压力，或变相增加印度平衡中国影响力的分量就是途径之一。比如，在看到印度由此变化后，恐怕在中东地区想法颇多的欧盟也会对这样的印度更感兴趣。当然，类似特朗普，目前处境也有内焦外困味道的莫迪政府，也有类似攘外必先安内的想法。虽然世界总体经济情况的不断恶化，本就问题超多的印度，社会内部各种矛盾也在不断尖锐化、公开化，尤其面临经济下行压力越来越大。为了更好地巩固政权，莫迪政府需要足够的外部空间加以支撑。

通过上面的讨论，大家不难看出，莫迪和特朗普一样，都是那种为了一己私利不惜牺牲国家利益的极端利己主义者。不排除万斯访问印度期间给了莫迪政府或莫迪的小集团足够多的利益，包括行贿（打着投资的旗号）让其敢于如此玩火。

再次提醒莫迪政府，如果美国在没有中国默许的情况下强行大规模开启印钞机，自然没人拦得住，但问题在于面对中国随时说“不要美元”之巨大风险，如何面对？某种意义上说，这或是特朗普和华尔街之间，或华尔街内部存在的最重要的唯一分歧。在这种巨大风险的背景下，“请神容易送神难”之充满变数更在于，莫迪政府小心被特朗普拖下水！

●正所谓，以斗争求团结，团结存。既然已经上升为斗争，那中国就绝无妥协退让的道理

我们注意到，近日，中国驻美国大使馆就特朗普声称“中国须做出实质性让步，否则不会取消对华加征关税”一事作出明确回应。

中方强调，美方若真诚希望通过对话解决中美经贸问题，就应立即停止对华的威胁讹诈，停止实施极限施压措施，营造平等互信的对话氛围。

特朗普在其第一任期期间，于2019年“第二次金特会”期间也曾试图挑起印巴冲突，这次可谓故技重施。显然，特朗普政府在莫迪政府的部分配合下，瞄着“巴基斯坦通道”的稳定大做文章，是特朗普自认为可以对国际社会继续施展威胁与讹诈的筹码。

但问题在于，中国南亚政策早已减重。对于本轮巴以关系紧张虽有所关注，但并不着急应对处理。从外交部对巴基斯坦方面提出中、俄介入调查的回应内容不难看出，中国并不急于主动介入。主要中国守好“国门”，以PLA今天之战力，试问，谁敢招惹？接下来大家不妨观察，印度方面会不会也类似巴基斯坦那样，公开邀请谁谁前来调解。

此外，值得大家注意的是，日前召开的中共中央政治局会议，首次提及将“统筹国内经济工作和国际经贸斗争”的说法，着重讨论作为重要应对之策，如何进行部署和安排。在我们看来，在中国基于行动层面已经开始做最坏、最后准备的情况下，面对本轮印巴关系紧张，用围棋术语形容，中国完全可以“脱先”，就算“巴基斯坦通道”乱掉又能怎样呢（注：前提是巴基斯坦自己要顶住）？大不了开启“最低经济内循环”就是。

值得一提的是，毛泽东主席喜欢使用“斗争”一词（注：在抗美援朝的决策中，所谓“一个半”中的“半个”是大家对毛主席的绝对信任，或者说大家从以往残酷斗争之点点滴滴中逐渐形成的从心底对毛主席产生大写的“服”字），今天我们又看到了“国际经贸斗争”中的“斗争”一词，正所谓，以斗争求团结，团结存。既然已经上升为斗争，那中国就绝无妥协退让的道理。

●因印巴关系紧张可能失控而被直接切断国际社会通往伊朗的“巴基斯坦通道”的背景下，朝鲜这份声明，似乎来得很是时候！

需要提醒特朗普政府的是，如果印巴真的爆发全面战争，什么时候结束，以什么形式结束，恐怕特朗普政府说了不算！

感觉良好只是特朗普自己的幻觉。除了上面我们提到的美国，乃至西方的金融市场存在可能遭遇“秒崩”之巨大风险外，在传统安全层面美国的战略处境只会愈发被动。

以俄罗斯为例，面对这样一个与自己在乌克兰问题上纠缠不清，一只脚已经陷在中东，在关税战问题上被中国打得七荤八素，内部恶斗日又甚一日的美国，不趁此机会“狠狠揩油”，真是有损素来在国际上以“善作交易”闻名的普京总统的名头！

在俄罗斯看来，特朗普政府点火印巴关系的主要意图之一就是借威胁“巴基斯坦通道”的稳定讹诈中国，顺便威胁伊朗，讨好内塔尼亚胡小集团以利内部恶斗。虽然现在的美国无法做到彻底解决伊朗问题，但作为伊朗与中国陆地联系途径的“巴基斯坦通道”一旦断绝，威慑伊朗当局还是能够起作用的。至少成为特朗普政府继续和伊朗谈判的筹码——伊朗当局你还别不信，阿巴斯港腾起的巨大蘑菇云已经说明了一切！所以，赶快和我（注：特朗普政府）谈，按我（注：特朗普政府）的条件谈！

无奈，中国对特朗普政府这手借威胁“巴基斯坦通道”，威胁伊朗，也就是威胁波斯湾的稳定施展的讹诈手段仍泰然处之，不理不睬。而中美关系妥善处理变得更加遥遥无期。中国“此路不通”，特朗普政府就只能回头再来找俄罗斯，可以说，在这一点上，俄罗斯吃定了美国。

值得注意的是，近日，朝鲜官方和俄罗斯官方都证实了朝鲜出兵俄罗斯协助收复库尔斯克一事。

在我们看来，美国等同在三个战略方向同时收到这样一份“内容不同，但性质类似的信号，即：美帝国主义在北约方向（乌克兰）、中东方向（巴以冲突）、西太方向（朝鲜半岛）陷入的任何一场军事冲突、后果都‘将’可能是极其严重的严重到‘将美帝在别的方向的传统与非传统安全利益’也卷入进去”。比如，推理一，朝鲜半岛（西太方向）一旦明天爆发冲突，那么，基于“朝俄军事协议”，今天已经形成的“朝鲜在乌克兰方向出兵帮助俄罗斯抗击侵略”的一幕，就极可能成为“俄罗斯在朝鲜半岛方向出兵帮助朝鲜抗击侵略”的局面。类似的推理，也就是推理二，既然中国基于“中朝平等互助条约”也会在朝鲜半岛爆发冲突的时候、启动条约相关条款，那么，中国在处理台海问题、南海问题时，朝鲜也会在必要时启动条约的相关条款。

值得强调的是，推理一与推理二之间的关系，并不因为“朝鲜出兵乌克兰方向”就可以直接推理出“中国也因为朝鲜而必须在乌克兰问题上正式支持俄罗斯立场”，因此，同样的逻辑，中国未来在处理台海问题、南海问题时，也并不能直接推理出“俄罗斯也因为朝鲜而必须在上述局面正式支持中国”，但却可以直接推理出“在与朝鲜有条约、从而有必要践行‘军事解决朝鲜问题是不可想象’的中国、在处理台海、南海问题、从而多多少少会因牵扯了中国部分资源而弱化对朝鲜军事保护的能力的时候，俄罗斯却有必要基于朝鲜今天兑现‘朝俄军事条约’而兑现自己的承诺。显然，不论俄罗斯对这份承诺是否最终兑现，在“最终”之前，对美日、美韩军事同盟都是个巨大的压力，从而反过来会极大弱化它们对美国西太安全框架的支撑力度。

显然，上述的推理过程，还可以“部分套用”于“中东方向（比如，伊朗）”、甚至刚刚出事的“南亚方向（巴基斯坦）”。也就是说，刚刚在乌克兰方向尝试过“传统安全层面解决问题但根本不现实、且业已陷入泥坑”的美帝（北约），如果有“打算在其他的战略方向进行类似的尝试”、或以“此打算“进行战略讹诈”，那么，其在乌克兰方向尝试的失败，尤其是最终导致了朝鲜依据“朝俄条约”的军事介入，就是个惨痛的教训！同样，这对日本极右，韩国极端亲美势力，以色列犹太极端复国势力、也包括菲律宾、印度当局等，都是个必须想清楚的教训。

当年，巴基斯坦借助公开“美国威胁要将巴基斯坦炸回石器时代”发出所谓的“呼救信号”，朝鲜立刻“悍然”进行第一次核试爆进行回应，今天，巴基斯坦再次遇到危险，且有可能因此事失控而直接切断国际社会通往中东（伊朗）的“巴基斯坦通道”的背景下，朝鲜的这份声明，似乎来得很是时候！

●“爱泼斯坦案件”的关键证人自杀意味美国内斗更加剧烈，美国债6月份开始陆续到期，特朗普急需要搞点什么

我们注意到，近日，以色列总理内塔尼亚胡在耶路撒冷发表的讲话。内塔尼亚胡表示，唯一的“好协议”将是拆除伊朗“所有核基础设施”，类似于2003年利比亚与西方达成的协议，该协议要求利比亚放弃其核、化学、生物和导弹计划。

还是那句话：他助先自助。伊朗今天的遭遇可以说是咎由自取，面对敌人的威胁，第一想到的还是投降，如此伊朗，谁会拿自己的背书让其充当投降的筹码呢？伊朗也许想要拖下去，但无奈美国内部恶斗日甚一日，特朗普政府为了内斗必须获得美国内部支持以色列的那部分资本势力的支持，所以，尽管心中对内塔尼亚胡小集团恨之入骨，但却还要还百般逢迎，甚至讨好。

现在，美国似乎给伊朗重新开出投降条件：拆掉所有核基础设施。问题在于，面对如此“卖国条款”，伊朗当局还打算继续妥协、退让吗？如果仍然如此，伊朗社会会不会内爆？如果仍然如此，美国会就此善罢甘休吗？波斯湾交出来，加入反华关税同盟，恐怕等待伊朗的是一个接一个的苛刻条件，否则，就是假投降。既然如此，那就继续打你，至于打你的理由，无非再拿出一瓶“洗衣粉”（注：栽赃伊朗还有化学武器、生物武器等）。不难看出，伊朗当局如果选择走妥协、投降这条路是一条死路。别的不说，就说眼前，我们可以断言，如果面对本次阿巴斯港口爆炸事件伊朗当局依然选择妥协，那么伊朗的核设施恐怕就真的危险了。

此外，美国国债6月份就要开始陆续到期，“爱泼斯坦案件”关键证人自杀则意味美国内斗更加剧烈。所以，特朗普急需要搞点什么名堂出来。如果能够逼迫伊朗投降，控制波斯湾，甚至迫使伊朗、印度加入“反华关税联盟”。至少欧盟，日、韩，东盟一些国家会再次转为观望。总之，一定要想方设法得到中国的默认，否则，金融市场对“红巨星效应”能发挥多少效应，能持续多久会产生强烈质疑，甚至会反过来对“红巨星效应”产生某种制约，甚至导致提前“坍缩”。

总体上，国际局势仍在持续恶化，下一步，大家不妨密切观察，看特朗普会不会彻底搞乱波斯湾，以及随之而来的伊朗战略处境是否会变得更加危险，印巴关系紧张是否持续加剧。在俄罗斯看来，如果这些都不幸变为事实，未尝不是好事，一个能源，一个军火，俄罗斯都能受益。至少欧盟或因能源安全问题改变对俄罗斯的态度。如果最终不幸因种种原因导致全球经济快速滑入“满地鸡毛”之“深水区”，国内，无论是房地产还是股票恐怕还有产生下滑空间。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Monday, April.28, 2025, Issue No. 1235

In light of the recent explosion incident at Iran's Bandar Abbas port, it is prudent for the international community to remain vigilant against the potential risk of extremist Zionist elements within Israel carrying out attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities

[Media Coverage]

On April 28, a spokesperson for the Iranian Red Crescent Society stated that the number of individuals injured in the explosion at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas, Iran, had risen to 1,200. The blast occurred at the port, located in the southern Iranian city of Bandar Abbas, on the 26th. On the 27th, the governor of Hormozgan Province in Iran announced that the explosion at Bandar Abbas Port had resulted in 40 fatalities.

【Discussion Summary】

● The international community should remain vigilant about the potential for "attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities by extremist Jewish Zionist elements from Israel."

In recent times, two major international events have captured significant attention. One is the sudden escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan; the other is the severe explosion at Iran's largest port, Bandar Abbas (Shahid Rajaee Port).

For U.S. President Trump, time has become an excruciating factor. One primary reason is the mounting financial pressure that comes with the ticking clock, exemplified by the impending wave of U.S. Treasury bond maturities in June. Rough calculations suggest that approximately $10 trillion in debt may mature by the end of 2025.

On the diplomatic front, the Trump administration is even more embattled, struggling with the unresolved U.S.-China relations that have left it in a passive and precarious position. On one hand, it must continue to engage and stabilize Russia over the Ukraine issue; on the other, it faces a relentless and sharp counterattack from China in the tariff war, with no viable solutions in sight. Additionally, to curry favor with the Netanyahu government in Israel and secure the support of capital forces within the United States that back Israel for domestic political maneuvering, the Trump administration not only resorts to intimidation and inducements against Iran but also treads carefully around Saudi Arabia, even contemplating how to destabilize the Middle East and the Persian Gulf to execute extreme strategic blackmail both domestically and internationally.

To reiterate, if we view Trump's intention to improve relations with Gulf Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia, stabilize U.S. Middle East policy, and find an entry point for effectively managing U.S.-China relations as "Plan A"—evidenced by his first foreign visit to Saudi Arabia and the "A-plan" documents in his briefcase—then his strategy of better serving, or even pandering to, the Netanyahu clique to execute extreme strategic blackmail both internally and externally for domestic political gains would be "Plan B." Here, "Plan A" is secondary, while "Plan B" takes precedence. Moreover, "Plan B" is intended to facilitate "Plan A." Notably, the targets of "Plan B's" extreme strategic blackmail include not only Saudi Arabia and the international community but also Trump's domestic rivals. Specific blackmail tactics encompass, but are not limited to, military strikes against Iran, particularly its nuclear facilities, to render it incapable of developing nuclear weapons and thoroughly destabilize the Persian Gulf.

The Netanyahu clique is acutely aware of the Trump administration's predicament, leading them to strongly doubt its resilience and longevity. The clique believes time is limited and must be exploited to maximize personal gains through the Trump administration. For Netanyahu personally, the ambition is to become the "father of Greater Israel," elevating himself to the status of a national "hero" in Israel, immune to future political retribution.

In our observations and assessments, it cannot be ruled out that Israel was directly behind the Bandar Abbas Port explosion. We must emphatically caution the international community about the potential for "attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities by extremist Jewish Zionist elements from Israel," pushing the situation towards an extremely dangerous precipice. Should this scenario materialize, the Trump administration would likely find itself with limited room for maneuver. Similarly, the Iranian authorities would face significant domestic accountability challenges.

● Even in the realm of traditional security, China was fully prepared to engage in a decisive confrontation and "overturn the table" with the United States before 2018, let alone in non-traditional security spheres.

Some netizens might ask why Israel hasn't struck Iran's nuclear facilities directly in one fell swoop. From our perspective, this not only reflects the brutality of the Netanyahu clique but also exposes their inherent bluster and weakness. Similarly, several U.S. presidents have exhibited comparable tendencies in their foreign policies, particularly towards China. They consistently provoke and escalate tensions, employing various forms of blackmail against China, yet falter at the critical juncture, hesitating to engage in an all-out confrontation.

During Trump's first term in 2018, preceding the initiation of the trade war against China, the United States, leveraging traditional security concerns, repeatedly provoked and instigated chaos around China's periphery. China's response strategy at that time was to be prepared for war, ready to confront the United States head-on on the battlefield. This was exemplified by the South China Sea standoff in 2016 and the Doklam incident in 2017.

On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague issued its "final award" in the South China Sea arbitration case, ruling in favor of the Philippines, negating China's "nine-dash line," and denying China's "historic rights" over the South China Sea. This so-called "South China Sea Arbitration," also known as "The Philippines v. China," was a politically motivated farce masquerading as a legal proceeding, orchestrated by an ad-hoc tribunal established unilaterally by the Aquino III administration of the Philippines. Among those most vociferous in championing this illegal arbitration, apart from the Philippines, was Vietnam, the sole entity capable of causing trouble for China in the South China Sea. To counter the illegal "South China Sea Arbitration" fabricated by the United States and other Western countries, and to deter any potential troublemakers in the South China Sea, on July 12, 2016, at 4:33 PM, nearly a hundred naval vessels and dozens of aircraft from the three major fleets of the People's Liberation Army Navy converged in the waters between Hainan Island and a certain area in the Xisha Islands, marking the commencement of a live-fire military exercise amidst a complex electromagnetic environment. This large-scale military drill was meticulously prepared with the premise of "real combat" in mind (there was a partial mobilization at that time, with many commanders and soldiers writing their last wills and testaments, and even making preparations for the aftermath of collecting the remains of fallen martyrs. Furthermore, the technicians and experts of the newly launched Type 052D destroyer undergoing sea trials refused the central government's request to disembark in Zhanjiang, demonstrating an unwavering spirit of solidarity with frontline troops, akin to the ancient Chinese poem "How can one say he has no clothes? I will share my robe with my brother." Their rationale was straightforward: the PLA sailors who had just boarded the ship were still unfamiliar with it, whereas these engineers, technicians, and experts were the most acquainted with the vessel). In other words, if Vietnam dared to provoke China in the South China Sea for the sake of another country's gains, China would employ all available means to "subdue" Vietnam (similarly, if Japan attempted to cause trouble for China over the "Taiwan issue," it would be "shot down").

The Doklam incident in 2017 followed a similar pattern and will not be elaborated upon here. In brief, before taking action against India, China would have first targeted the mastermind behind the scenes—the United States, such as by delivering a decisive blow to the "West Pacific Security Framework" (noting the Diaoyu Islands issue as a starting point), ensuring that the United States would not be able to turn the Doklam incident into a proxy war. It was precisely due to China's appropriate response during the 2017 Doklam incident that the United States, fearing the collapse of the "West Pacific Security Framework" and the subsequent bankruptcy of its global strategy, refrained from intervening when India most needed its support and assistance. Instead, it retreated, prompting the then-Indian Naval Chief to denounce the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" (comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India) as militarily insignificant, merely an alliance confined to economic and security cooperation.

Before 2018, China was fully prepared to engage in a decisive confrontation and "overturn the table" with the United States, even in the realm of traditional security, let alone in non-traditional security spheres. The reason why China did not implement stringent controls on the export of rare metals and their products to the extent seen today between 2018 and 2025 is twofold: firstly, our preparations were not as thorough as they are today, which is a significant factor; secondly, and more importantly, during this period, the opposing side did not adopt a posture akin to the one it displays today, ready to engage in an all-out confrontation with China (characterized by "strategic risk-taking one moment, followed by immediate compromise and concession the next").

● To better consolidate its power, the Modi government requires sufficient external space for support. Before diving deeper into the discussion, let's first look at a news report.

On April 28, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun hosted a regular press conference.

A reporter asked: Earlier, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif stated in an interview with Russian media that Russia and China could participate in an international investigation into the Kashmir terrorist attack. Does China have any plans to join this investigation?

Guo Jiakun: China welcomes all measures conducive to de-escalating the current situation and supports the prompt launch of an impartial investigation. As a common neighbor of both India and Pakistan, China hopes that the two sides will exercise restraint, meet each other halfway, and properly handle their differences through dialogue and consultation to jointly safeguard regional peace and stability.

In our previous discussion, we touched upon the 2017 Doklam incident. Drawing from historical context and in light of the current tensions between India and Pakistan, based on our observations and assessments:

Firstly, we advise the Modi government, which harbors numerous internal (e.g., consolidating power) and external (e.g., expanding influence in the Middle East) ambitions, to be cautious about colluding with the United States to exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan, lest they find it "easier to invite a deity than to bid it farewell."

Secondly, for China, instability in South Asia, which could even spill over to the stability of the "Pakistan Corridor," undoubtedly has negative repercussions on the Chinese economy. However, similar to the delayed impact on China's economy should chaos erupt in the Persian Gulf, there exists a "reflex arc." Conversely, the impact on the U.S. and Western economies, particularly their financial markets, would likely be immediate, akin to the repercussions of turmoil in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, should a full-scale conflict break out between India and Pakistan, it is uncertain whether the situation would unfold as the United States envisions, such as India blindly heeding U.S. directives—a prospect that likely leaves the Trump administration itself uncertain.

Thirdly, given that both India and Pakistan are full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), despite the organization's current "substantive stagnation" due to Russia's self-serving motives, China and Russia, as the SCO's founding members and core states, recognize the generally correct approach taken by Pakistan in "seeking the organization's assistance first." It is plausible that Pakistan has already consulted with China and Russia separately and obtained some form of tacit approval from them before publicly announcing the invitation for China and Russia to participate in the international investigation into the Kashmir terrorist attack.

Now that Pakistan has formally proposed China and Russia's participation in the investigation, it remains to be seen whether India will agree. In our view, if India does agree, it is likely to impose its own conditions. The latitude for setting these conditions stems from the Modi government's need to expand its external influence to better consolidate its power amid the ongoing U.S.-China "tariff war." In other words, while the Modi government collaborates with the United States to stoke tensions between India and Pakistan, it is contemplating "exit strategies."

Regarding these "exit strategies," in India's perspective, the most desirable direction may not lie with China or Russia but rather with Saudi Arabia acting as a "mediator" for the following reasons:

First，As a major financial backer of Pakistan and a representative of Sunni Muslims (note: Pakistan is also predominantly Sunni), Saudi Arabia's mediation on behalf of the Islamic world would be welcomed by Pakistan.

Second，In Indian-administered Kashmir, despite significant investments by the Modi government, conflicts between Hindus and Muslims have intensified. Saudi involvement in mediation could help alleviate internal pressures on the Modi government and mitigate religious tensions within India.

Third，Saudi mediation would facilitate India's further development of relations with key Middle Eastern countries in areas such as labor exports and energy security. Through this process, India could exert its influence in the Middle East to counterbalance China's growing influence in Nepal and Bangladesh.

From these three perspectives, it is evident that the Modi government is "inviting a deity" and even "playing with fire," hence our earlier caution about the uncertainties involved, including the risk of "easier to invite a deity than to bid it farewell." One unfavorable possibility for India is that while the United States may hesitate to engage in a protracted confrontation with China over the "tariff war," it could readily impose sanctions on India.

For the Trump administration, securing India's cooperation in threatening the "Pakistan Corridor" and joining the "anti-China tariff alliance" is feasible given the close Sino-Pakistani relationship, with Pakistan often referred to as China's "iron brother" domestically.

It is worth mentioning that Trump hopes India will cooperate in threatening the "Pakistan Corridor," partly to pressure Iran. For India, a complete breakdown of order in the Persian Gulf poses both a threat and an opportunity. At this juncture, India could choose to cooperate with the United States and Russia or risk being marginalized by them. Regardless of the path taken, India aims to amass sufficient leverage and influence, particularly in the Middle East. One avenue to achieve this is by exerting pressure on China or indirectly enhancing India's ability to balance Chinese influence. For instance, upon witnessing India's evolving stance, the European Union, which also harbors significant interests in the Middle East, might become more intrigued by such an India.

Of course, both Trump and Modi, who currently find themselves in similarly precarious internal and external situations, share the notion of "securing the interior before addressing the exterior." Amid the worsening global economic landscape, India, already beset with numerous internal issues, is witnessing the intensification and public exposure of various social contradictions, particularly under mounting economic downward pressure. To better consolidate its power, the Modi government requires ample external space for support.

From the above discussion, it is evident that both Modi and Trump are extreme egoists willing to sacrifice national interests for personal gain. It is not inconceivable that during Vance's visit to India, the Modi government or Modi's clique was offered substantial benefits, including bribes (under the guise of investments), emboldening them to engage in such risky behavior.

We once again caution the Modi government: if the United States proceeds to massively print money without China's tacit approval, there may be no one to stop it. However, the question remains: how will it confront the immense risk of China readily rejecting the U.S. dollar? In a sense, this could be the most significant and perhaps the only point of contention between Trump and Wall Street or within Wall Street itself. Amidst this backdrop of immense risks, the uncertainties surrounding "easier to invite a deity than to bid it farewell" are further compounded by the risk of the Modi government being dragged into the fray by Trump.

● As the saying goes, "Unity is preserved through struggle." Once the situation has escalated into a struggle, there is absolutely no reason for China to compromise or yield.

We have noticed that recently, the Chinese Embassy in the United States issued a clear response to Trump's claim that "China must make substantive concessions, or the additional tariffs imposed on China will not be lifted."

China emphasized that if the United States genuinely hopes to resolve Sino-U.S. economic and trade issues through dialogue, it should immediately cease its threats and blackmail against China, halt the implementation of extreme pressure tactics, and foster an atmosphere of equality and mutual trust for dialogue.

During his first term, Trump also attempted to provoke tensions between India and Pakistan during the "Second Kim-Trump Summit" in 2019. This time, he is essentially resorting to the same old tactics. Clearly, with partial cooperation from the Modi government, the Trump administration is heavily exploiting the stability of the "Pakistan Corridor," perceiving it as leverage to continue threatening and blackmailing the international community.

However, the issue lies in the fact that China has long since adjusted its South Asia policy. While China is paying attention to the current tensions between India and Pakistan, it is not in a hurry to respond or take immediate action. From the Chinese Foreign Ministry's response to Pakistan's proposal for China and Russia to intervene in the investigation, it is evident that China is not eager to take the initiative in介入 (jièrù, meaning "to intervene" or "to get involved"). As long as China safeguards its borders and, with the current combat capabilities of the PLA, who dares to provoke it? Next, we can observe whether India, similar to Pakistan, will publicly invite external mediators to intervene.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the recent meeting of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee mentioned for the first time the strategy of "coordinating domestic economic work with international economic and trade struggles," with a focus on discussing how to deploy and arrange important countermeasures. From our perspective, given that China has already begun making the worst-case and final preparations at the operational level, in the face of the current tensions between India and Pakistan, using a Go analogy, China can completely afford to "deviate from the immediate confrontation" (tuō xiān in Chinese, meaning to prioritize other strategic moves over the current direct engagement). Even if the "Pakistan Corridor" becomes unstable (with the caveat that Pakistan itself holds firm), what's the worst that can happen? At most, China can initiate a "minimum economic internal circulation" mode.

It is worth mentioning that Chairman Mao Zedong was fond of using the term "struggle" (dǒuzhēng). (Note: During the decision-making process for the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the "one and a half" references include the absolute trust everyone had in Chairman Mao, or rather, the profound respect and admiration developed through countless past harsh struggles.) Today, we once again encounter the term "struggle" in the context of "international economic and trade struggles." As the saying goes, "Unity is preserved through struggle." Once the situation has escalated into a struggle, there is absolutely no reason for China to compromise or yield.

● Against the backdrop of escalating tensions between India and Pakistan that could spiral out of control and potentially sever the "Pakistan Corridor," a crucial link connecting the international community to Iran, North Korea's recent statement seems to have arrived at an opportune moment!

It is imperative to remind the Trump administration that if a full-scale war breaks out between India and Pakistan, the timing and manner of its conclusion are likely beyond the Trump administration's control!

The sense of self-assurance is merely an illusion of Trump's own making. Beyond the colossal risks of an "instantaneous collapse" in the financial markets of the United States and the broader Western world, as previously mentioned, the strategic position of the United States on traditional security fronts will only grow more precarious.

Take Russia as an example. Faced with a United States entangled in the Ukraine issue, one foot already mired in the Middle East, reeling from the tariff war with China, and embroiled in increasingly bitter internal strife, it would be a dereliction of duty for President Putin, renowned internationally for his "skill in deal-making," not to seize this opportunity to "exploit the situation" to his advantage.

From Russia's perspective, one of the primary intentions behind the Trump administration's fanning of flames in the India-Pakistan relationship is to blackmail China by threatening the stability of the "Pakistan Corridor," while also intimidating Iran and currying favor with the Netanyahu faction to gain an edge in internal power struggles. Though the United States cannot currently resolve the Iranian issue once and for all, the disruption of the "Pakistan Corridor," which serves as a land route connecting Iran and China, could still serve as a deterrent to the Iranian authorities. At the very least, it could act as leverage in the Trump administration's ongoing negotiations with Iran— "Don't doubt it; the towering mushroom cloud rising over Bandar Abbas already speaks volumes! So, hurry up and negotiate with me (the Trump administration), and do so on my terms!"

However, China remains unfazed by the Trump administration's blackmail tactics, which leverage threats to the "Pakistan Corridor," Iran, and consequently, the stability of the Persian Gulf. Sino-U.S. relations now seem even more distant from a resolution. With this path blocked for the Trump administration, it has no choice but to turn back to Russia. In this regard, Russia has the upper hand over the United States.

It is noteworthy that recently, both North Korean and Russian officials have confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia to assist in the recapture of Kursk.

In our view, the United States is simultaneously receiving "signals of a similar nature but varying content" from three strategic directions: namely, the NATO front (Ukraine), the Middle East front (the Israel-Palestine conflict), and the Western Pacific front (the Korean Peninsula). These signals convey that any military conflict the U.S. imperialism becomes embroiled in on any of these fronts will likely have far-reaching consequences, dragging in the United States' traditional and non-traditional security interests in other regions. For instance, if a conflict were to erupt on the Korean Peninsula (Western Pacific front) tomorrow, based on the "North Korea-Russia Military Agreement," the current scenario of "North Korean troops deployed to Ukraine to aid Russia in repelling aggression" could very well morph into "Russian troops deployed to the Korean Peninsula to aid North Korea in repelling aggression." Similarly, if China were to invoke relevant clauses of the "Sino-North Korean Treaty of Equality and Mutual Assistance" in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, then, when China addresses issues in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, North Korea could also invoke relevant treaty clauses when necessary.

It is crucial to emphasize that the relationship between the first inference and the second does not imply that "because North Korea has sent troops to the Ukraine front, China must formally support Russia's stance on the Ukraine issue due to North Korea." Consequently, by the same logic, it cannot be directly inferred that "Russia must also formally support China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea issues due to North Korea." However, it can be directly inferred that for China, which has a treaty with North Korea and thus is obligated to uphold the principle that "a military solution to the Korean Peninsula issue is unthinkable," when addressing issues in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, which may divert some of China's resources and consequently weaken its ability to provide military protection to North Korea, Russia is obligated to honor its commitments based on North Korea's fulfillment of the "North Korea-Russia Military Agreement" today. Clearly, regardless of whether Russia ultimately honors these commitments, before the "final" outcome, it will exert immense pressure on the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea military alliances, thereby significantly weakening their support for the U.S. security framework in the Western Pacific.

Evidently, the aforementioned reasoning process can also be "partially applied" to the "Middle East front (e.g., Iran)" and even the "recently troubled South Asian front (Pakistan)." In other words, if the United States (NATO), which has already "attempted to resolve issues through traditional security means on the Ukraine front but found it fundamentally unrealistic and has become mired in a quagmire," intends to "make similar attempts in other strategic directions" or use "such intentions" for strategic blackmail, then the failure of its attempt on the Ukraine front, particularly the resulting military intervention by North Korea in accordance with the "North Korea-Russia Military Agreement," serves as a painful lesson! Similarly, this is a lesson that must be carefully considered by Japan's far-right forces, South Korea's extreme pro-U.S. factions, Israel's ultra-Zionist extremists, as well as the authorities in the Philippines and India.

In the past, when Pakistan publicly issued a so-called "distress signal" by revealing that "the United States threatened to bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age," North Korea immediately responded with its "brazen" first nuclear test explosion. Today, with Pakistan once again facing danger and the possibility of the "Pakistan Corridor," a vital link connecting the international community to the Middle East (Iran), being severed due to uncontrolled escalation, North Korea's recent statement seems to have arrived at an opportune moment!

● The suicide of a key witness in the "Epstein case" signals an intensification of internal strife within the United States. With U.S. Treasury bonds starting to mature in June, Trump is desperate to orchestrate some kind of move.

We have taken note of the recent speech delivered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem. Netanyahu stated that the only "good deal" would be the dismantling of all of Iran's "nuclear infrastructure," akin to the 2003 agreement reached between Libya and the West, which required Libya to abandon its nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile programs.

The old adage goes: "Help yourself before others can help you." Iran's current predicament can be seen as self-inflicted. Faced with threats from enemies, its first instinct is to surrender. With such an approach, who would risk their own credibility to endorse Iran's capitulation? Iran may hope to prolong the situation, but it is helpless in the face of escalating internal strife within the United States. The Trump administration, in order to secure support from domestic capital forces aligned with Israel amid its internal power struggles, harbors deep resentment towards the Netanyahu faction yet must still curry favor with them.

Now, the United States appears to be presenting Iran with new surrender terms: dismantle all nuclear infrastructure. The question is, faced with such "treasonous clauses," does the Iranian regime intend to continue compromising and retreating? If it does, will Iranian society implode? If it persists, will the United States simply let the matter rest? Handing over the Persian Gulf and joining an anti-China tariff alliance would likely subject Iran to one harsh condition after another; otherwise, any supposed surrender would be a sham. In that case, the United States would continue to attack Iran, and the pretext for such attacks would be nothing more than producing another vial of "detergent" (a reference to the infamous "weapons of mass destruction" pretext used in Iraq, implying the potential to fabricate evidence of chemical or biological weapons in Iran). It is evident that the path of compromise and surrender for the Iranian regime is a dead end. Without even considering the broader picture, we can assert that if the Iranian regime continues to choose compromise in the face of the recent explosion at the Bandar Abbas port, its nuclear facilities will truly be in grave danger.

Moreover, with U.S. Treasury bonds starting to mature in June and the suicide of a key witness in the "Epstein case" signaling an intensification of internal strife within the United States, Trump is desperate to make some kind of move. If he can coerce Iran into surrendering, gain control of the Persian Gulf, and even compel Iran and India to join an "anti-China tariff alliance," at the very least, countries like the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and some ASEAN nations may once again adopt a wait-and-see attitude. In essence, the United States must strive to obtain China's tacit approval; otherwise, the financial markets will have strong doubts about the efficacy and sustainability of the "Red Giant Effect" (a metaphor for the perceived economic dominance or influence of a major power), and this could even impose certain constraints on it or lead to its premature "collapse."

Overall, the international situation continues to deteriorate. Moving forward, it would be prudent to closely observe whether Trump will completely destabilize the Persian Gulf, and whether Iran's strategic position will become even more perilous as a result, along with whether tensions in India-Pakistan relations will continue to escalate. From Russia's perspective, if these unfortunate scenarios materialize, it could be a boon, as Russia stands to benefit from both energy and arms sales. At the very least, the European Union may alter its stance towards Russia due to energy security concerns. If, ultimately, for various reasons, the global economy rapidly descends into a "deep recessionary quagmire," domestically, there is likely to be further downside potential in both the real estate and stock markets.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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