2025年5月1日，星期四，第1237期

包括国际社会在内、美国、印度、伊朗等各方将如何评估、应对本轮印巴冲突或将趋于“长期化”？

【媒体报道】

4月30日，俄罗斯驻伊斯兰堡大使馆对俄罗斯媒体表示，如果收到相关的官方请求，俄罗斯准备考虑巴基斯坦提出的帮助调查克什米尔恐怖袭击事件的想法。

4月30日，伊朗外交部部长阿拉格齐表示，伊朗将在和美国举行核问题第四轮会谈之前与英国、德国和法国举行会谈。

【讨论纪要】

●我们希望巴基斯坦当局应尽快改变当前与印方对峙的方式

在正式展开本次讨论前，大家来看一则新闻报道。

4月30日，印度发布夜间航行通告，宣布即时开始，限制所有在巴基斯坦注册、运营或租赁的飞机进入印度领空，包括商业航空公司和军用飞机，直至5月24日清晨为止。这是巴基斯坦实施同等措施六天后，印度宣布采取的对等行动。自从4月22日，印控克什米尔地区的枪击事件造成重大人员伤亡后，印度与巴基斯坦均采取强硬措施，引发局势升级。印度军方称，双方连续第6晚在克什米尔实际控制线一带交火。

在我们的观察与评估中，“双方连续第6晚在克什米尔实际控制线一带交火”的情况是可能存在的，主要判断依据有三个：其一，本次印巴关系紧张背后，本来就有人在故意搞事情。特朗普政府和莫迪政府，出于各自的政治目的和利益算计，“共谋”了本轮印巴关系紧张；其二，印度在总体实力上强于巴基斯坦；其三，巴基斯坦决策层目前尚未成统一意见。

第三点尤为重要，对巴方也尤为不利，这无疑给印方进一步战略冒险留下可操作空间。这种局面是美国所乐见的。我们希望巴基斯坦当局应尽快改变当前与印方对峙的方式，学习中国在关税战问题上如何对美国进行反击，也就是果断决策，坚决反击，打掉印方任何幻想空间。

●虽然巴方在总体实力对比上弱于印度，但在克什米尔地区对印方有一战之力

虽然巴基斯坦在总体实力对比上弱于印度，但在克什米尔地区，巴基斯坦的军事力量，尤其是空中力量是有一战之力的。

巴基斯坦军方装备的中国产“歼-10CE”战机以及“PL-15”系列空空导弹，在性能上优于印度军方装备的法国“阵风”战机以及“流星”系列空空导弹。此外，巴基斯坦是中国的邻国，可就近获得来自中国的军事支援，尤其是军事作战体系的强力支撑。所以，有传闻称，2架巴基斯坦“歼-10CE”战机逼退印度4架“阵风”战机，在纯技术指标层面加以观察，是完全可能的。

有人将“歼-10CE”称为中型机，在我们看来，严格意义上说是“歼-10CE”是轻型机，双发的“阵风”战机是标准的中型机，从这一点上说，“阵风”战机占优。但在雷达性能上，“歼-10CE”装备的第三代氮化镓雷达，雷达口径更大，收发组件更多，性能优于“阵风”战机。机载导弹方面，“歼-10CE”使用的“PL-15”系列空空导弹采用双脉冲技术，将燃料分段燃烧，实现了在飞行中段的“二次点火”，这一创新让其有效射程突破200公里，同样优于“阵风”战机。此外，“歼-10CE”战机还具有半隐身设计，以及“歼-20”系列战机相关成熟技术的下放加持，这使得“歼-10CE”战机在总体性能上超过“阵风”战机一截。

地面防空系统，巴基斯坦装备的“红旗-9P”远程防空系统是“红旗-9”系列的早些型号。当然，巴军方也装备了一批“红旗-9”系列的后续型号，比如，“红旗-9BE”远程防空系统。印度方面主要装备的是“S-300”与“S-400”系列防空导弹系统。

值得一提的是，我国也进口国一小批“S-400”系列防空导弹系统用于学习研究，PLA眼中的“S-400”类似于“SU-35”，后者同样进口了一小批用于学习研究，当然，这笔军火生意中也有“政治交易”的成分，算作是对俄罗斯的某种战略策应，但PLA显然从不将其当主力战机使用，更多在巡航南海的时候会使用，发挥其长航程的优点。值得一提的是，“SU-35”还有一个特点，就是使用了矢量发动机。其中，出口中国的货真价实一点，而出口印度的则差强人意，甚至有传说称，印度装备的“SU-35MKI”的矢量发动机需要“手工操作”。

值得一提的是，由于我们研究学习过“S-400”系列防空导弹系统，相关细节自然会与巴方分享。此外，前不久传闻对巴基斯坦提供军事援助的土耳其也装备有“S-400”系列防空导弹系统。关键在于，土耳其还是北约国家，其装备有大量西方武器装备，到底会分享给巴基斯坦什么，我们就无从得知了。所以，就地面防空系统方面，印度方面显然比巴基斯坦薄弱的多，这也是我们说在克什米尔地区，巴方有能力一战的原因之一。

此外，需要补充的是，巴军方很多主战装备都是中国生产，无论是从装备端，还是从系统端，都可以较好融合并嵌入中国军事作战体系之中。相比于PLA军事作战体系的完整性，印军显然并不具备。印军不仅很多装备是“万国造”，且没有自己的卫星导航系统，军事作战体系性支撑依赖美国而非北约本身。

唯一能够解释巴基斯坦没有采取强硬态度的理由，就与其内政问题密切相关。在涉及巴基斯坦内政问题上，国际社会是不好多说什么。所以，国际社会在外交层面并没有采取类似美国对印度那种公开明确的支持态度，更多是在军事层面上给予支持。也就是说，军事上很到位，但达不到中国对朝鲜那种程度。政治上中立，但偏向巴基斯坦。

值得一提的是，在美印“共谋”挑起事端，而巴基斯坦当局在第一时间反应不够强硬的情况下，出现印巴军方开始对话的消息，对巴基斯坦同样不利，至少说明巴基斯坦当局仍然决心不足，动用一切可能手段，如：在印方不惜动用反人类手段，悍然使用“水武器”在前，经警告无效，或将采取“摧毁印方相关大坝”等手段加以反制，针对印方的挑衅和得寸进尺予以强硬回击。

此外，有关俄罗斯准备考虑参与调查克什米尔恐怖袭击事件的消息也侧面证明，目前的总体态势对印方有利。俄罗斯的态度总体上虽然中立，但偏向于印度，俄罗斯此时表态，显然应印度所请，同时，印方拒绝中国参与调查，如果真的成立一个没有中国参与的调查组，调查结果对谁有利，不难想象。

●所谓“巴基斯坦当局切不可掉以轻心”，其中一个主要方面指的就是，时间越拖，巴基斯坦损失越大

最近，有网友提问，问到印巴之间是否会爆发核战争。

在我们的观察与评估中，巴基斯坦手中的王牌当属核武器。尽管印度也拥有核武器，但和巴基斯坦使用核武器原则有区别也有共同点。

巴基斯坦强调“受到直接攻击”，强调的是国家安全受到威胁的程度，而没有强调一定是遭遇核打击。相比之下，巴基斯坦的核原则更像俄罗斯。俄罗斯相比北约处于弱势，核武器是俄罗斯安家立命的唯一依仗。而印度更像中国，强调“不在第一时间不使用核武器，只有在遭到对方核打击后才考虑动用核武器进行反击”，这一点更像中国（注：印度的核武器对其他核大国不构成威胁，印度的核武器就是针对巴基斯坦的，而巴基斯坦也是如此，其前后在1998年先后进行核试验）。所以，印巴之间爆发核战争的可能性不大。

由上面的对比不难看出，巴基斯坦动用核武器的条件要比印度敏感得多，而之所以印度敢于冒着可能遭致巴基斯坦核反击的风险主动发起挑衅的主要原因在于，其一，印度内部的方方面面，比如，经济下行压力，民族矛盾，宗教矛盾等因素对莫迪政府的压力巨大；其二，美国给印度的利诱实在是太大了，使其无法抗拒。不排除美国许诺印度，一旦其占领整个克什米尔地区，美国将予以承认的可能性。甚至不排除特朗普政府拿中国与印度有主权领土争议地区做筹码许诺印度当局好处的可能性。对此，巴基斯坦当局切不可掉以轻心。

所谓“巴基斯坦当局切不可掉以轻心”，其中一个主要方面指的就是，时间越拖，巴基斯坦损失越大：损失之一，“中巴通道”稳定受到冲击。毕竟目前中国准备向巴基斯坦进行更大规模投资，“中巴通道”不稳定必然对中国向巴基斯坦的投资进度、规模造成负面影响。损失之二，印度会无限使用“水武器”。而“水武器”绝不是“反正蓄满水也要放”那么简单，而是在巴基斯坦需求的时候不放水，不需要的时候放下去。这会让以农业为立国之本的巴基斯坦始料未及，无论是干旱或洪水。印度已经演绎了“水武器”如何使用。这也是我们强调，巴基斯坦第一时间必须做出强硬反击，扼杀印度投机空间的原因。

需要再次提醒印度当局的是，如果印度方面一再推动事态发展，到一定程度，恐怕莫迪政府想要收手都不可能。届时，一定会有人在背后“帮助”印度将印巴冲突升级为全面战争。如此，莫迪政府无异于玩火自焚。

●3年前，有关“西方资本围绕乌克兰重建问题发‘乌克兰重建债券’为‘华尔街永动机’续命”之相关评估得到完美验证

我们注意到，4月30日，伊朗外交部部长阿拉格齐表示，伊朗将在和美国举行核问题第四轮会谈之前与英国、德国和法国举行会谈。

在我们的观察与评估中，伊朗当局或从巴基斯坦当局的一系列表现中，感觉到本轮印巴冲突或将长期化，这使得伊朗当局认为，和特朗普政府就伊核问题的谈判可以稍稍拖后，转而先与欧盟谈判。而欧盟在伊核问题上的立场和特朗普政府渐行渐远，欧盟更主张通过政治途径，而非武力手段解决。

有关对本轮印巴冲突或将长期化的理解，大家可参考“俄乌战争长期化”。

对特朗普政府来说，印巴冲突长期化对其有利的一面在于：其一，彰显美国仍与中国进行对抗，有能力给中国施加压力；其二，通过威胁“巴基斯坦走廊”的稳定性威胁伊朗，为特朗普政府争取国内支持内塔尼亚胡小集团那部分资本势力的站台，尽可能为内斗主动权加分；其三，通过在亚洲，尤其是中国周边地区制造混乱，迫使一部分资金停止流入亚洲，尤其是流入中国，回流美国金融市场，比如，购买国债。

对特朗普政府不利的一面在于，随着美国6月份国债开始密集到期，随着中美关系持续紧张且毫无改善证照，时间因素正随着华尔街对特朗普怒火的不断聚集而愈发显得迫人。特朗普很清楚，光靠制造印巴关系紧张回流美国金融市场的资金远远不够填补到2025年年底之前集中到期的大约7万亿美元债务。

我们注意到，5月1日，乌第一副总理兼经济部长斯维里坚科有关乌克兰和美国签署了矿产协议的新闻报道。

除了在亚洲，尤其是中国周边地区制造混乱，迫使一部分资金停止流入亚洲，尤其是流入中国，回流美国金融市场之外，美国金融当局唯一能够缓解2025年年底之前集中到期的大约7万亿美元债务之巨大压力的手段仍然逃不出“印钱”二字，具体说就是发新债，还旧债。在发新债的问题上，有什么比乌克兰这份“金边债券”更能解燃眉之急的？

值得一提的是，东方时事解读早在2022年2月24日俄乌战争爆发后不久，准确说是2022年5月20日，以“西方资本会不会围绕乌克兰重建问题发‘乌克兰重建债券’为‘华尔街永动机’续命？”为话题，首次就西方资本将乌克兰打造为“金边债券”为华尔街苟延残喘续命进行讨论。到今天，大约3年的时间过去了，随着在美国逼迫下，美乌签署所谓“矿产合作协议”，这一评估得到完美验证。有兴趣的同学可以收听“第4515期”音频，回顾相关讨论。

●中欧在“有必要搞出点动静儿，甚至‘大动静儿’”的问题上似乎达成了某种默契

值得注意的是，在美国和乌克兰签署所谓“矿产协议”的背后，大家应注意俄美关系的微妙变化。

如果没有俄乌战争烈度趋于弱化，美乌之间达成的“矿产协议”的有效性将大打折扣。所以，在这份美乌“矿产协议”的背后或隐藏了俄美之间就乌克兰问题即将达成的某种协议，至少让外界感觉到，俄乌战争的和平气氛有所增强，这自然有利于包装乌克兰这一“黄金资产包”。所以，如果美方派遣人员出席5月9日俄罗斯的胜利日阅兵我们并不感到奇怪。

俄美关系的微妙变化，首先对欧盟形成压力，欧盟对以美俄瓜分乌克兰而将自己排除在外一向十分敏感。恰恰在这个背景下，网络上出现了“运-20”运输机现身黎巴嫩的传闻。4月29日，一架中国“运-20”运输机以“7A4410”呼号穿越巴基斯坦、阿联酋领空，最终降落黎巴嫩贝鲁特机场。此时正值以色列对贝鲁特南郊发动空袭后的敏感时刻。

在我们的观察与评估中，如果最终这则传闻被证实是真实的，首先，大家可以基于此前我们就美俄、中欧，围绕乌克兰问题，中东问题等凑成“两桌儿麻将”之中欧“做对家”综合观察。对于中东地区，这一美国全球战略之重中之重，显然，中欧在“有必要搞出点动静儿，甚至‘大动静儿’”的问题上似乎达成了某种默契。欧盟高层更直接将冯德莱恩称为“有毒”，要求其辞职。

无独有偶，就在有关中国“运-20”运输机在敏感时间出现在黎巴嫩之前几天的4月26日，援引消息人士的话报道称，无论是外交还是内部政策，欧盟高级官员越来越意识到欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩的“毒性”。欧盟官员认为冯德莱恩并不具备政治和外交才干。欧盟官员们还认为，冯德莱恩的离任能够解决欧盟不少问题，其中包括与中国的持续对抗。所以，人们希望她能够尽快辞职、

●南亚政策早已减重的中国，南亚无论出现何种局面，都能从容应对

在我们看来，如果真的本轮印巴冲突长期化，首先意味着巴基斯坦决策层或在较长时间内无法达成有效统一意见，进而对外表现出进一步的妥协、软弱，一旦如此，国际社会也好，沙特也罢，对其的援助都将是有限的。对印度来说，这反而会成为其利用民族、宗教、宗族冲突，巩固莫迪政权，肃清印控克什米尔地区异己分子的绝佳机会。对伊朗来说，“巴基斯坦通道”或将长期陷入不安全，不稳定的状态之中，这自然不利于伊朗当局做出对国际社会有益的相关决策。

不过，万事万物没有绝对的好事，也没有绝对的坏事。正所谓，物极必反，不破不立。也就是说，本轮印巴关系紧张如果持续发酵，双方擦枪走火，甚至最终演化为全面战争也未必全是坏事。

这一点大家可以参考此前我们就必要时刻武力收台与对我国经济相关影响之间的辩证关系分析。大致观点如下：在某些特定阶段，或在某些特殊情况下，战争不一定对经济全是坏事，战争也可以拉动经济。以我国为例，借准备收台，将大量需求转向军工，使得工业产能围绕战争准备全面运作。也就是说，我们可以通过战争或准备战争将助力于“最低经济内循环”，比如，美国就是借助二战走出的经济大萧条（注：具体可参考4月10日，第1221期核心摘要内容）。

我们的担心，并不在于中国如何应对，中国的南亚政策早已减重，可以说，无论怎样的局面出现，都能从容面对，我们的担心更多在于为巴基斯坦人民担心，为中巴友谊担心，我们从心里往外不希望看到巴基斯坦多灾多难。

●以围魏救赵这一策略对美印共谋，在南亚地区制造不稳定进行反击，也是着眼于各方因素留给特朗普政府时间不多这一点

最后，我们不妨从围魏救赵的角度简单讨论国际社会如何应对本轮巴以冲突。值得一提的是，国际社会不仅实力强大，且战略取势已有所变化。能够继续维持“能河渡”之战略态势自然好，如果条件不具备，就“超度”了西方邪恶势力。

在此基础上，再去观察“运-20”运输机在敏感时间出现在黎巴嫩上空这一事件，基于围魏救赵层面，瞄着特朗普政府金融维稳压力与日俱增，华尔街对其不满日益加深，内部恶斗更是日甚一日，在美国与俄罗斯围绕乌克兰问题尔虞我诈之际，在美国全球战略重中之重的中东地区注入“变量”，是国际社会应对美印共谋，刻意在南亚地区制造不稳定局面的绝佳反击手段！而在看到中国军事力量接二连三地出现在中东地区（注：先有中埃联合军事演习，后有中国军用运输机出现在黎巴嫩上空）的以色列内塔尼亚胡政府更是看在眼里，急在心头。

基于围魏救赵这一策略，国际社会应对的方向，除了中东地区之外，还可以通过对印度施加战略压力进行反击，比如，在尼泊尔、孟加拉方向对印度东北部地区的7个邦（注：阿萨姆地区，包括阿萨姆邦、梅加拉亚邦、曼尼普尔邦、那加兰邦、米佐拉姆邦、特里普拉邦和阿鲁纳恰尔邦）施压，进而激化印度社会内部矛盾，以解巴基斯坦之危。当然，无论是采取哪种策略应对，首先还是看巴基斯坦当局如何决定和选择。

此外，需要强调的是，以围魏救赵这一策略对美印共谋，在南亚地区制造不稳定进行反击，也是着眼于各方因素留给特朗普政府时间不多这一点。虽然在局部问题上，本轮印巴关系紧张对美国有利，但将其放在时间因素上观察则经不起推敲：中美关系进一步恶化，美国国债集中到期就在眼前，中东政策岌岌可危，俄乌战争仍在继续，即便是美国在西太最重要的两个“马仔”——日本和韩国，在关税问题上对特朗普政府也非百依百顺。

5月3日，美国特朗普政府做出重大举措，对发动机和变速器等主要汽车零部件加征25%关税。日本，作为汽车零部件出口大国，对美出口的汽车零部件是其重要经济支柱之一。2024年，日本汽车零部件对美出口额比上年增加14.4%，高达约1.2万亿日元，汽车及零部件合计的出口额占对美出口总额的三分之一 。美国这一突然加征关税的行为，无疑是对日本汽车产业的一记重拳。日本首相石破茂在当天接受媒体采访时表示，对美国这一关税政策感到“非常遗憾”，日本将继续要求美国特朗普政府重新考虑这一关税措施。

而在此前的4月29日，美财长贝森特在白宫记者会上自信满满地表示：韩国“希望在总统大选前与美国建立贸易谈判的基本框架”，以此作为政绩向选民展示。然而仅仅不到24小时，韩国政府火速出面否认这一说法，直接点名：“我们并未向美方传达或讨论过在大选前推进贸易谈判的意向。”言下之意，不仅没有所谓“谈判框架”，甚至连急于谈判的意愿都不存在。这一来一回，不只是一次外交节奏的错位，更是一记响亮的耳光，抽在了华盛顿傲慢的面孔上。

●若在特朗普政府在6月美国债开始集中到期前仍无法有效处理中美关系，特朗普本人或特朗普政府的前景可谓“相当不妙”

结合上面的讨论，我们认为，特朗普政府基于时间因素再度出现重大战略误判的可能性较大，正所谓“十次车祸九次快”。这也是中国不急于直接介入本轮印巴冲突的主要原因之一。

当地时间4月25日，美国亿万富翁爱泼斯坦性侵案中最早发声、最具代表性的受害者弗吉尼亚·朱弗雷的家人表示，朱弗雷在西澳大利亚尼尔加比的农场中自杀身亡，终年41岁。而在此前几天的4月22日，第41任美国总统“老布什”之子，第43任美国总统“小布什”的弟弟尼尔·布什，现身中国香港，参加 2025 空间技术和平利用 (健康) 国际研讨会筹备会。在受记者采访的过程中，面对当下敏感的中美关系，尼尔指出，当前美国的对华政策 “令人遗憾”，他认为，所谓 “中国威胁美国” 的说法完全是无稽之谈，在现实中找不到任何事实依据。特朗普政府挥舞关税大棒，试图通过加征关税等手段来遏制中国发展，在尼尔看来，绝非解决问题的良方。他明确表示，这种关税战最终不仅会让美国自身经济受损，还会对世界经济造成严重的负面影响。

通过上面两则新闻报道大家不难看出，正在行动的不仅有美国民主党，而且还有美国共和党中的一部分人，比如，布什家族，这是美国内部出现民主党和共和党联手针对特朗普的苗头。在我们的观察中，若在特朗普政府在6月美国债开始集中到期前仍无法有效处理中美关系，特朗普本人或特朗普政府的前景可谓“相当不妙”。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Thursday, May. 1, 2025, Issue No. 1237

How will various parties, including the international community, the United States, India, Iran, and others, assess and respond to the possibility that this round of the India-Pakistan conflict may become "protracted"?

[Media Coverage]

On April 30, the Russian Embassy in Islamabad stated to Russian media that Russia was ready to consider Pakistan's proposal for assistance in investigating the terrorist attack in Kashmir, should it receive an official request to that effect.

On April 30, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian indicated that Iran would hold talks with Britain, Germany, and France ahead of the fourth round of nuclear negotiations with the United States.

【Discussion Summary】

● We hope that the Pakistani authorities will promptly change their current approach of confrontation with India.

Before formally commencing this discussion, let's first take a look at a news report.

On April 30, India issued a night flight advisory, announcing an immediate ban on all aircraft registered, operated, or leased in Pakistan from entering Indian airspace, including commercial airlines and military aircraft. This ban was to remain in effect until the early morning of May 24. It was a reciprocal action taken by India six days after Pakistan implemented similar measures. Following the significant casualties caused by a shooting incident in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22, both India and Pakistan have adopted hardline measures, leading to an escalation in tensions. According to the Indian military, exchanges of fire occurred for the sixth consecutive night along the Line of Actual Control in Kashmir.

In our observations and assessments, the situation of "exchanges of fire occurring for the sixth consecutive night along the Line of Actual Control in Kashmir" is plausible. Our primary justifications are threefold: Firstly, behind the current tensions between India and Pakistan, there are individuals intentionally stoking the flames. The Trump administration and the Modi government, driven by their respective political agendas and interests, have "conspired" to escalate tensions between the two countries. Secondly, India holds a superior overall strength compared to Pakistan. Thirdly, the Pakistani decision-making circle has yet to reach a unified stance.

The third point is particularly crucial and unfavorable to Pakistan, undoubtedly leaving room for India to engage in further strategic adventurism. This scenario aligns with the United States' interests. We hope that the Pakistani authorities will promptly change their current approach of confrontation with India and learn from China's response to the United States in the tariff war, that is, making decisive actions and resolutely countering any illusions held by India.

● Although Pakistan is weaker than India in overall strength, it has the capability to engage in combat against India in the Kashmir region.

While Pakistan's overall strength may pale in comparison to India's, in the Kashmir region, Pakistan's military capabilities, particularly its air power, present a formidable challenge.

The Chinese-made J-10CE fighter jets and PL-15 series air-to-air missiles equipped by the Pakistani military outperform the French Rafale fighter jets and Meteor series air-to-air missiles in the Indian military's inventory in terms of performance. Additionally, being a neighboring country of China, Pakistan can readily receive military support, especially robust support for its military operational systems, from China. Thus, rumors about two Pakistani J-10CE fighter jets repelling four Indian Rafale fighter jets are entirely plausible from a purely technical standpoint.

Some refer to the J-10CE as a medium-sized aircraft. However, in our view, strictly speaking, it is a light fighter, while the twin-engine Rafale is a standard medium-sized aircraft, giving the Rafale an edge in this regard. Nevertheless, in terms of radar performance, the J-10CE, equipped with a third-generation gallium nitride radar boasting a larger aperture and more transmit-receive modules, outperforms the Rafale. Regarding airborne missiles, the PL-15 series air-to-air missiles used by the J-10CE employ dual-pulse technology, which allows staged combustion of fuel and enables a "secondary ignition" mid-flight, extending their effective range beyond 200 kilometers and again surpassing the capabilities of the Rafale. Furthermore, the J-10CE features a semi-stealth design and incorporates mature technologies from the J-20 series, elevating its overall performance above that of the Rafale.

As for ground-based air defense systems, Pakistan is equipped with the early-model Hongqi-9P long-range air defense system, part of the Hongqi-9 series. Of course, the Pakistani military also has later models of the Hongqi-9 series, such as the Hongqi-9BE long-range air defense system. India, on the other hand, primarily relies on the S-300 and S-400 series air defense missile systems.

It is worth noting that China has imported a small batch of S-400 series air defense missile systems for research and study purposes. In the eyes of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the S-400 is akin to the SU-35 fighter jets, which China also imported a small batch for research. Of course, these military purchases also involve elements of "political transactions," serving as a form of strategic support for Russia. However, the PLA clearly does not regard these systems as mainstay equipment, instead utilizing them more during patrols in the South China Sea to leverage their long-range capabilities. Another notable feature of the SU-35 is its use of thrust vectoring engines. The engines exported to China are of genuine quality, whereas those exported to India reportedly fall short of expectations, with rumors even suggesting that the thrust vectoring engines on India's SU-35MKI require "manual operation."

Moreover, since China has studied the S-400 series air defense missile systems, it naturally shares relevant details with Pakistan. Additionally, Turkey, which has recently been rumored to provide military assistance to Pakistan, is also equipped with the S-400 series. The key point is that Turkey, being a NATO member, possesses a vast array of Western weaponry. What exactly it might share with Pakistan remains uncertain. Therefore, in terms of ground-based air defense systems, India is notably weaker than Pakistan, which is one of the reasons we believe Pakistan has the capability to engage in combat in the Kashmir region.

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that many of Pakistan's main combat equipment are Chinese-made, enabling seamless integration and embedding into China's military operational systems at both the equipment and system levels. In contrast, the Indian military lacks the completeness of the PLA's military operational systems. Not only does India rely on a "hodgepodge" of equipment from various countries, but it also lacks its own satellite navigation system, relying on the United States rather than NATO for military operational system support.

The only plausible explanation for Pakistan's lack of a tough stance is closely tied to its internal political issues. On matters concerning Pakistan's internal affairs, the international community is hesitant to intervene. Consequently, the international community has not adopted a public and explicit stance of support for India akin to that of the United States at the diplomatic level. Instead, it provides more support at the military level. In other words, military support is substantial but does not reach the level of China's support for North Korea. Politically, the international community remains neutral but leans towards Pakistan.

It is noteworthy that amidst the US-India "conspiracy" to provoke tensions and Pakistan's initially insufficiently tough response, news of the initiation of dialogue between the Indian and Pakistani militaries emerged, which is also unfavorable to Pakistan. At least it indicates that the Pakistani authorities still lack determination. If India resorts to inhumane tactics, such as brazenly using "water weapons," and warnings prove ineffective, Pakistan may have to resort to countermeasures like "destroying relevant Indian dams" to forcefully respond to India's provocations and escalations.

Additionally, the news that Russia is considering participating in the investigation of the Kashmir terrorist attack incident also indirectly indicates that the current overall situation favors India. Although Russia maintains a generally neutral stance, it leans towards India. Russia's statement at this juncture, obviously at India's request, and India's refusal to allow China's participation in the investigation, if a truly investigation team without China's involvement is established, it is not hard to imagine whose interests the investigation results would serve.

● One of the key aspects of the warning "The Pakistani authorities must not take the situation lightly" is that the longer the delay, the greater the losses Pakistan will incur.

Recently, a netizen posed a question about the possibility of a nuclear war breaking out between India and Pakistan.

In our observations and assessments, Pakistan's trump card undoubtedly lies in its nuclear weapons. Although India also possesses nuclear weapons, there are both differences and commonalities in their principles regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan emphasizes "direct attacks," focusing on the extent to which national security is threatened, without necessarily specifying that it must be a nuclear strike. In contrast, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine bears similarities to that of Russia. Russia, being in a weaker position compared to NATO, relies on nuclear weapons as its sole guarantee of security. India, on the other hand, more closely resembles China in its stance, emphasizing that "it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and will only consider retaliating with nuclear weapons after being subjected to a nuclear strike by the other side." This aspect aligns more with China's approach (Note: India's nuclear weapons do not pose a threat to other major nuclear powers; they are primarily targeted at Pakistan, and the same is true for Pakistan, which conducted nuclear tests in 1998). Therefore, the likelihood of a nuclear war breaking out between India and Pakistan is slim.

From the above comparison, it is evident that the conditions for Pakistan to resort to nuclear weapons are far more sensitive than those for India. The primary reasons why India dares to initiate provocations, despite the risk of provoking a nuclear counterstrike from Pakistan, are as follows: Firstly, there are immense pressures on the Modi government from various internal factors within India, such as downward economic pressures, ethnic tensions, and religious conflicts. Secondly, the temptations offered by the United States to India are too great to resist. It cannot be ruled out that the United States has promised India that it would recognize India's occupation of the entire Kashmir region once achieved. There is even a possibility that the Trump administration used territorial disputes between China and India as bargaining chips to offer India incentives. In this regard, the Pakistani authorities must not take the situation lightly.

One of the key aspects of the warning "The Pakistani authorities must not take the situation lightly" is that the longer the delay, the greater the losses Pakistan will incur.One of the significant losses is the destabilization of the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) / Pakistan Corridor" (depending on the strategic focus of the context; both terms are interchangeable in this analysis). After all, China is currently preparing to make even larger-scale investments in Pakistan, and any instability in this corridor will inevitably have adverse impacts on the pace and scale of Chinese investments in the country.The second consequence lies in that India may resort to using the "water weapon" (hydro-hegemony tactics) in an unrestricted manner.The "water weapon" is not merely about releasing water after it has accumulated, but rather involves withholding water when Pakistan needs it and releasing it when it does not. This will catch Pakistan, an agricultural-based country, off guard, whether it experiences droughts or floods. India has already demonstrated how to use the "water weapon." This is precisely why we emphasize that Pakistan must make a strong and immediate counterstrike to nip India's speculative behavior in the bud.

We would like to remind the Indian authorities once again that if India continues to push the situation to a certain extent, it may become impossible for the Modi government to back down. By that time, there will undoubtedly be forces behind the scenes "helping" India escalate the India-Pakistan conflict into a full-scale war. In doing so, the Modi government would be playing with fire and risking self-immolation.

● Three years ago, our assessment that "Western capital would issue 'Ukraine Reconstruction Bonds' centered around the issue of Ukraine's reconstruction to extend the lifespan of the so-called 'Wall Street Perpetual Motion Machine'" has been perfectly validated.

We have noticed that on April 30th, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran would hold talks with the United Kingdom, Germany, and France before the fourth round of nuclear negotiations with the United States.

In our observations and assessments, the Iranian authorities, perhaps perceiving from a series of developments involving the Pakistani authorities, sense that the current round of India-Pakistan conflicts may become protracted. This perception leads the Iranian authorities to believe that negotiations with the Trump administration on the Iranian nuclear issue can be slightly delayed, and instead, they can engage in talks with the European Union (EU) first. The EU's stance on the Iranian nuclear issue has increasingly diverged from that of the Trump administration, with the EU advocating more for political solutions rather than military means.

Regarding the understanding that the current round of India-Pakistan conflicts may become protracted, one can refer to the prolonged nature of the Russia-Ukraine war.

For the Trump administration, there are favorable aspects to a prolonged India-Pakistan conflict: Firstly, it underscores that the United States is still engaged in confrontation with China and capable of exerting pressure on it. Secondly, by threatening the stability of the "Pakistan Corridor," it aims to coerce Iran and garner domestic support from capital factions aligned with Netanyahu's clique within the Trump administration, thereby maximizing its leverage in internal power struggles. Thirdly, by fostering chaos in Asia, particularly in regions surrounding China, it seeks to deter a portion of capital from flowing into Asia, especially China, and instead redirect it back to the U.S. financial markets, such as through the purchase of Treasury bonds.

However, there are also unfavorable aspects for the Trump administration. As U.S. Treasury bonds begin to mature mass maturities (in a concentrated manner) in June, and with Sino-U.S. relations remaining tense without any signs of improvement, the factor of time is becoming increasingly pressing amid mounting ire from Wall Street towards Trump. Trump is acutely aware that the funds diverted back to the U.S. financial markets by merely heightening tensions between India and Pakistan are far from sufficient to cover the approximately $7 trillion in debt that will mature mass maturities (in a concentrated way) by the end of 2025.

We have noted the news report on May 1st about Ukraine's First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko announcing that Ukraine and the United States had signed a minerals agreement.

Apart from creating chaos in Asia, particularly around China, to deter capital from flowing into the region, especially into China, and redirect it back to the U.S. financial markets, the only viable means for the U.S. financial authorities to alleviate the immense pressure of the approximately $7 trillion in debt maturing mass maturities (in a concentrated way) by the end of 2025 still revolves around "printing money," specifically by issuing new debt to repay old debt. When it comes to issuing new debt, what could be more expedient than Ukraine's "gilt-edged bonds"?

It is worth mentioning that as early as February 24th, 2022, shortly after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, to be precise, on May 20th, 2022, Dongfang Shishi Interpretation initiated a discussion under the topic "Will Western capital issue 'Ukraine Reconstruction Bonds' centered around the issue of Ukraine's reconstruction to extend the lifespan of the so-called 'Wall Street Perpetual Motion Machine'?" Fast forward approximately three years, with the signing of the so-called "minerals cooperation agreement" between the United States and Ukraine under U.S. coercion, this assessment has been perfectly validated. Interested readers can listen to the "Episode 4515" audio to revisit the relevant discussions.

● China and the EU seem to have reached a certain tacit understanding on the need to "make some noise, even 'big noise'" in international affairs.

It is noteworthy that behind the signing of the so-called "minerals agreement" between the United States and Ukraine, one should pay attention to the subtle changes in Russia-U.S. relations.

Without the intensity of the Russia-Ukraine conflict weakening, the validity of the "minerals agreement" reached between the United States and Ukraine would be significantly undermined. Therefore, it is plausible that this "minerals agreement" might conceal some form of impending understanding between Russia and the United States regarding the Ukraine issue, at least giving the outside world the impression that the atmosphere for peace in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has strengthened, which naturally helps in packaging Ukraine as a "golden asset portfolio." Thus, it would not come as a surprise if the United States were to send officials to attend Russia's Victory Day Parade on May 9th.

The subtle changes in Russia-U.S. relations first exert pressure on the EU, which has always been sensitive to the prospect of being excluded while the United States and Russia divide Ukraine among themselves. Against this backdrop, rumors have emerged online about a Chinese "Y-20" transport aircraft appearing in Lebanon. On April 29th, a Chinese "Y-20" transport aircraft, with the call sign "7A4410," traversed Pakistani and UAE airspace before eventually landing at Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport in Lebanon. This occurred during a sensitive period following Israel's airstrikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut.

In our observations and assessments, if these rumors are ultimately confirmed to be true, one can first analyze them within the broader context of our previous discussions on the "two tables of mahjong" dynamic involving the United States and Russia on one side, and China and the EU on the other, centered around the Ukraine issue and the Middle East issue, with China and the EU effectively "playing against each other." Regarding the Middle East, a region of paramount importance to the United States' global strategy, it appears that China and the EU have reached some form of tacit understanding on the need to "make some noise, even 'big noise.'" EU high-level officials have even gone so far as to directly label European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as "toxic" and have called for her resignation.

Coincidentally, just a few days before the alleged appearance of the Chinese "Y-20" transport aircraft in Lebanon at a sensitive time, on April 26th, sources cited reports indicating that EU senior officials, both in terms of foreign and internal policies, were increasingly recognizing the "toxicity" of von der Leyen. EU officials believe that von der Leyen lacks political and diplomatic acumen. They also argue that her departure could resolve many of the EU's problems, including the ongoing confrontation with China. Therefore, there is a hope that she will resign as soon as possible.

● China, having long reduced its strategic emphasis on South Asia, is capable of responding calmly to any scenario that may unfold in the region.

In our view, if the current round of India-Pakistan conflicts were to become protracted, it would first and foremost imply that the Pakistani decision-making echelon might struggle to reach effective and unified consensus for an extended period, thereby projecting further signs of compromise and weakness externally. Should this scenario materialize, the assistance extended to Pakistan by the international community, including Saudi Arabia, would inevitably be limited. For India, this would conversely present an opportune moment to exploit ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts to consolidate the Modi regime and eliminate dissenting elements in Indian-administered Kashmir. For Iran, the "Pakistan Corridor" would likely remain in a state of prolonged insecurity and instability, which would naturally hinder the Iranian authorities from making decisions beneficial to the international community.

However, nothing is absolutely good or bad in this world. As the saying goes, extremes meet, and destruction often paves the way for reconstruction. In other words, if the current tensions between India and Pakistan continue to escalate, leading to unintended clashes or even a full-scale war, it may not necessarily be entirely detrimental.

One can draw parallels from our previous analysis of the dialectical relationship between the potential use of force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland at a crucial juncture and its related economic impacts on China. The broad argument is as follows: At certain specific stages or under exceptional circumstances, war does not necessarily have solely negative economic consequences; it can also stimulate economic growth. Taking China as an example, by gearing up for the potential reunification of Taiwan, a significant portion of demand could be redirected towards the military-industrial sector, thereby enabling industrial capacities to operate at full throttle in preparation for war. This means that we could leverage war or the preparation for war to bolster the "minimum essential economic internal circulation." The United States, for instance, emerged from the Great Depression by capitalizing on World War II (Note: For specific details, please refer to the core summary content of Episode 1221 on April 10th).

Our concerns do not lie in how China would respond, as China has already streamlined its South Asia policy and can confidently handle any situation that arises. Instead, our apprehensions are more centered around the well-being of the Pakistani people and the future of China-Pakistan friendship. From the bottom of our hearts, we do not wish to witness Pakistan enduring further hardships and calamities.

● Countering the U.S.-India collusion aimed at destabilizing South Asia through the strategy of "relieving Zhao by besieging Wei" (a classic Chinese military tactic meaning attacking one enemy to draw attention away from another) also takes into account the limited time window available to the Trump administration due to a confluence of factors.

Finally, let's briefly discuss, from the perspective of "relieving Zhao by besieging Wei," how the international community could respond to the current round of the Israel-Palestine conflict. It's worth noting that the international community not only boasts substantial strength but has also undergone strategic shifts in its positioning. While maintaining a strategic posture akin to "crossing the river by deception" (a tactical maneuver implying subtlety and indirectness) would be ideal, if circumstances do not permit, it may be necessary to "usher" the Western malevolent forces into oblivion.

Against this backdrop, observing the incident where a Chinese "Y-20" transport aircraft appeared over Lebanese airspace at a sensitive juncture, and from the lens of "relieving Zhao by besieging Wei," injecting "variables" into the Middle East, a region of paramount importance to the U.S. global strategy, amidst the U.S.'s scheming with Russia over the Ukraine issue, represents an excellent countermeasure by the international community against U.S.-India collusion deliberately sowing instability in South Asia. This move comes as the Trump administration faces mounting pressures to stabilize its financial markets, deepening discontent from Wall Street, and escalating internal infighting. The Israeli government of Netanyahu, witnessing China's military presence consecutively emerging in the Middle East (note: preceded by joint Sino-Egyptian military exercises, followed by the appearance of a Chinese military transport aircraft over Lebanon), is undoubtedly feeling the heat.

Based on the strategy of "relieving Zhao by besieging Wei," the international community's response could extend beyond the Middle East to include exerting strategic pressure on India, for instance, by pressuring the seven northeastern states of India (note: including Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, and Arunachal Pradesh) through Nepal and Bangladesh, thereby exacerbating internal societal contradictions within India to alleviate the crisis in Pakistan. Of course, the specific course of action taken would primarily depend on the decisions and choices made by the Pakistani authorities.

Moreover, it is crucial to emphasize that employing the strategy of "relieving Zhao by besieging Wei" to counter U.S.-India collusion in destabilizing South Asia also considers the limited time available to the Trump administration due to various factors. While the current tensions in India-Pakistan relations may seem advantageous to the United States in isolated instances, when viewed in the context of time, they do not withstand scrutiny: Sino-U.S. relations are deteriorating further, U.S. Treasury bonds are maturing in droves, the Middle East policy is teetering on the brink, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues unabated. Even Japan and South Korea, two of the United States' most crucial "henchmen" in the Western Pacific, are not entirely compliant with the Trump administration on tariff issues.

On May 3rd, the Trump administration took a significant step by imposing a 25% tariff on major automotive components such as engines and transmissions. Japan, as a major exporter of automotive components, relies heavily on automotive component exports to the United States as a pillar of its economy. In 2024, Japan's automotive component exports to the United States surged by 14.4% year-on-year, reaching approximately 1.2 trillion yen, with automotive and component exports accounting for one-third of total exports to the United States. This abrupt tariff increase by the United States undoubtedly dealt a severe blow to Japan's automotive industry. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba expressed "deep regret" over the tariff policy in a media interview on the same day, stating that Japan would continue to urge the Trump administration to reconsider the tariff measure.

Prior to this, on April 29th, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent confidently stated at a White House press briefing that South Korea "hopes to establish a basic framework for trade negotiations with the United States before the presidential election" as a political achievement to showcase to voters. However, within less than 24 hours, the South Korean government swiftly refuted this claim, explicitly stating: "We have not conveyed or discussed any intention to advance trade negotiations with the United States before the election." In essence, not only was there no so-called "negotiation framework," but there was also no urgency to negotiate. This exchange not only represented a misalignment in diplomatic rhythms but also dealt a resounding slap to Washington's arrogant demeanor.

● If the Trump administration fails to effectively manage Sino-U.S. relations before the concentrated maturity of U.S. Treasury bonds in June, the prospects for Trump himself or his administration could be described as "rather dire."

Drawing from the preceding discussions, we believe there is a significant likelihood that the Trump administration will commit another major strategic miscalculation due to time constraints, as the saying goes, "nine out of ten car accidents are caused by speeding." This is also one of the primary reasons why China is not in a hurry to directly intervene in the current round of India-Pakistan conflicts.

On local time April 25th, the family of Virginia Giuffre, the earliest and most prominent victim to speak out in the Jeffrey Epstein sex trafficking scandal, announced that Giuffre had died by suicide at her farm in Neergabby, Western Australia, at the age of 41. Just a few days prior, on April 22nd, Neil Bush, the son of the 41st U.S. President, George H.W. Bush, and the younger brother of the 43rd U.S. President, George W. Bush, made an appearance in Hong Kong, China, to attend the preparatory meeting for the 2025 International Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Space Technology (for Health). During an interview with reporters, when confronted with the current sensitive state of Sino-U.S. relations, Neil pointed out that the current U.S. policy towards China is "regrettable." He argued that the notion of a "Chinese threat to the United States" is entirely baseless and lacks any factual basis in reality. In Neil's view, the Trump administration's use of tariff sticks, attempting to curb China's development through measures such as imposing tariffs, is far from a solution to the problem. He explicitly stated that such a tariff war would ultimately not only harm the U.S. economy itself but also inflict severe negative impacts on the global economy.

From these two news reports, it is evident that not only the Democratic Party but also certain factions within the Republican Party, such as the Bush family, are taking action. This signals a potential alignment between the Democratic and Republican parties within the United States against Trump. In our observations, if the Trump administration fails to effectively manage Sino-U.S. relations before the concentrated maturity of U.S. Treasury bonds in June, the prospects for Trump himself or his administration could indeed be described as "rather dire."

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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